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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, perhaps no institution of American governance has
been so thoroughly and consistently excoriated by legal theorists as the
familiar American system of winner-take-all elections. In the most common
kind of winner-take-all system, multimember government bodies are elected
by dividing the relevant jurisdiction into as many election districts as there
are seats to be filled. Candidates for office compete separately in each
district and, typically, the candidate with the highest vote total in each
district is elected. In the last decade, legal theorists have condemned this
method of election as "simple-minded,"' "crude,"2 and "illegitimate."' The
winner-take-all system is said to "waste votes,"' lead to "majority
monopolization" of political power,5 and cause the "underrepresentation"
and consequent "social and economic subordination"' of political
minorities. According to its critics, the winner-take-all electoral system is
worse than merely "unfair."7 The system grievously injures politics itself by
undermining the electoral accountability of government officials, depressing
levels of political competition, and discouraging voter mobilization! The
winner-take-all system, according to its critics, thus subverts the very popular
sovereignty it purports to serve.
Legal theorists are hardly alone in their condemnation of the winner-
take-all electoral system. The great majority of political scientists seem to
agree that it is a peculiarly bad system of democratic self-governance.
Political scientists have argued, for example, that the winner-take-all
electoral system unfairly denies representation to those who vote for losing
candidates;9 causes politicians to adopt shifting and ill-defined positions on
1. LANi GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 101 (1994) (hereinafter GuI.E.R,
TYRANNY].
2. Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing. Single,.nnbtr Offices and the Voting Rigts Act,
77 VA. L REv. 1, 11 (1991) [hereinafter Karlan, Undoing].
3. GuiiER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 79.
4. l& at 121, 134-35.
5. Karlan, Undoing, supra note 2, at 9.
6. Samuel Issacharoff, Polaied Voting and the Political Process: The Transfonraion of Vling
RightsJurisprudene 90 MICH. L REV. 1833, 1837, 1849 (1992) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Poamted
Voting].
7. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political Equaliy, 77 VA. L REv. 1413,
1429 (1991).
8. GUINIER, TIRANNY, supra note 1, at 79.
9. E.g., DOUGLAS J. AMY, REAL CHOIcEs/NEW VOICEs: THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL
REPRESENTATION ELEcTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES ch. 1 (1993); STLvEJ. BRASIS & PETER C.
FISHBURN, APPROVAL VOTING 1-3 (1983); ENID LAKLEmAN, POWER TO ELEcT: THE CASE FOR
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 22, 166 (1982); ROrIERT A. NMIAND. CO I AELATIVE
ELECTORALSsTEiS 11, 21 (1982). Seegeneral, GARY W. COX, MAKING VOTEs COUNT: SrnATECIc
COORDINATION IN THE WORLD'S ELEcTORAI. SNhTEMS (1997).
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important political issues; ° installs a permanent monopoly of the two major
political parties;" results in a racially, ethnically, and ideologically
homogeneous legislature;12 and ultimately raises unnecessarily the possibility
of majoritarian factional tyranny."3 As one recent critic has summed things
up, "An electoral system in a democracy is required to perform two
functions-first, to ensure that the majority rules, and second to ensure that
all significant minorities are represented. Plurality and majoritarian [winner-
take-all] systems of election fail to achieve either of these two aims." 4 The
winner-take-all system, then, cannot accomplish the only goals an electoral
system is ever called upon to accomplish; it is, on this view, quite literally
good for nothing.
In spite of these criticisms, it seems clear that there is virtually no
chance that Americans will soon abandon the winner-take-all system in favor
of its chief rival and the overwhelming favorite of its critics, proportional
representation (PR). Frequently hailed as the remedy for many of the
American political system's ills,'5 PR electoral systems aim to assure that
candidates for multimember governmental bodies or, in some versions, the
political parties fielding candidates, win seats in direct proportion to their
support among the electorate. '6 Despite a century-and-a-half of advocacy by
political theorists in favor of PR, 7 the winner-take-all electoral system enjoys
an almost complete monopoly among American jurisdictions. It is presently
used to elect Congress," every state legislature, and virtually every local
10. AMIY, supra note 9, ch. 3.
11. Id. ch. 4; KATHLEEN L. BARBER, PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTION
REFORM IN OHIO 34 (1995).
12. SeeAMfY, supra note 9, chs. 5-6; BARBER, supra note 11, at 299-303.
13. For example, see BARBER, supra note 11, at 13 and ROBERT G. DIXONJR., DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS 41 (1968).
14. Vernon Bogdanor, First-Past-the-Post: An Electoral System Which is Difficult to Defend, 34
REPRESENTATION 80, 80 (1997).
15. See AtY, supra note 9, for an especially enthusiastic and wide-ranging endorsement of
the benefits of Proportional Representation (PR). An earlier example of scholarly endorsement
is GEORGE H. HALLETr,JR., PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION-THE KEY TO DEMOCRACY (1937).
16. See infra, Part I.B, for a fuller discussion of PR.
17. PR in its modern form was invented by Thomas Hare in the 1850s. SeeTHOMAS HARE,
TREATISE ON THE ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES PARLIAMENTARY AND MUNICIPAL (1859). John
Stuart Mill, impressed by Hare's analysis, took up the issue and brought it forcefully to public
attention. SeeJohn Stuart Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (1861), in ON LIBERTY
AND OTHER ESSAYS (John Gray ed., Oxford University Press 1991). In Great Britain, an
organized movement for electoral reform dedicated to instituting PR has existed since the latter
part of the nineteenth century. See REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE VOTING
SysTENI 6 (U.K. Stationery Office, October 1998) [hereinafter-JENKINS COMMISSION REPORT]. In
the United States, some branches of the Progressive Movement offered significant support for
PP See BARBER, supra note 11; HALLE-Tr, supra note 15.
18. Winner-take-all districted elections were first required for Congress in 1842, see
Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 14, 5 Stat. 491 (1842), and have been used ever since, despite
intermittent expirations of formal legal requirements. See LAURENCE F. SCHMECKEBEIW.R,
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government.'9 PR has never been used, and indeed has never even been
seriously contemplated, in any but a handful of municipal jurisdictions. Even
then, the experiment lasted for only a brief period early in the twentieth
century."a The prevailing American attitude toward PR was concisely
summed up by President Ronald Reagan, who pronounced it "alien to the
traditional political principles of our country."2' Even more recently,
President Clinton withdrew his 1993 nomination of Professor Lani Guinier
to head the U.S.Justice Department's Civil Rights Division when her support
for proportional representation and semi-proportional systems, such as
cumulative voting, provoked great controversy in the Senate. Yet one of the
strangest aspects of the debate over electoral systems is that in spite of all the
attacks it has suffered at the hands of PR advocates, the existing winner-take-
all system rarely receives any kind of defense. Few seem to think it even
needs one; apparently, the system is generally understood by all except its
critics to be either so right or so natural as to require no defense.2
How is it possible that an electoral system so thoroughly defective in its
operation and pernicious in its results could enjoy public support so
complete as to all but preclude the possibility of any serious public
discussion of alternatives? Sometimes the fact that nothing much is said in
support of a position means that nothing much can be said on its behalf.
Some critics of the winner-take-all system have suggested as much. For
example, some suggest that the winner-take-all system is defensible only on
racist grounds as a means to prevent blacks and other minorities from2 4
achieving political influence. There is, to be sure, an ugly history,
CONGRESSIONALAPPORTION IENT 132-35 (1941).
19. Leon Weaver, The Rise, Decline and Resurralion of Proportional Rprsenlation in the Lzal
Governments in the United States, in ELECTORAL LAM AND THEIR POUTQAL CONSEQUENCES 139,
14042 (Bernard Grofman &Arend Lijphart eds., 1986).
20. At its height, PR was used in nearly two dozen American dries during the first half of
the twentieth century. Today it is used only in city council and school committee elections in
Cambridge, Massachusetts, and in school board elections in NewYork City. SeeA..n, supra note
9, at 10-11.
21. Statement on Action by the SenateJudiciary Committee Concerning Extension of the
Voting Rights Act, PuB. PAPERS 552 (May 3, 1982); see also ROBERT A. DA-t, O, D-IOCRC"
134-35 (1998) ("[H]ostility to PR is so widespread in the United States that neither legislatures
norjudges give it serious consideration.").
22. Guinier describes these events in LANi GUINIER, IFr EERVoicE: TURNING A CVIL
RIGHTS SMAcK INTO A NEW VISION OF SOCIALJUSTICE (1998). AsJohn Hart Ely has pointedly
observed: "As for proportional representation ... we know it must be pretty radical stuff if an
expressed taste for it was enough to cause President Clinton to abandon his friend Lani Guinier
after her name had been sent to the Senate for an assistant attorney generalship." John Hart
Ely, Geymanders: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 50 STAN. L REv. 607,610 (1998).
23. As Douglas Amy has observed, most Americans consider the uinner-take-all. single-
member-plurality system to be "the most common and natural way to elect officials. We assume
that this system is the epitome of democracy and a model for the rest or the free world." Akw;
supra note 9, at 1.
24. One of the dearest examples of this is Karlan, Undoing, supra note 2, at 41 (asserting
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particularly in the American South, of using winner-take-all systems such as
at-large municipal elections as a way to suppress black political power.2' But
winner-take-all systems are used everywhere, in completely white as well as in
racially mixed jurisdictions, and have been employed continuously since
colonial times, before any question of the political power of racial minorities
could even have been contemplated.
Other critics suggest that Americans cling to the winner-take-all system
out of a mindless refusal to abandon tradition."6 Yet this too seems
implausible. On the federal level, Americans have amended the United
States Constitution to change their political traditions more times than for
any other purpose: they have altered the operation of the Electoral College,
expanded suffrage on several occasions, established direct popular election
of Senators, and changed the order of presidential succession. On the state
level, where most of the power over electoral systems resides, voters have
adopted constitutional changes to political processes even more frequently.
Common reforms include provisions for referendum, initiative, recall,
rotation in office, and the election of judicial and lower executive branch
officials, 28 all features of the package of Progressive-era reforms of which PR
was sometimes a part.2 Moreover, it is difficult to understand how a naked
tradition, unsupported by any plausible justification, could have become so
thoroughly entrenched if it failed all along to respond to any genuine public
sentiment or to fulfill any genuine public need.
There is another possibility. The ability of the winner-take-all system to
withstand such unstinting criticism, and to do so without ever really being
called upon to offer any substantial selfjustification, suggests a different
kind of problem, a problem of public discourse. The lack of a meaningful
response to criticism of the winner-take-all system suggests strongly that such
criticisms simply do not demand a response. An argument can only fail in
this way if it does not hit its mark, and critics of the winner-take-all system
can only fail to hit their mark if their arguments somehow fail to impugn, or
perhaps even to address, the beliefs or practices that actually justify the
widespread use and acceptance of the winner-take-all system. The debate, in
that the use of single-member offices results from a "deeply felt, if unconscious, need to
maintain white political control in the guise of protecting democratic values").
25. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE INIPAcT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson and Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) [hereinafter QUIET
REVOLUTION] (explaining historically oppressive statutes); BERNARD GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY
REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FORVOTING EQUALITY ch. 1 (1992) (same).
26. This, at least, seems to be the insinuation made by those who dwell on the feudal
origins of the winner-take-all system. See GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 127-29 (describing
notions of dependence on existing political frameworks).
27. U.S. CONSr. amends. XII, XV, XVII, XIX, XX, XXIV, XXVI.
28. See generally James A. Gardner, Devolution and the Paradox of Democratic Unresponsiveness,
40 S. TEX. L. REv. 759 (1999).
29. For more on the Progressives, see infra Part III.B.
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other words, is one-sided because there is no debate; proponents are arguing
past one another.
My goal in this article is twofold. First, I aim to conduct a fresh
examination of the historical and conceptual roots of the American system
of winner-take-all elections to identify the best, or at least historically the
most pertinent, justifications for that method of election. Second, having
done so, I seek to reconstruct the contemporary debate over electoral
systems and to explore its ramifications for the structure and design of
American political institutions. My argument, in brief, is as follovs.
Critics of the winner-take-all system converge on their position from
several directions. These include support for proportional remedies to
minority vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act;s2 dislike for the Supreme
Court's recent equal protection jurisprudence of race-conscious election
districting?," and general support for proportional representation as a system
of democratic self-governance. Although they almost never say so explicitly,
advocates of these positions share a fundamental reliance on a particular
conception of politics, often known as interest pluralism, in which politics is
conceived as an arena in which individuals and groups compete against and
bargain among one another for the purpose of satisfying to the greatest
possible extent their own self-interest. It is on this set of premises that
winner-take-all systems, with their suppression of minority political power,
seem so unfair. Some enterprising political scientists have attempted to
defend winner-take-all systems on the ground that they perform better than
PR in maximizing long-term collective social interests. These attempts
generally ring hollow, however, because they require defending wi6nner-take-
all systems on pluralist premises, premises according to which winner-take-all
systems are patently unfair regardless of their ultimate efficiency.
I argue, in contrast, that winner-take-all electoral systems rest upon, and
can be adequately defended, if at all, only upon an entirely different set of
premises. Specifically, I argue that the concept of inner-take-all elections
grew up alongside, and relies heavily upon, a very different and much older
conception of politics, one that conceives of politics as an arena for
identifying and then implementing the common good. Unlike the common
good said to arise under interest pluralism from the aggregation of the self-
interest of unrelated individuals and groups, the common good on this
conception of politics is typically understood as objective, applicable to all
members of society, and indivisible-that is why winners can and should take
alL On this model, political activity principally represents an attempt to solve
the epistemological problem of identifying the good of society. In some
models, the common good is best discovered through the deliberation of
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994).
31. See, among others, Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Mi/lr ,.Jhnson, 515 US. 900
(1995); Bush v. Vein, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
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wise and virtuous representatives; in others, the people themselves are best
qualified to identify the good of all.
This conceptual reconstruction sets the debate on a very different
footing, for it now appears that a choice among electoral systems involves at
some level a choice among conceptions of politics. The choice, moreover, is
stark indeed: responsible, public-regarding politics or pluralism-virtue or
self-interest. However, one of the principal efforts of the Framers of the U.S.
Constitution was to figure out a way to avoid making just this choice. They
wanted instead to design a system of democratic self-governance that would
both encourage a politics of virtue to flourish, yet also guard against the
worst excesses of a politics of self-interest should one materialize. I call this
aspiration "Madison's hope." Unfortunately, the choice cannot be so easily
avoided, at least when it comes to designing electoral institutions because, as
I demonstrate below, those electoral systems best suited to permitting a
politics of virtue to flourish tend to fail badly when the electorate behaves
self-interestedly, and vice-versa. Consequently, choosing among electoral
systems inevitably involves choosing between two unsatisfying alternatives:
whether to give virtue a fair chance to succeed or whether to contain self-
interest within the bounds of fairness-a choice, one might say, between a
society's hopes and fears.
The article is organized as follows. Part I describes the sustained attack
on winner-take-all electoral systems and the intellectual traditions that have
produced it. Part II analyzes the conceptual underpinnings of attacks on
winner-take-all systems and the concomitant preference for proportionality,
concluding that they rest on an underlying conception of politics as interest
pluralism. Part III examines some recent efforts to defend winner-take-all
systems from attack on pluralist grounds, and argues that the defenses are
unavailing; on pluralist assumptions, proportionality is by far the fairest and
most reasonable electoral system. Part III then goes on to propose that
winner-take-all systems are far more effectively defended on an entirely
different conception of politics, one that contemplates a politics of virtue,
rather than self-interest, and that is aimed at identifying and self-consciously
pursuing the common good. In so doing, Part III sets out the historical and
conceptual development of the notion of a politics of virtue, including its
association with historical justifications for majority rule. Part IV considers
the feasibility of the Madisonian hope, concluding that it is ill-founded, at
least when applied to electoral systems alone. By analyzing the political
sociologies of the relevant conceptions of politics, Part IV demonstrates that
the factual circumstances necessary for some conceptions of politics to
succeed simultaneously impede the success of their rivals. Finally, Part V
addresses some of the ramifications of these conclusions for the design and
maintenance of political institutions in the coming century, including the
feasibility of designing political institutions so as to achieve social goals, and
the possibility of employing any conception of politics other than interest
(20001
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group pluralism in a world that has experienced the historical and
intellectual developments of the century just past.
I. THE ATrACK ON WINNER-TAKE-ALL ELECTORAL SiSTEms
A. WNNER-TAKE-ALL ELECTORAL SYSTEMS
The dominant method of electing public officials in the United States
has always been the winner-take-all system.- American colonists inherited
this system from Great Britain, where it has existed continuously in some
form since medieval times." The most familiar and conceptually simple form
of winner-take-all election occurs when the voters of a jurisdiction elect a
single official to occupy an office with jurisdiction-wide power. Chief
executives, such as the governor of a state or the mayor of a city, are typically
elected in this manner s In such elections, every voter in the jurisdiction
typically casts a single vote for one candidate, and the candidate with the
highest vote total is elected. Election is thus by a plurality.? In some cases, a
candidate cannot be elected without obtaining a majority of the votes cast.
In such jurisdictions, if no candidate obtains a majority on the first ballot, a
runoff election is held between the top contenders. " These elections are
understood as winner-take-all because the winner, whether measured by
plurality or majority vote, occupies the entire office and exercises all its
powers; losing candidates obtain no share in the direct power of
37governance.
The winner-take-all system is also the dominant American system for
electing officials of multimember governing bodies such as legislatures and
city councils. For legislative elections, winner-take-all electoral systems come
in two principal forms, one associated with the practice of single-member
32. See BARBER, supra note 11, at 26; EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVEN''ING THE PEoPLE: THE
RISE OF POPULAR SOTREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 40 (1988).
33. See MORGAN, supra note 32, at 40-48; -LANNA FENIcHEL PiT=N, REPREsErrATiox 21-
252 (1967).
34. The preeminent chief executive in the United States, the President, is not elected
using a system of direct election; the President is elected by the Electoral College, whose
members are chosen in such manner as the state legislatures direct. Sre U.S. Co.,sr. art. II, § 1.
amend. XII.
35. The plurality vote is sometimes known, particularly in Britain and many of its former
colonies, as "first-past-the-post."
36. See CAL ELEc. CODE § 15651(b) (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE ,4NN. § 21-2-501 (Supp.
1998).
37. While election to an office occupied by a single individual is inherently uinner-take-all,
Pam Karlan has correctly observed that the choice to create a "single-member office," on the
other hand, is contingent-it is not necessarily the case that certain powers inherently must be
exercised by a single individual rather than a multimember body. Harlan. Undang, supra note 2.
The creation of a multimember body in lieu of a single official also creates the opportunity,
though not the logical necessity, for relaxing the winner-take-all aspect of election to the office
in question.
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districting and the other associated with at-large elections. In a single-
member districting scheme, the jurisdiction governed by the multimember
body is typically divided into a number of election districts equal to the
number of seats to be filled. Voters within each election district then select
the candidate who will occupy the seat representing their district. Most
often, officials from single-member districts are selected by plurality vote.
Legislative elections from single-member districts are thus analogous to
jurisdiction-wide election for chief executives: within the district, there is
only one office to be filled, and the winner of the election takes all. In other
words, he or she exercises all the power to which an occupant of a seat on
the governing body is entitled. Again, candidates falling short of the highest
vote total get nothing.
In an at-large election, voters throughout the jurisdiction collectively
select all members of the governing body. Candidates typically compete for
specific seats in the legislature or council, but compete for votes throughout
the jurisdiction rather than in a single election district. Voters vote for one
candidate for each of the designated seats, and candidates who obtain a
plurality of votes for their seats are elected.3 For example, suppose a city
council consists of five members, each elected at large. Seats on the council
might be designated One through Five, and the political parties might
nominate one candidate to run for Seat One, another for Seat Two, and so
on. The candidates for Seat One then campaign against each other
throughout the city, hoping to attract a plurality of city voters. They do not,
however, compete against candidates running for the other seats on the
council. Candidates for the other seats do likewise.
An at-large election can be viewed as winner-take-all in several ways. For
instance, the at-large election of a five-member council is somewhat
analogous to the independent election of five chief executives, each of
whom exercises an equal share of the office's power. Alternatively,
conducting such an election is also equivalent to conducting elections from
five single-member election districts, except the districts are geographically
coterminous instead of mutually exclusive. The key point in either case is
that the losing candidate for any seat on the council obtains nothing and the
winner exercises all the power that the seat commands. At-large elections are
also winner-take-all in that the same majority of voters can completely
control the outcome of the election. Thus, if sixty percent of city voters are
Republicans and forty percent are Democrats, electing the city council at-
large will likely result in the election of an all-Republican council no matter
how many seats are to be filled; the same Republican majority will be able to
control each seat.
38. For discussions of such "place systems" in a legal setting, see generally Mobile v. Bolden,




For many years, there was no significant discussion within the Anglo-
American tradition concerning alternatives to winner-take-all electoral
systems. The question simply did not come up until the eighteenth century,
when the rise of liberalism caused political theorists to begin to consider the
relationship between majorities and minorities."s Since then, theorists have
devoted considerable energy to devising alternative election systems,
especially in the last few decades, when the emergence of so many new
nations has placed front and center the question of what form of electoral
system a new polity ought to adopt.L Today, the chief competitor to winner-
take-all electoral systems, and the only one I shall take up here, is
• 41
proportional representation.
PR systems are designed primarily to assure that seats in multimember
governing bodies are awarded to candidates or political parties in
proportion to the amount of support they receive from voters. A distinctive
feature of winner-take-all majoritarianism is that the winners of election
contests gain their seats regardless of whether they win every vote in the
jurisdiction or just more than half. In the case of a plurality system, the seat
may be awarded to a candidate who polls considerably less than half the
votes. As a result, even winner-take-all systems that require winners to obtain
an outright majority can allow a mere fifty-one percent of the electorate to
control one hundred percent of the available seats. PR systems, in contrast,
strive for a different result: candidates of parties that earn fifty-one percent
of the votes should, in a well-designed PR electoral system, earn fifty-one
percent of the seats. The remaining seats are distributed among the
candidates of other parties in proportion to their vote totalsil
39. Joseph Charles Helm, The Demise of the Confessional State and the Rise of the Idea of a
Legitimate Minority, in NONIOS XXXII: MAJORITIES AND MINORITIES 11 (John W. Chapman &-
Alan Wertheimer eds., 1990); Jane J. Mansbridge, Te Rise and Fall of SelfInterest in the
Explanation of PoliticalLife, in BEVOND SELF-INTEREST 3,4-6 (JaneJ. Mansbridge ed. 1990).
40. See generally Arend Lijphart, Constitutional Choies for Nea Demnoracirs, 2 J. DE.,tO,'ACV
72 (1992) (discussing the benefits of a joint PR and parliamentary system); Arend Lijphart &
Bernard Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL 'ShM: ISSUES AND
ALTERNATIVEs (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds.. 1984) [hereinafter lUjphart &
Grofman, Choosing an EletoralSysteml (surveying the differences between PR and plurality rule).
41. For good overall accounts of PR, see generally A.ty, supra note 9 (arguing for te
abolition of the plurality system); MICHAEL DiMMiEFr, PRINCIPLES OF ELECTORA L REFOpM
(1997) (explaining the basis on which society should decide the type of electoral s)stem it
should use); HALLEr, supra note 15 (asserting the fundamental importance of PR); RoBETr A.
NEWLAND, COMtPARATIVE ELECTORAL SmrFscS (1982) (comparing the principal electoral
systems).
42. PR contrasts most starkly with at-large elections, which are completely insensitive to
the distribution of electoral support for candidates. Although single-member districting is
winner-take-all within any given election district, across a jurisdiction it has the potential to
allow some degree of proportionality in the composition of the legislature when minorities are
not distributed evenly throughout the jurisdiction. When minorities are geographically
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To achieve proportionality in representation, PR elections must be held
in multimember election districts-election districts that elect more than
one representative to the legislature. These districts can be as large as the
entire nation, as in the case of Israel,43 but they can also be much smaller;
evidence suggests that the marginal increase in the proportionality of
representation declines rapidly as the number of representatives to be
elected from each district increases." Political scientists generally agree that
the single-transferable-vote (STV) system of proportional representation-a
complex system of vote quotas, multiple ballot counts, and vote transfers
among candidates that was invented in the nineteenth century by Thomas
Hare and popularized by its most famous supporter, John Stuart Mill 4 -- is
the PR system that most accurately allocates seats in proportion to votes." In
an STV election, voters from a hypothetical five-member election district
would cast ballots on which they are permitted not only to vote for as many
candidates as they wish, but also to rank those candidates in order of
preference. Votes are then tabulated by initially counting first-place votes
and then moving through the ballots roughly in order of descending
preference until all available seats have been filled.
C. DEMANDS FOR PROPORTIONALITY
Over the years, demands for proportionality in electoral systems have
been made primarily by political rather than legal theorists, usually in the
course of arguing for the superiority of PR over winner-take-all systems as a
method of general election. Although it has been argued in many different
ways, the usual brief for PR is relatively simple: PR is fair. First and foremost,
PR is said to be fair to political minorities insofar as it provides them with an
opportunity to elect representatives of their choice.4 ' No one has made this
concentrated, they may constitute a plurality or majority in one or several election districts. This
is the premise of the Voting Rights Act, which typically requires the creation of electoral
subdivisions as a remedy for minority vote dilution, though only when minorities are
geographically compact. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986). See also Connor v. Finch,
431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (stating that in Fourteenth Amendment vote dilution cases, "this
Court has concluded that single-member districts are to be preferred in court-ordered
legislative reapportionment plans"). However, single-member districting is functionally no
different from at-large elections when minorities are geographically dispersed throughout a
jurisdiction. See generally BRUCE CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984). In that situation,
geographical election districts cannot be drawn in which the minority comprises a plurality or
majority of voters.
43. See AREND LjIPHART, DEMOCRACIES: PATrERNS OF MAJORITARIAN AND CONSENSUS
GOVERNMENT IN TWENTY-ONE COUNTRIEs 218 (1984) [hereinafter LIJPHART, DEMOCRACIES]
(identifying Israel as an example of the consensual-unitary category).
44. DOUGLAS RAE, THE POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OFELECTORAl, LAWS ch. 7 (1971).
45. Seesupra note 17 (discussing the origins of PR).
46. See DUMMEr, supra note 41, ch. 13; NEWIAND, sufrra note 9, at 34, 35.
47. This language has been formalized in section two of the Voting Rights Act (VRA),
which provides: "A violation [of this section] is established if, based on the totality of
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point more eloquently than Mill, PR's most notable champion. Democracy,
Mill writes, is supposed to be "government of the whole people by the v.hole
people," yet under the winner-take-all system it consists of government of the
whole by "a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented."" The
result, Mill claims, is "the complete disenfranchisement of minorities."-, The
majority, he concedes, will necessarily outvote the minority and prevail, but
"does it follow that the minority should have no representatives at all?" '
Many others have since restated Mill's basic point in slightly different ways.
Contemporary critics frequently accuse winner-take-all systems of altogether
denying minorities representation' As the indefatigable British electoral
reformer Enid Lakeman has argued, those who do not vote for the winner in
a wvinner-take-all election can hardly "think of him as their MP [Member of" 52
Parliament]. Others argue that even if minorities are not entirely
unrepresented, they are, at best, misrepresented in that they are forced to
accept representatives they do not want. s Some have put the point in even
starker terms: votes cast by minorities for losing candidates, they argue, are
literally wasted-such votes have just the same effect on the result as if they
had been thrown away instead of being counted. 
,
While PR is fair to minorities, it is also, according to its supporters, fair
to majorities: it provides majorities with the measure of political control to
which they are entitled consistent with the principle of majority rule, but no
more. As Mill put it, "[i]n a really equal democracy, every' or any section
would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately."
Winner-take-all systems, in contrast, exaggerate the degree of representation
to which majorities are entitled,"5 resulting in "disproportional"
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the
State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a [protected]
class... in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate... to
elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
48. Mill, supra note 17, at 302.
49. 1& at 303.
50. Id.
51. SeeAMy, supra note 9, ch. 1; ROBERT RICIE AND STEVEN HILi, REFu.cTriNG-.L OF Us:
THE CASE FOR PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 3 (1999). A variation on this approach proceeds
from the observation that some citizens who are in a small political minority in the election
districts in which they live may "pass their entire adult lives without ever voting for a winning
candidate ... [and] without any realistic hope of influencing a result:" JLKI%,Ns CwtlSSIO.N
REPORT, supra note 17, at 9. To the same effect is the REPORT OF THE [NEW ZL\I.u%1)] Rou.
COMMISSION ON THE ELECTORAL S.ThrEM: TOWARDS A BImR DLMOCAca' 23-24 (Dec. 1986)
[hereinafter REPORT OFTHE ROYAL COMMISSION].
52. LARimAN, supra note 9, at 166.
53. SeeMill, supra note 17, at 305.
54. See STEvEN J. BRAMs & PETER C. FISHBURN, APPROVAL VOTIN. 3-5 (1983); Ku xrrT,
supra note 15, at 14-18; LAmtAN, supra note 9, at 22; set also NEIAND, supra note 9. at 11. 21.
55. Mill, supra note 17, at 303.
56. SeeAMY, supra note 9, at41;JENKIs CO.MMISSION RPORT, supra note 17. at 7.
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representation, 5 a phenomenon that has also been likened to a kind of
malapportionment.5s In traditional geographical malapportionment, for
example, rural voters might have more representatives than urban voters.59
In a winner-take-all electoral system, it is majorities, regardless of location,
that receive disproportionate representation in the legislature. Indeed, say
its critics, only through the operation of some kind of winner-take-all
electoral system can a bare majority obtain control over the entire apparatus
of government, thus raising the specter of majority factional tyranny, a major
concern of the Framers of the United States Constitution.60 By filling offices
with candidates in proportion to their support throughout the electorate,
PR, according to its supporters, is neutral in a way that winner-take-all
systems are not: PR merely registers and reproduces the wishes of the
electorate without distorting them in the process.6' PR's equation of seats
with support thus "reflect[s], as exactly as possible, the social forces and
political groups in the population."62
Winner-take-all systems have also been attacked by numerous legal
theorists, usually on similar grounds. Attacks by legal critics, however,
sometimes take on an added urgency because their focus often encompasses
volatile issues of race. The main complaints against winner-take-all electoral
systems are that they provide no representation for political minorities and,
correspondingly, that they provide excessive and undeserved representation
to majorities. In the peculiar dynamic of American politics, however,
political and racial minorities frequently coincide, thereby lending racial
overtones to what might otherwise have been purely political critiques. For
example, Lani Guinier, a leading critic of winner-take-all electoral systems,
has complained that the traditional American winner-take-all system "allows
a racially homogeneous majority disproportionate representation at the
expense of an historically oppressed racial minority. "e 3
57. DUMMETr, supra note 41, at 21.
58. DIXON, supra note 13, at 17, 437-38.
59. See generally Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964).
60. See DIXON, supra note 13, at 41. Dummett goes so far as to describe winnertake-all as a
system of rotating "temporary dictatorship." DUMNMNIr, supra note 41, at 26.
61. See ArY, supra note 9, at 27; GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 107 (1965)
[hereinafter SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY].
62. Dieter Nohlen, Two Incompatible Principles of Representation, in CHOOSING AN EI.ECTORAI.
SYSTEM, supra note 40, at 87; see also Aw, supra note 9, at 27 (describing "[tlhe notion that
legislatures should reflect as accurately as possible the political desires of the public"); BERNARD
MANIN, THE PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 212 (1997) (stating that PR reflects
"the precise state of the balance of forces within the electorate"). Other benefits claimed for PR
include producing more issue-oriented campaigns and principled politics, AMIY, supra note 9, at
155-75, increasing voter turnout, id at 14042, and increasing the number of women and
minorities elected, id. at 99-139. See also BARBER, supra note 11, at 307 (finding that PR facilitates
the representation of minorities).
63. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 82.
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Legal critics tend to attack winner-take-all elections in two different,
though closely related, contexts. First, legal theorists sometimes criticize the
winner-take-all system in the course of expressing support for the use of
race-conscious districting under the Voting Rights Act (VRA) to enhance the
representation of racial minorities in multimember governing bodies. The
Voting Rights Act was originally enacted to address the problem of racially
discriminatory exclusion of blacks from the political process, a phenomenon
often denominated "minority vote dilution." Since 1982, the VRA has
prohibited the use of any "voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice or procedure ... in a manner which results in a denial or
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on
account of race or color."O For the most part, this has meant either breaking
up large, multiracial jurisdictions into smaller election districts, or redrawing
the lines of existing election districts, so as to create at least one election
district that members of a racial or ethnic minority can control-a so-called
"majority-minority" district. A sometimes unstated goal of this kind of
subdistricting is to achieve a kind of rough proportionality in racial control
over election districts within the relevantjurisdiction-to draw district lines,
in other words, to provide minorities with control over a proportion of all
election districts that corresponds to their proportion of the population. 7
In this context, legal theorists have praised the VRA in language that
clearly echoes the language political theorists have used to praise PR. The
VRA is said, for example, to aim at allowing blacks to gain political
influence6e by providing them with "proportional legislative power." ' The
VRA, according to its supporters, rejects a notion of politics as the means by
which a majority may "arrogate to itself all governing power,"' thereby
repudiating "majority monopolization."7' In so doing, the VRA protects
minorities from the "perils of untrammeled majority factionalism'- that can
arise when winner-take-all electoral systems "reward [a majority faction] with
superordinate representation."3 In the absence of the kind of legislative
64. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986); Mobile v. Bolden, ,146 U.S. 55, 58
(1980); seegenera/y MINORrnVVOTE DILUTION (Chandler Davidson ed. 1989).
65. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994)).
66. The term is now standard usage. See Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 88, 97 (1997);
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899,902,911 (1996).
67. This, at least, has been the Supreme Court's major complaint in recent cases about the
Justice Department's management of redisuicting under the VRA. Ste Miller v. Johnson, 515
U.S. 900,927 (1995).
68. See GuINiER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 72.
69. Id. at 79.
70. Karlan, Undoing, supra note 2. at 3.
71. Id. at 9.
72. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 1862.
73. Id. at 1861.
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corrective embodied in the VRA, proponents claim, racial minorities cast
"wasted votes7 and thus go unrepresented. Some critics, however, have
cautioned that the VRA may create its own problems of unfair
disproportionality by employing single-member districts as the preferred
remedy for minority vote dilution. To designate in advance certain districts
for political control by particular groups requires that district lines be drawn
first around the designated group and then extended to include a
population of "filler people," whose only role is to bring the district's
population up to the constitutionally required level, 76 and then to lose
elections repeatedly. Single-member districting, on this view, thus merely
replicates on a smaller scale the kind of problems that the VRA was intended
to solve.
The second context in which legal theorists have criticized winner-take-
all systems and praised electoral proportionality is in the course of criticizing
the Supreme Court's recent constitutional jurisprudence of race-conscious
districting. Until the early 1990s, the Court never intimated that the use of
race-conscious subdistricting to remedy minority vote dilution could raise
constitutional problems under the Equal Protection Clause. If anything, the
Court's rulings suggested not only that minority vote dilution itself raised a
serious constitutional problem in need of solution,77 but that the creation of
majority-minority districts was the most natural remedy. 8 In a series of cases
beginning in 1993, however, the Court dramatically shifted direction. In
Shaw v. Reno, ' Miller v. Johnson," and several subsequent cases,' the Court
held that the deliberate creation of majority-minority election districts
74. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 129.
75. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Rare find Redistricting: Drawing
Constitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv. 588, 601 (1993).
76. The Equal Protection Clause doctrine of one-person-one-vote requires that election
districts within ajurisdiction be roughly equipopulous. See e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
584 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 744
(1983).
77. SeeWhitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 162-63 (1971); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755,
769 (1973).
78. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415 (1977) (finding that single-member districts are
preferred); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 18 (1975) (same); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315,
333 (1973) (stating that "in fashioning apportionment remedies, those of single-member
districts are preferred"); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765 (1973) (same); Connor v.
Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971) (agreeing with the lower court that "single-member districts
are preferable to large multi-member districts as a general matter").
79. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
80. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
81. See generally Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) (holding that the reapportionment
scheme is not narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests and violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Abrams v.Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997) (same); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899
(1996) (same); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (holding that size of a governing body is not
subject to a vote dilution challenge under section two of the VRA);Johnson v. De Grandy, 512
U.S. 997 (1994) (same).
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violated the Equal Protection Clause when race was the "predominant
factor" used to draw district lines!' It makes no difference in the Court's
analysis that race-conscious districting is undertaken for the purpose of
remedying minority vote dilution s nor even that it is undertaken pursuant
to the VRA itself.8 4 The constitutional vice of deliberate race-conscious
districting, the Court has ruled, is the "expressive harm" that results when
the government, through its redistricting decisions, publicly affirms that race
is and should be an overridingly important factor in the official political life
of the community."5
Because the Shaw line of cases limits the use of race-conscious
subdistricting, it limits the ability of government to use districting to achieve,
other than inadvertently, any kind of rough racial proportionality in the
composition of the legislature. While academic criticism of the Shaw cases
has focused mostly on their doctrinal confusion and internal
inconsistencies, the cases have also drawn the fire of those who support
proportionality as a way of ending the political submersion of racial
minorities. For example, as one critic has put it, the Court's approach in the
Shaw line of cases "prohibits black Americans from negotiating collectively
82. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
83. The use of race-conscious districting appears to be permissible, however, if it is used as
a remedy for demonstrated, past, intentional dilution of minority voting poler. Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
84. Miller, 515 U.S. at 921. In taking this position, the Court seems to have intimated that
section two of the VRA may be unconstitutional, at least as it has been applied by theJustice
Department. SeeJames A. Gardner, Liberty, Communit, and the Constitutional Stnttre of PA7ltcal
Influence:.A Reconsideration ofthe Right to Vote4 145 U. PA. L REV. 893,933-41 (1997).
85. Bush, 517 U.S. at 984. For discussions of the Court's concept of harm in these cases,
see Samuel Issacharoff & Thomas C. Goldstein, Jdm t ing the Harm in Racial Grzr,-andenng
Claims, 1 MICH.J. RACE & L 47 (1996); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi. ExpreneHarris
"Bizarre Districts," and Voting Rights: Evaluating Elertion.Distri Apparances After Shaw v. Reno, 92
MICH. L RE,. 483 (1993).
86. See, among many others, Aleinikoff and Issacharoff, supa note 75 (discussing the
impact of Shaw); Andrea Bierstein, Millennium Approaches: The Future of the %oing Rights At after
Shaw, De Grandy, and Holder, 46 HAsriNGs L.J. 1457 (1995) (attempting to reconceptualize
the Court's voting rights jurisprudence); Richard Briffault, Race and Reprasentatron after Miller v.
Johnson, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL FORU.t 23 (considering the Supreme Court's approach to racial
districting); Issacharoff and Goldstein, supra note 85; Pamela Karlan, Still Ha:. after All 'T1ese
Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CutmB. L REV. 287 (1996) (looking at the areas of
doctrinal instability in gerrymandering cases); Pildes and Niemi, supra note 85 (evaluating the
appearance of congressional districts after Shaw); Jamin B. Raskin, Yhe Suprrve Court's Racial
Double Standard in Redistricting. Unetal Protection in Politics and tie Sho!arhip 77at Dfrnds It, 14J.
L. & PoL 591 (1998) (exploring the paradoxes in the Court's redistricting cases); Melissa L
Saunders, Equal Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 Mtical. L RFV. 245 (1997)
(arguing that the Court's interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause as applied to racial
gerrymandering cases does not comport with the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
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with white Americans," with the result that blacks "exercise no political
influence."7
II. PLURALISM AND PROPORTIONALIY
Is it really true that winner-take-all electoral systems, as their critics
contend, "waste" votes, and that those who vote for the losing candidate in
such systems are literally "unrepresented"? Or are these characterizations
nothing more than pejorative descriptions of the normal operation of a
majoritarian system?H It is certainly true that winner-take-all systems
"exaggerate" majority representation compared to a baseline of
proportionality, but perhaps that is their point. A system that delivers
disproportionate electoral success to majorities is unfair only if
proportionality is the correct baseline against which to measure the validity
of electoral systems. Yet there is no a priori reason to accept such a
definition of electoral fairness, and critics of winner-take-all systems offer no
particular defense of their assumption.
Nevertheless, the critique of winner-take-all systems obviously has some
resonance, a clear indication that its conclusions flow logically from some set
of potentially acceptable premises. What, then, are the assumptions on
which the proportionality-oriented critique of winner-take-all electoral
systems makes sense? I argue that supporters of proportional systems of
representation, including proportional remedies for minority vote dilution
under the Voting Rights Act or the Equal Protection Clause, tend to
embrace implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) a familiar conception of
politics known as interest pluralism. It is only on the assumptions of interest
87. James U. Blacksher, Dred Scott's Unwon Freedom: The Redistricting Cases as Badges of
Slavery, 39 HOw. L.J. 633, 662 (1996) (quoting DON E. FEHRENBACHER, SLAVERY, LAW &
POLITIcs: THE DRED ScoTT CASE IN HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 38 (1981)).
88. Brian Barry has this to say concerning the argument about wasted votes and lack of
representation:
In recent years ... supporters of systems of proportional representation in Britain
have succeeded in scoring something of a propaganda victory by pressing the idea
that the vote for a candidate who comes in third (or lower) in a plurality system is
.wasted" and the people who vote for the candidate are "effectively
disenfranchised." But then why stop there? The only way of making sense of this
argument is by postulating that anyone who voted for a candidate other than the
actual winner-even the runner-up-was "effectively disenfranchised"; and it was
not long before some academics stumbled on this amazing theoretical
breakthrough. I do not think that anyone of ordinary intelligence would be found
saying of an election for, say, the post of president of a club: "I didn't vote for the
winning candidate. In other words my vote didn't help elect anybody. And that
means I was effectively disenfranchised." It is a little alarming that such palpably
fallacious reasoning should have the power to impose on people when the context
is a parliamentary election.
Brian Barry, Is Democracy Specia4 in DEMOCRACY, POWER AND JUSTICE: ESSAYs IN POIITICA.
THEORY 24, 26, 27 (1989) (citation omitted).
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pluralism that winner-take-all systems appear as ill-conceived and unfair as
their critics contend.
A. INTEREsTPLuRAwsl
I shall have more to say about pluralism later," for present purposes,
however, a brief sketch will suffice. By interest pluralism, I mean the notion
that politics consists of a competitive struggle among the groups and
individuals comprising society for control over governmental power.
According to the theory of interest pluralism, groups and individuals seek
such power for the purpose of using it to pursue their own self-interest.
The concept of a socially diverse society comprised of multiple groups, each
with some distinctive interest, is an old one in political theory. Its
contemporary formulation, however, is of relatively recent vintage. The
seeds of interest pluralism as a political theory were sown in the eighteenth
century when Adam Smith's theory of economic markets provided a basis for
legitimating the pursuit of self-interest. 2 According to Smith, self-interested
economic behavior benefits not merely the individuals who pursue it, but
society as a whole because it leads to the efficient allocation of resources:
In the mid-nineteenth century, the founders of utilitarianism refined
and formalized this idea and generalized it into a full-blown theory of
politics. According to utilitarianism, a good society is one that achieves, in
Bentham's famous phrase, "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." '
Consequently, the only proper goal of society is to maximize overall utility.
Overall utility, in turn, is understood simply as the sum of the individual
utilities of each member of society3 Individuals, for their part, maximize
their own utility simply by pursuing their personal self-interest however they
are able. Utilitarianism provides, then, that political actions are best
understood as attempts by individuals to maximize their own personal utility.
This means, of course, that all public and political acts are by definition
89. See infra Part IV.B.2.
90. See Cass R. Sunstein, Intfeest Groups in Ammeriran Public Law, 38 STAN. L R.w. 29, 32-33
(1985) (describing the pluralist conception of politics); Mansbridge, supra note 39 (discuming
the origins of self-interest based theories).
91. Aristotle, for example, conceived of society as containing distinct dases, and
identified certain kinds of government as ones in which one part ofsociety ruled in its own self-
interest. ARISTOTLE, POLrTlcs bk. III, ch. -ii. For example, Aristotle defined oligarchy as the rule
of the noble or wealthy class in its own self-interest. Id. at bk. III, ch. viii.
92. See RALPH KETC-AM, PRESIDENTS ABOVE PAR'. THE FIRST A uc.rI PREs nDE,; 1789-
1829, at 22-28 (1984) (discussing the growth of the commercial ethic).
93. See generally 1 ADAMi SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIOxS (Ernest Rhys ed., E.P. Dutton &
Co. 1910) (1776).
94. J.REMY BENTaAm, A FRAGMI'NT ON GOVERNMENT AND AN INTRODLrTION TO THE
PRINCIPLES OFIORALS AND LEGISLATION 3 (Basil Blackwell ed. 1948) (1776).
95. 1& at 126 ("The interest of the community then is, what?--the sum of the interests of
the several members who compose it.").
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taken in pursuit of private self-interest.6 Although this leads to a political life
of competitive struggle, the overall effect is good: the political process of
bargaining and compromise through which citizens maximize their own
individual utility also leads to the maximization of overall social utility and,
consequently, to the good of the society in a genuinely ethical sense.
In addition to its assumptions concerning self-interested individual
behavior, interest pluralism also entails a particular conception of legislative
representation sometimes known, in Hanna Pitkin's terminology, as the
"delegate" model of representation."' Interest pluralism's goal of social utility
maximization cannot be achieved when voters merely elect representatives
to pursue their constituents' self-interest: legislators must also loyally pursue
their constituents' self-interest in the course of bargaining in the legislature.
To the extent they fail to do so, legislative bargaining will fail to adjust
diverse social interests properly, thereby failing to maximize utility.
Bentham, however, thought sufficient loyalty of representatives could be
assured by linking representatives' self-interest to their effective pursuit of
their constituents' self-interest through the mechanism of frequent
elections."
The birth of modem, observational social science in the late nineteenth
century provided new conceptual tools that, when applied to politics,
appeared to provide empirical support for utilitarianism's speculative
premises about the self-interested behavior of political actors. In a series of
influential studies, political scientists argued on both empirical and
theoretical grounds that the pursuit of self-interest by, and bargaining
among groups and their representatives, was a ubiquitous and indispensable
part of any feasible conception of democratic politics.,7 Today, the utilitarian
96. Bentham makes this crystal clear in his withering attack on the corruption of public
service in the Britain of his day. SeeJEREMY BENtUAM, PtAN OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORMI 2-15
(London, T.J. Wooler 1818) [hereinafter BENTHAM, PLAN OF PARLIAMENTARY REFORM]. Other
founders of utilitarianism took the same view.James Mill argued quite directly that government
officials will use power to pursue their private self-interest unless restrained. JAMES MILL, AN
ESSAY ON GOVERNMENT 50 (Currin V. Shields ed., Liberal Arts Press 1955) (1820). Though
somewhat more moderate,John Stuart Mill made much the same point when he described the
chief aim in the design of political systems as enabling each individual to "stand up for" his or
her own interests, if not directly, then through chosen representatives beholden to their
constituents.J.S. Mill, supra note 17, at 245,
97. PrTKIN, supra note 33, at 119-21, 133-34.
98. See BENTHAM, PIAN OF PARLIAMENTARY REFoRM, supra note 96, at 5-30 (discussing the
control of self-interests and representation). See also JAMFS MiLL, supra note 96, at 69-70
(explaining that the less time one spends as a representative, the less he will pursue his self.
interest); Ross HARRiSON, BENrHAi 207-10 (1983); Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Majorities:
Rousseau Revisited, in NOMOs, supra note 39,46-48 (discussing Bentham's theories); PITFiN, supra
note 33, at 200-02 (stating how to make legislators follow the community's interests). The first
modern expression of this position is often said to be Schumpeter's statement of the theory of
competition for political leadership. See JOSEPH SCHUMIPETER, CAPITAI.ISM, SOCIAL.ISM AN)
DEMOCRACY 269-83 (3d ed. 1950).
99. SeegeneraUyARTHURF. BENTi.EY, THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT (Peter H. Odegard ed.,
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assumption of rational utility-maximization through self-interested political
behavior provides the standard premise of virtually every kind of political
science analysis from the most empirical observational work to the most
abstract and theoretical aspects of public choice theory.""
B. THE FLURALSTIC PREFERFVCE FOR PROPRVOM\OLTI"
Proponents of electoral proportionality reveal their reliance on interest
pluralism in their language, in their concepts, and, occasionally, in direct
acknowledgments. For example, Lani Guinier has made no bones about the
fact that her support for proportional remedies to minority vote dilution is
based directly on a notion of "interest representation" in which the purpose
of electoral systems is to produce in the legislature the "representation and
satisfaction" of the interests of minority voters."' On this view, the defect of
winner-take-all electoral systems is that they "submerge[]" minority
interests," - thereby violating the right of every political minority "to have its
interests satisfied a fair proportion of the time." Pam Karlan also criticizes
winner-take-all electoral systems for their capacity to permit the white
majority to "ignor[e] the interests of racial minorities,"'" while Rick Pildes
describes the VRA as designed to "define representation in terms of the
political interests of specific groups."""
When they are not describing the political process in terms of the clash
of competing interests, supporters of proportionality often speak in terms of
power. Thus, according to Guinier, winner-take-all systems award "all the
power" to majorities, whereas semiproportional electoral systems such as
cumulative voting would give blacks greater "political power,"O7 thereby
ameliorating the "disproportionate power" that white majorities now wield
under the present system.m  Karlan likewise criticizes winner-take-all
Belknap Press 1967) (1908); DAVID B. TRUMLAN, THE GOvERNMENTAL PROCESS: PoICnA-%L
INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951); ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEM-OCRATIc THEORY
(Univ. of Chicago Press 1956) [hereinafter DAHL, A PREFAcETo DE.MOCFSr THEORY]- ROBERT
A. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS?: DE %OCRACAND POWER IN AN AMERICAN Crr' (1951).
100. See generay James A. Gardner, Stop Me Before I Quantib Again: Te Role of PolitialS-wence
in the Study of Eleclion Law,, 32 LOY. LA. L REV. 1141 (1999); Mansbridge. supra note 39.
101. GUINIER, IANNY, supra note 1, at 94; seeGardner, supra note 100, at 92-117.
102. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 94.
103. Id. at 104.
104. Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to 1'ote" Some Pessimism About Forradsin,, 71 Tmx. L REv.
1705, 1740 (1993) [hereinafter Karlan, The Rights to Vote].
105. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Ridistnemg, 106 Y.U.E LJ.
2505, 2536 (1997). Critics of the VRA commonly contend that VRA supporters are committed
to a form of racial interest representation. Se Katharine lnglis Butler, Affirmatire Racal
Gerymandering. Rhetoric and Reality, 26 Cu.IB. L REV. 313, 317-18, 360 (1996); ABIGAIL M.
THERNSrROM, WHOSEVOTES COUNT? (1987).
106. GUINIER, TVEANNY, supra note 1, at 135.
107. Id. at 95.
108. Id. at 102.
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electoral systems for their capacity to "unfairly minimize the political
strength of distinct groups in the electorate."'09 Political power, of course, is
critically important in interest pluralism because it is the tool groups use to
compete for the grand prize of interest pluralism: satisfaction of their private
interests. Moreover, according to the utilitarian calculus of interest
pluralism, all social interests should be represented in proportion to the
degree in which individuals embrace them."" Only then will each interest
possess bargaining power commensurate with its magnitude, thereby
enabling contending groups to strike a bargain that accurately maximizes
overall utility.
This reliance on interest pluralism by supporters of proportionality is
more than an artifact of their language-it is integral to the concepts they
use to critique winner-take-all electoral systems. For example, as noted
above, supporters of electoral proportionality claim both that votes cast for
losers in winner-take-all systems are "wasted" or "thrown away,""' and that
the minority is in consequence "unrepresented. " 1 The concept of "filler
people-a minority who are included in a district only to round out the
population and who cannot harbor any realistic expectation of electoral
success 1-refers to the same idea. Votes for losers, of course, are not
literally thrown away; they are counted just like any other ballots, and are
tabulated according to the same principle of simple addition. Similarly,
those who vote for a losing candidate, including "filler people," are not
literally unrepresented in the sense that the legislative seat from their district
is unfilled; the seat is filled, though by someone whom they did not support.
These concepts are explicable only if representatives entirely ignore the
minorities in their districts-those constituents who voted for the
representatives' vanquished opponents.
Interest pluralism assumes precisely such a dynamic. It holds that the
sole job of elected representatives is to press the interests of their
constituents in the legislature, 4 yet the loyalty of representatives to their
109. Karlan, Undoing, supra note 2, at 14.
110. As Bentham put it: "In order that the universal interest may be advanced, all particular
interests must be comprehended and advanced...." BFNTHAM, PlAN OF PARLIAMENTARY
REFORM, supra note 96, at 24. Moreover, the effective aggregation of these interests requires
that each individual have a "share, of a certain degree of magnitude, in the choice of a person to
form one in the body of the representatives of the people," and that this share be equal. Id. at
25. Bentham concluded from these premises that universal suffrage was necessary for accurate
maximization of social utility. See id. at 24-25.J.S. Mill later argued that these conditions require
PR as well. Mill, supra note 17, at 303-07.
111. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 125, 134. See also Mill, supra note 17, at 303.07.
112. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 105; Mill, supra note 17, at 302-03.
113. Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 75, at 601.
114. This conception of representation has been aptly referred to as the "transmission belt"
theory. NANCY L. ScHwARTZ/, THE BLUE GUITAR: POLTICAl. REPRESENTATION AND CONINWNITY
25 (1988). According to Schwartz, in the Benthamite "delegate" version of the transmission belt
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constituents can be assured only by means of electoral control."5
Representatives will thus respond to and press the interests of whoever
possesses the ability to reelect them." In a winner-take-all system, that power
is held exclusively by the majority in the representative's district.."7 On these
assumptions, the minority might indeed be "unrepresented" if, by
representation, one means solely the willingness to press ithin the
legislature for satisfaction of a constituent's self-interest. The minority's votes
are also on these assumptions "wasted" because those votes do not
contribute to disciplining the jurisdiction's elected representative. Both of
these critiques, it bears repeating, originated with John Stuart Mill, and it is
no accident that PR's greatest supporter was also one of the founders of
utilitarianism.
Other concepts employed by supporters of electoral proportionality
also reveal their reliance on interest pluralism. They complain, for example,
that winner-take-all systems exaggerate majority representation by rewarding
the majority with a number of seats that exceeds its proportion of the
electorate. Correspondingly, they assert, minority votes are "diluted"
theory, the representative is delegated by others to act according to their wishes, yet in a way
"that also accords with the good of the whole state." Id. at 28.
115. See supra note 99 (citing sources discussing pluralist political theory).
116. De Grazia goes so far as to call PR an outgrowth of the old system of 'estates," in which
certain classes of society are understood to have fixed interests, and in which representatives
from each estate are selected to press the interests of the estate in the legislative assembly. See
ALFRED DE GRAZA, PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC 195,205 (1951). On PR's assumption of the loyalty of
representatives, see also MANIN, supra note 62, at 211.
117. This assumption is almost certainly somewhat oversimplified. An entire body of
political science literature, originating with ANTHONY DOWNs, AN EcONo.IC iTHEOY OF
DFstocAc v (1957), argues that candidates tend not to rely solely on appeals to a district
majority because that is not the most reliable way to assure their election. Instead, candidates
improve their chances by adopting positions that appeal to a broader spectrum of the
electorate. Contemporary versions of the Downsian analysis use a spatial metaphor to array
voters along an ideological spectrum. These theories then postulate that each voter votes for
the candidate whose positions fall on this spectrum closest to the voter's personal views. It
follows that candidates will attract the most support if they adopt the policy preferences of the
"median voter" in their district. A candidate who attempted to appeal solely to a district
majority would adopt the policy preferences of the median voter of the majority, rather than
the median voter of the entire electorate. See Elizabeth &. Gerber & Rebecca B. Morton, Primary
Election Systems and Representation, 14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 304, 321-22 (1998) (describing an
analogous dynamic in party primary elections, where candidates try to position themselves to
appeal to the median preferences of members of their party). However, dese positions may
differ, meaning that the attempt to appeal exclusively to the majority would cause the candidate
to take a position that would lose support among voters outside the nmajority. To increase their
chances of election, candidates thus usually attempt to appeal to voters beyond their core base
of supporters. Since successful candidates usually take these broader positions, as
representatives they probably press in the legislature some positions that are in the interests of
many of their constituents who voted for other, losing candidates. For an examination of some
of the most recent disputes in Downsian voting analysis, see generally Anders Westholm,
Distance Versus Direction: The Illusory Defeat of the Proximity 77woi' of Electoral ChJowe, 91 A'.I. POL.
SCL REV. 865 (1997).
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through proportionate under-representation. But why is this a problem? It is
clear that the overrepresentation of majorities constitutes a problem in need
of solution only if the proper balance of representation is proportionate.
And on what set of assumptions is proportionality to be taken as the
normatively correct outcome? Interest pluralism provides the answer.
According to interest pluralism, the spoils of government can be divided
fairly, and in a way that maximizes overall utility, only when each interest
achieves representation in proportion to its strength. Unlike winner-take-all
systems, PR does just that: it creates a legislature that reflects "the precise
state of the balance of forces within the electorate." "8 These forces,
appropriately balanced within the assembly, are then in a position to
negotiate a fair, utility-maximizing settlement."9 As Sam Issacharoff has
forthrightly observed, the Voting Rights Act's embrace of electoral
proportionality "rests on the foundations of a failed pluralism in the political
process and the distortions of public policy that follow from that
failure"L -- distortions, that is, from the perspective of a successful pluralism
that gives to each interest its proportionate due.
III. WINNER-TAKE-ALL AND THE POLITICS OF VIRTUE
We have seen, thus far, that winner-take-all electoral systems have been
heavily criticized, and that such critiques rely predominantly on the
assumptions of interest pluralism. At the same time, these critiques have
apparently had no real impact upon the public perception and acceptance
of winner-take-all electoral systems. There is no public clamor in the United
States for proportional representation, not even among groups that might
be thought to benefit from it. Two explanations for this disjunction suggest
themselves: either the critique of winner-take-all systems fails on its own
terms, or winner-take-all systems are justifiable, if at all, on some entirely
different set of assumptions about politics. In section B below, I suggest what
such an alternative justification might look like. To see why an alternative is
necessary, though, we must first examine some of the standard defenses of
winner-take-all electoral systems.
A. STANDARD DEHENSI:S OF WNNE.R-TAKF-AL,
Legal theorists by and large have not bothered to explore the possible
justifications for winner-take-all electoral systems. Political scientists, in
contrast, devote considerable attention to the study of electoral systems,
118. MANIN, supra note 62, at 212.
119. As Richard Katz observes, strict proportionality is necessary only to what he calls
"legislative democracy," RicHARD S. KATZ, DEMOCRACY AND Et.E(T"rIONS 128 (1997) (hereinafter
KAT, DEMOCRACY AND EI.ECTIONSI, which he defines as a system for handling multiple
alternatives through logrolling and trade offs, and which thus requires a multiparty system and
proportionality so that groups can benefit fairly. Id. at 42-44.
120. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 6, at 1890.
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although the great majority of them favor PR and seem to find little to
recommend in winner-take-all systems. Nevertheless, a small and sometimes
vocal group of political scientists has attempted to mount a defense of
winner-take-all systems. Much, though by no means all, of this work has been
done to support opposition to electoral reform in Britain, where electoral
reform societies that support PR have been active since the nineteenth
century.121
Some of the most frequently made arguments on behalf of winner-take-
all systems are merely attacks on PR rather than justifications for winner-
take-all, and may be dismissed at once on the ground that they merely
criticize PR for doing successfully precisely what it aims to do. For example,
it is often said that PR creates ideological conflict within the legislature.'_ Of
course it does-that is its purpose. PR is designed to create a legislature that
accurately reflects society's social divisions as a way of creating a forum in
which those divisions can be resolved to general satisfaction. Another
common criticism of PR is that it gives minorities too much poiver. '  Aside
from the fact that critics rarely stop to explain how much power is "too
much" and compared to what, if the criticism means simply that minorities
are capable of exercising significant power under PR, the criticism is
pointless. PR aims to give minorities power, at least compared to their lack
of power under winner-take-all systems.
A third common criticism of PR condemns it on the ground that it
forces legislative compromise.' 4 A somewhat more potent variant holds that
PR is defective because of its process of post-election coalition formation, a
process that prevents voters from knowing at the time of the election just
what policies they are approving, or even what government they are
electing.'_ Yet here, too, critics attack PR for doing only what it seeks to do.
The point of any principled kind of PR is to assemble in the legislature
representatives of all of society's significant interests and then set them loose
to negotiate, compromise, logroll, and othervise buy each other off in a
process that efficiently and, from the utilitarian perspective ethically,
allocates society's resources and the satisfaction of private wants that such
resources provide.
121. See supra note 17 (discussing the origins of PR in Great Britain and the United States).
122. See Quentin L. Quade, PR and Dernorratir Staterraft, 2J. DEtoCAWY, Summer 1991, at
36-37; RicHARD S. KAr/, A THEORY OF PARTIES AND ELECrORAL SINSTSs 24 (1980) [hereinafter
KArZ, THEORY OF PARTIES].
123. See Guy Lardeyret, The Problem with PR, 2J. DEMtOCRACY, Summer 1991, at 30 (stating
that PR gives preference to minorities). Amy disputes tis. AMY, supra note 9, ch. 8.
124. KATZ, THEORYOF PARTIES, supra note 122, at 121.
125. See Maurice Duverger, Wdch Is the Best Eleaoral System?, in CHOOSING ;%N ELEcTOnA.
SSTE=M, supra note 40. at 31, 32; see also P-E ILAIN, PROFORTIO.'.A MtSREFRESL%'A'ITION: THL
CASE A.AiNST PR IN BRITAIN 30-32, 45-46 (1986) (discussing, as an example, post-election
coalition formation in the former West Germany, and summarizing the main points against
PR).
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Defenders of winner-take-all systems have, however, developed several
stronger arguments that seek to justify winner-take-all rather than merely
attack PR Perhaps the most common argument advanced on behalf of
winner-take-all systems is that they produce strong leadership and a
concomitant capacity to govern.2 6 As Giovanni Sartori has observed, winner-
take-all systems "do not seek a parliament that reflects the voting
distributions; they seek a clear winner. Their intent is not only to elect a
parliament but at the same time to elect... a government."2' Winner-take-
all systems thus over-reward electoral success for the express purpose of
assuring majoritarian control over the government. The idea here is that
such a government will be able to act decisively and pursuant to a single,
coherent plan, unlike a PR government, which must constantly compromise
to bring along its coalition partners.2 2 Nevertheless, as Lijphart and
Grofman point out, "[t]o the partisans of the PR principle, strong
government based on disproportional representation is illegitimate, just as
dictatorial government, however effective and benevolent, would be
unacceptable."2m
The defenders of winner-take-all systems sometimes justify such systems
on other grounds. For example, winner-take-all systems are often said to
enhance democratic accountability.'" Their tendency to award seats
disproportionately to the majority party makes them extremely sensitive to
small changes in public opinion. AsJ.A. Chandler has explained:
The leaders of a political party that can remain in power despite
considerable loss of electoral support will clearly find less need to
126. See Lijphart & Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 40, at 3, 5; Quade, supra
note 122, at 39; see also SCHUMPETER, supra note 98, at 272-273; ELAINE SPITZ, MAJORITY RULE 26,
40 (1984).
127. GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL ENGINEERING: AN INQUIRY INTO
STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES 5 (1994). See alsoJENKINS COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 17, at 5; REPORT OFTHE ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 51, at 6.
128. PR supporters respond that majoritarian governments may also have to compromise.
See AMY, supra note 9, ch. 8. Another, related argument made in defense of winner-take-all
electoral systems is that they provide stability. According to what has come to be known as
"Duverger's Law," winner-take-all electoral systems tend to produce two-party systems, whereas
PR tends to produce multi-partyism. See generally MAURICE DUVERGER, POLITICAL PARTIES: THEIR
ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVrIY IN THE MODERN STATE (1954) (outlining electoral law and party
methodology); William H. Riker, Duverger's Law Revisited, in ELECTORAL LAWS AND THEIR
POLITICAl. CONSEQUENCES, supra note 19 (discussing the ambiguity in Duverger's claim),
Keeping the number of parties down to two makes it easier to produce stable one-party
government. Lijphart & Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 40, at 5; see also KATZ,
THEORY OF PARTIES, supra note 122.
129. Lijphart & Grofman, Choosing an Electoral System, supra note 40, at 6.
130. See HAIN, supra note 125, at 2; Lardeyret, supra note 123, at 31; AUSTIN RANNEY, THE
DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT: ITS ORIGINS AN) PRESENT STATE (1962);
Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, Send the Rascals Packing: Defects of Proportional Representation and the
Virtues of the Westminster Mode 25 TIMES LITERARY SUPPI.EMENT 10, 10-11 (Sept. 25, 1998).
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take account of popular opinion than the leaders of a party who
realize that only a relatively small reduction in their electoral
strength will remove them from office. One of the most criticized
consequences of the plurality system, the wide variation in votes
cast to seats won, therefore becomes a positive advantage for the
development of responsive governments. Within a plurality system
a relatively small loss of votes will result in a disproportionately
large loss of seats for the largest parliamentary parties and will be
likely to threaten their ability to form part of a government.,
Moreover, a governing party that does not respond effectively to
changes in public opinion will, on this view, be more vulnerable to
"expulsion" from office; winner-take-all systems thus provide voters with a
more effective "means of ousting" than does PR.I- A related argument is that
governments formed under a winner-take-all system ill be more moderate
than those formed under PR.I Because a winner-take-all system places such
a premium on majority support, it "encourages the competing parties to
adopt a majority-forming attitude. The parties incline to be moderate, to
seek conciliation."'3 This forces the parties "to coalesce before the balloting
occurs," a process that requires them to "synthesize the divergent interests
and opinions" of voters.'-, The result is a majority government of moderate
views.
Both of these arguments, however, are vulnerable to the objection
framed by Lijphart and Grofman: who cares? Winner-take-all systems may
provide accountability, but to whom? If accountability is purchased at the
price of excluding minorities from participating in the processes of
governance, the outcome is still unfair and the objection to winner-take-all
systems stands unrefuted. Similarly, it hardly matters from the point of 'iew
of PR supporters that a majoritarian government adopts moderate positions
if the views of the minority are not fairly-that is to say, proportionately-
reflected in those positions. The truth seems to be, as Peter Taylor has
observed, that defenders of inner-take-all systems simply ignore PR's
strongest claim-the fairness issue-and thus "the moral argument against
reform seems largely to have gone by default." *'
The real reason why the standard arguments in favor of winner-take-all
131. J.A. Chandler, The Plurality Vote: A Rwappraisa4 30 POL STUD. 87,92 (1982).
132. Pinto-Duschinsky, supra note 130, at 10.
133. KATz, THEORY OF PARTIES, supra note 122, at 122; Larde)ret. sup-a note 123, at 33;
Quade, supra note 122, at 41;JENKINS COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 17, at 5.
134. Quade, supra note 122, at41.
135. Lardeyret, supra note 123, at 33. &e also Kr7., THEORY OF PARTIES, supra note 122, at
27.
136. PeterJ. Taylor, The Case for Proportional Tenure: A Defene of the Blatchulotaral Sster, in
CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL S'sTEi, supra note 40, at 53. But me CARI.Es R. BEW/, POLrCl.L
EQUALITY: AN ESSAYIN DEMOCRATICTHEORY ch. 6 (1989).
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fail to refute the proportionalist arguments from fairness is that these
arguments attempt to meet proportionalists on their own ground.'" They
defend winner-take-all systems, that is, on the instrumental ground that such
systems produce good results: firm government, accountability, moderation,
and so forth. There are no doubt non-instrumental grounds for desiring
these benefits, but the defenders of winner-take-all seem to prefer them
predominantly as instrumental goods. Firm government thus is good
because it enables the society to achieve its goals efficiently. Moderation is
good because it reduces conflict, which is inefficient. Accountability is good
because it produces both firm government and moderation. The problem
with this approach is that it proposes a certain view of what kind of political
policies will best maximize overall social utility without subjecting those
policies to the fair negotiation process that utilitarianism demands, a process
of negotiation and trading among all significant social interests. If it is true,
for example, that society as a whole indeed prefers a firm, decisive
government to one that is paralyzed, the PR negotiation and coalition-
building process will, according to its proponents, produce just such a
government automatically. The reason PR countries sometimes do not have
such a government, PR's advocates would argue, is precisely because of an
underlying divergence of interests, one that cannot be made to disappear
merely by appealing to some presumed cross-cutting interest in firmness.
Favoring some interests at the expense of others will of course remove the
logjam, but, on proportionalist premises, it will do so only by forcing on the
dissenting minority an unfair and inefficient allocation of social resources.
On the assumptions of interest pluralism, then, there can be little
question that winner-take-all electoral systems are distinctly inferior to
proportional ones. If any justification for winner-take-all systems is to be
found, it must be found on some conception of politics other than interest
pluralism, one that views politics as predominantly something other than a
forum for the clash and accommodation of competing interests.
B. VIRTUE AND THE BASIS OF WINNER-TA IE-ALL
Interest pluralism, as I have indicated, is a relatively recent conception
of politics. A far older-indeed, in western thought the original-
conception of politics holds that its purpose is to identify and achieve the
common good of society. Politics, on this view, is the forum in which truth
emerges and is applied for the benefit of all. It is an arena in which actors
are expected to behave virtuously, and where virtue is measured in part by
the willingness to value the good of all ahead of private interests and to act
accordingly. To speak of politics in this way is to use the term politics in its
137. See SARTORI, DFMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 61, at 107 ("[l]t is symptomatic that the
very critics of proportional representation at a certain point accept the ground of discussion
selected by their adversaries. ").
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original sense-as referring to the kind of life good citizens aspire to lead in
their pols-and I shall from time to time use the term in this iny, especially
to contrast it with pluralism, a kind of life that the Greeks would have
considered, again in its original sense, idiotic-that is, centered upon the
personal or private."" To avoid confusion, however, I shall also use the term
politics of virtue to refer to the older conception of politics.
Winner-take-all electoral systems have been in use since the birth of
modem democracy. They seem to have been adopted without any awareness
of alternative methods of election, and indeed without any kind of reflection
at all. In this section, I demonstrate that winner-take-all electoral systems
were conceived and introduced into the American democratic process at a
time when the idea of politics as a politics of virtue was unchallenged. As a
result, at the time of their introduction into American democratic political
life, winner-take-all electoral systems would have seemed not only entirely
natural and unremarkable, but the only kind of electoral system even worth
contemplating.
1. The Basic Inheritance
The generation that founded the United States and decided upon the
initial structure of its political institutions inherited and embraced two basic
ideas concerning the nature of politics: first, that the common good of
society was objective and capable of discovery; and second, that politics was
the means by which the objectively knowable common good was revealed to
society's members. The precise way in which politics reveals the common
good has been the subject of considerable debate throughout American
history between, broadly speaking, two schools of thought: a republican
school holding that the common good emerges from the deliberation of
wise, virtuous, and largely independent elected representatives, and a
populist school holding that the people know better than their
representatives where the common good lies. Examination of this debate is
deferred to the next subsection.
a. The Objectiviy of the Common Good
The idea that society has a single, objective common good falls within a
long tradition in western thought of what might be called, in Virginia Held's
useful terminology, a "unitary" theory of the public interest' On this
understanding, the common good is objective in that it "has an existence
independent of private preferences " '4" and thus stands for some body of
timeless, substantive principles with which current policies must accord."'
138. See CHRISTOPHERJ. BERRY, THE IDEA OFA DE.OCRATK: CoWit, NrIW 8-9 (1989).
139. VIRGINIA HELD, THE PUBLIC INTERESTAND INDIVlI)UAL IN'EREsTS, at liii. ch. 5 (1970).
140. KA-z, DEMOCRACYAND ELECTIONS, supra note 119, at 30.
141. RICHARD E. FLA-THMAN, THE PUBLIC INTEREST: AN EsA CONERNING TMIl NOIPMVTIVE
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Such a common good is also unitary if "a valid judgment that a given
measure, decision, or arrangement is in the public interest rules out the
possibility that conflicting individual claims of interest... may also be
valid."'42
This conception of the common good goes back at least as far as Plato,
and grows logically out of the platonic understanding of the world as a
single, harmonious whole in which the good of one part is necessarily linked
organically to the good of the entirety.' 43 The idea that certain propositions
about the world and about morals are objectively either true or false, and
that humans ought to conform their behavior to the true propositions, also
has deep roots in the lengthy tradition of natural law running from Aristotle
through Aquinas to the natural law writers of the Enlightenment.'44 The
content of the natural law may sometimes be difficult to discover, "but if this
is truly ascertained, it will be in the interest of the community and in the
common interest of all its members."1
45
By the eighteenth century, such ideas were thoroughly commonplace.
They are evident in such diverse accounts as Rousseau's insistence that the
general will "is always rightful and always tends to the public good,""4 and
Edmund Burke's description of Parliament as the deliberative assembly of a
single nation, with a single common interest which it is the role of Commons
to express.'47 The objectivity of the common good, and the idea that humans
possess the tools to find and implement it, even infiltrated Anglo-American
legal institutions. Blackstone, for example, held that common law rules
embody "the wisdom of the ages," 4 and should thus be treated as
expressions of true principles on the ground that "no individual or even an
entire generation can match the experience and wisdom accumulated over
countless generations and reposited in the law."
49
It should come as no great surprise, then, to find that the American
founding generation broadly accepted the idea of an objective, and
objectively knowable, common good. This notion comes through clearly in,
for example, the language of the Declaration of Independence, which
DISCOURSE OF POLtrICs 53-60 (1966).
142. HELD, supra note 139, at 135.
143. Id. at 136-40. This idea persisted well into the Enlightenment. See DON H-RZOG, HAPPY
SLAvES: A CRITIQUE OF CONSENT THEORY ch. 2 (1989).
144. See GEORGE C. CHRIsTIE,JURISPRUDENCE chs. 1-2 (1973); LLOYD L. WEINREB, NATURAI.
LAW AND JUSTICE chs. 1-3 (1987); see generally NATURAL. LAW THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAY
(Robert P. George ed., 1992).
145. HELD, supra note 139, at 141.
146. JFAN-JACQUES ROUSSFAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 72 (Maurice Cranston trans., 1968)
(1762).
147. SeeDE GRAZiA, supra note 116, at 38,41.
148. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *42.
149. GERALDJ. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 64 (1986).
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declares certain "truths" to be "self-evident.""" These words, in Morton
White's thorough analysis, mark Thomas Jefferson, the document's author,
as a "moral rationalist"'5 -one who holds that "we use our intuitive reason in
perceiving self-evident truths of natural law. "I"2 Indeed, the leading
revolutionaries, according to White, "held that there are truths in ethics and
politics which have all the certainty of mathematical axioms and which
would be denied" only by those who have become debased."
The same ideas appeared just as prominently during the period when
the Constitution was drafted and debated. As Joseph Bessette recently
observed, "the entire case for replacing the Articles of Confederation with
the Constitution of 1787 was a massive argument that there is a common
interest that binds the parts of the union."'" Federalists and Anti-federalists
may have disagreed on many things, but the objectivity of the common good
was not one of them. The Federalists "were emphatic... in holding that
there exists an objective, collective interest which, factoring out
subjectivities, forms the true standard for representative rule."v  The truth,
for Federalists, was "constant and universal and capable of being discovered
by enlightened and reasonable men."" The Anti-federalists, meanwhile,
believed even more strongly "that any political society has a common good
or ruling principle, higher than and inclusive of the good of its parts."" 7
Madison's most famous argument in support of the Constitution, to cite
another prominent example, is incomprehensible except on the assumption
of an objective common good. In Federalist No. 10, Madison responds to
critics of the proposed Constitution who complained about its proposal to
150. THE DECLARATION OFINDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
151. MORTON WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OFTHEA.M ERIcAN REVOLLITnON 77 (1978).
152. Id. at 61.
153. Id. at 94,95.
154. JOSEPH M. BEssErTE, THE MILD VOICE OF REASON 28 (1991); sr asoJms sA. MORONE.
THE DEMOCRATIC VIsH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS OFAM ERIcrN Govm.'.E:%'ET 41
(rev. ed. 1998) (asserting that the republicanism of the founding period involved 'the
subordination of individual interests to the common good," which contemplated 'a distinct
public interest with an objective existence of its own").
155. Wilson Carey McWilliams, The Anti-Federalits, Represenation, and Parqy 84 NW. U. L
REV. 12, 14 (1989).
156. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICA.ISM OF THE A.MERICAN REVOLUrION 362 (1992)
[hereinafter WOOD, RADICALiSM]. Wood, however, maintains that the Federalist cerainty in
universal truths was by the 1810s quickly and dramatically replaced by a more open-ended
notion of truth as diverse and considerably more democratic, an episode that Wood calls *an
epistemological crisis as severe as any in [American] history." Id.; see also Gordon S. Wood, The
Democralization of Mind in the American Rerohliion, inTHEMOM LFOUNDATIONS OFTHE AMERI.vN
REPuBtnc 109 (Robert H. Horwitz ed., University Press of Virginia, 3d ed. 1986) (making a
similar argument). If Wood's point is that competing views of truth began to emerge as genuine
competitors, then he is surely correct. However, if he means to say that the Federalist
conception of truth as objective and unitary was completely replaced, he has grossly overstated
his case, as the ensuing discussion in text of the Progressives makes dear.
157. McWilliams, supra note 155, at 21.
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create a single republic of continental scope.'5 Madison defends the size of
the proposed republic on the ground that a larger nation would be less
susceptible to "majority faction," which he regards as the single greatest
threat to liberty against which constitutional designers need to guard. '" In
the course of his argument, Madison defines a faction as "a number of
citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community. " '6 This critical definition shows two things. First,
Madison obviously believed there is such a thing as the "aggregate interests
of the community," or common good. Second, he believed that a majority
should be deemed a faction if it acts in opposition to the common good,
something that is impossible on pluralist or other relativist assumptions
under which the beliefs of the majority define the common good.
Consequently, for Madison, the common good was objective, and existed
independent of the transient beliefs of any particular group of citizens, even
a majority. 
1
The notion of an objective common good persisted long after the
founding to become a staple of American political thought. For example,
the belief in an objective common good formed the centerpiece of the
ideology of the highly influential Progressive reform movement of the early
twentieth century. Progressives were deeply critical of what they considered
to be the debasement and corruption of turn-of-the-century American
politics. The main thrust of the movement was "to restore a type of
economic individualism and political democracy that was widely believed to
have existed earlier in America and to have been destroyed by the great
corporation and the corrupt political machine," and in so doing to "bring
back a kind of morality and civic purity that was also believed to have been
158. THE FEDERAi.IST No. 10 (James Madison).
159. Id. at 60-61 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
160. Id. at57.
161. Interestingly, one of the most important contemporary pluralist critiques of Madison
implicitly acknowledges this point. In his Preface, Robert Dahl criticizes Madison's definition of
majority faction on the ground that we can never know what would amount to such a faction
because Madison never specifies the rights and interests of the citizenry in opposition to which
such a faction would be aligned. Moreover, Dahl argues, the majority itself is by definition
excluded from defining what constitutes a faction, because on Madison's assumptions of self-
interested behavior, it would never so define itself. Similarly, a minority cannot do so since it
would by hypothesis use that power tyrannically. DAHI., A PREFACE TO DENiOCRATIC TIIEORY,
supra note 99, at 25-27. This argument is greatly overstated, but it nevertheless exemplifies
vividly that Madison must have envisioned not only an objective common good, but one that
was accessible only to some kind of elite that has both the knowledge and wisdom to discern it
and the virtue to pursue it. SeeTHE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961) ("The aim of every political constitution is or ought to be first to obtain for rulers




losL"' Progressives thus tended to support a package of reforms designed to
break what they saw as control over political institutions by special interests
that manipulated the political system for their own advantage and contrary
to the interests of society generally. Such reforms typically included the
initiative and referendum, popular recall of elected officials, short terms of
office, a professionalized civil service, and other measures designed to
remove control over the political system from career politicians and to place
that control either in the people directly, or in professional, and presumably
apolitical, experts and managers. *"
A basic tenet of Progressive reform was that "there was a public interest
which could be defined objectively and which, if implemented, would
benefit all citizens equally."'" This public interest, Progressives held,
becomes known through the achievement of a public consensus."3
Progressives had faith that such a consensus would inevitably coalesce:
clearly echoing beliefs prevalent a century earlier during the founding
period, Progressives expected that "in the formal process of election and
decision making a consensus will emerge through the process of right
reason and by the higher call to the common good.""' So robust was the
Progressive conception of the common good that Progressives frequently
asserted that many issues, particularly those dealing with the administration
of local government, were inherently apolitical'*--that is, admitted of only
one best answer. This position led Progressives to support, with considerable
success, the institution of nonpartisan political systems in many local
jurisdictions throughout the United States. *
Today, of course, the ideology and logic of the common good is not
only a staple of political rhetoric, but is part of the mandatory vocabulary for
any official or candidate. It is almost never permissible for a politician to
support some measure on the ground that it will benefit some group at the
expense of another. One must rather claim either that the supported
162. RICHARD HorsTADrER, THE AGE OF REFORM 5 (1955) [hereinafter HOFsTAUDTER. AGE
OF REFORM].
163. See generally HOFSTADTER, AGE OF REFORM, supra note 162; RICHARD S. CHILDS, CIVIC
VICTORIES: THE STORY OF AN UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1952); BENJAMIN PARKE DE Wrrr, THE
PROGzssrvE MOVENiENT (1915).
164. DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF A.MERICN Cm-s: PRVATE POWER AND PUBLIC:
POuc 101 (1979).
165. ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 1877-1920, at 162 (1967) [hereinafter
WIEBE, ORDER]; SeeMORONE, supra note 154, at 98, 113.
166. See EUGENE C. LEE, THE POLITICS OF NONPARTI.ANSHIP A STUDY OF CAIJFOR!NL Cm
ELECTIONS 34 (1960).
167. LEON WEAER, NONPARTImAN ELECTIONS IN LOCALo O\_NMt.NT: SOME KEY IssuLS aD
SUGGESTED GUIDE LINES FOR DECISION-M-AKING 20 (1971).
168. See id&; Charles R. Adrian, Some General Charartirist's of onpartian LTdaions, 46 A,M.
POL ScI. RE . 766 (1952); see also LEE, supra note 166, at 34-35 (discussing the role of
nonpartisan politics in California).
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measure is directly in the common interest, or that the measure, although in
the immediate interest only of some particular group, is indirectly and in the
long run in the interest of all. For example, a politician may successfully
support dairy subsidies, not on the ground that they benefit dairy farmers at
the expense of consumers, but on the ground that a strong dairy industry is
in the interest of all Americans. The ideology of the objective common good
has thus been a constant in American political life and thought.
b. Politics as a Politics of Virtue
In political thought, to postulate the existence of an objective common
good tells only half the story, for it says nothing about how the common
good can be known and realized. Such an idea becomes political only when
it is linked to some conception of politics. In western political thought, the
notion of an objective common good has frequently been associated with
the idea that the main purpose of politics is first to identify the common
good and then to take action to achieve it. This linkage occurred from the
very beginning: Plato's Republic is nothing less than an "attempt to establish
the claim of truth to sovereignty."'o Although Plato derived from this
equation a system of government by philosopher-king, other assumptions
about knowledge, society, and political behavior can lead to the conclusion
that other forms of government are better suited to identify and implement
the common good. Such claims, when made on behalf of democracy,
amount to an "epistemic" theory of democracy: one that postulates the
existence of "right and wrong answers" to public questions, and holds that
democracy is better equipped than other forms of government to get at and
act upon the right answers.7 0 Whatever the form of government it is invoked
to justify, however, the basic account of politics remains the same: it is a
forum for perceiving and acting upon the common good. To find the
common good, one must seek it. To do the common good, one must pursue
it, even at the expense of one's own private interests. Politics, on this view,
necessarily means a politics of virtue, one in which political actors are
obliged to act, and do in fact act, virtuously.
Just as Americans inherited a conception of an objective common good,
so they also inherited the companion idea of politics as a politics of virtue
aimed at discerning and achieving society's common interests. To a
considerable extent, this idea entered American political thought through
liberalism and the understandings of popular sovereignty from which it
emerged. In England, representative assemblies originated in the king's
need to obtain agreement from all segments of the realm, an agreement
169. THERIESA MAN LING LEE, POLITICS AND TRUTH: POLITI(Al. THEORY AND THE
POSTMODERNIST CHALLENGE 15 (1997).




that at the time was seen as part of a pragmatic negotiation to obtain
compliance with taxation and other laws.'" Such an assembly "had to be
assembei. It had to be composed from the parts of the whole.""- As power
gradually passed from the crown to Parliament, however, and legislators
began to make policy for the whole society, "they had to think in different
terms from the needs and desires of their localities; sharing regal authority,
they had to think regally, to think for the nation rather than the
neighborhood."'3
The evolving idea that elected representatives had to consider and act
upon the interests of all fit neatly with another idea that persisted well into
the eighteenth century "[t] he ancient ideal of an organic polity whose parts,
operating independently within their assigned spheres, fitted together
harmoniously."' 4 The combination of these ideas led by the eighteenth
century to an understanding, widely accepted in Britain and America, of
how public officials ought to behave: "the difference between rightful,
virtuous rulers and unworthy parvenus was the ability to subordinate private
interest to the common good." 7'm This understanding showed up clearly, for
example, in the general distrust during that period of political parties, which
were associated with the selfish pursuit of private interests:
Party rivalries signified illness within the body politic, malfunctions
within the system, not because all interests were expected to
harmonize with each other automatically but because right-minded
men-men motivated not by private but by public interests-would
naturally find ways of reconciling them.'
This emphasis on virtuous political behavior, and its measurement in
terms of an inclination to seek the common good rather than private
interest, is inscribed at the deepest levels of liberal thought. Liberalism is
sometimes taken to endorse a kind of atomistic individualism that justifies
governmental institutions based on the pluralistic pursuit of self-interest,17
and as to liberalism's contractualist aspects there is surely some truth to this
171. EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGN'TY IN
ENGLANDAND AMERIcA 39-42 (1989).
172. Id. at 44.
173. Id. at 47.
174. BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OFAMERI.N POLITICS 36 (1970).
175. Richard R. Beeman, Defernc4 Republcanism, and the Er.-wgne of Popular Po!fizs in
Eighteenth-CenturyAmerica, 49'VI. & MARYQ. 401.401 (1992).
176. BAiLN, supra note 174, at 36-37. See also RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE IDEA OF A PARM"
SsTEM: THE RISE OF LEGITIMATE OPPOSITION IN THE UNITED STATES, 1780-1840, at 9 (1969)
[hereinafter HOFsTADTER, PARTY S'sEM] (finding that the "root idea" of Anglo-American
political thought about parties %as that"parties are eil").
177. See generally DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 99; C.B.
MACPHERSON, THE POLITICALTHEORYOF POSSESS INDIVIDUAI.ISM: HOnuES"TO LoCKE (1962);
MICHAEIJ. SANDE!, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS oFJusTICE (1982).
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observation. However, it must not be forgotten that liberal thinkers
simultaneously saw natural law as an ever-present constraint on what
government-and the self-governing people from which that government
derives its legitimacy-may rightfully do. This disjunction points to a tension
in liberalism that has frequently occupied political theorists: how is it
possible to achieve the kind of genuinely collective self-rule that liberalism
authorizes, yet at the same time assure that such self-rule complies with
natural law-that it is, in other words, substantively good?
Some theorists have found an answer in positivism, which dissolves the
tension only by denying that collective self-rule has any intrinsic tendency
toward justice.' T Liberal thinkers of the Enlightenment, however, resolved
the tension differently: by assuming the inherent virtue of political actors. As
Willmoore Kendall has remarked, much of what Locke says is intelligible
only on the hypothesis that he believed that "the majority of any
commonwealth can be trusted, not only to arrive at and fight for and impose
its will, but to arrive at and fight for and impose a fight will."'' Locke
reached this conclusion, Kendall adds, because he believed that the average
person is "rational and just."' John Dunn, another Locke scholar, similarly
observes that Locke saw "the nature of legitimate political authority as a
structure of well-founded trust."""' On this view, government itself thus
"presupposes the presence of virtue-the presence of trustworthiness-in
the society."
8 2
There can be little question that this is how the American founding
generation understood its liberal inheritance. An emphasis on virtue was, of
course, a staple of Anti-federalist thought,8 3 but even Federalists, those
allegedly "prototypical liberal pluralists," expected "the majority of citizens,
and, even more so, most rulers to be 'virtuous' most of the time."'' 4 The
178. Leading positivists include Austin, Hart, and Raz. See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE
PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF L.Aw (1961);
JOSEPH RAZ, THEAUTHORITYOF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAWAND MORALITY (1979).
179. WILL.MOORE KENDALL,JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORIT,-RULE 134 (1965)
[hereinafter KENDALl, LOCKE].
180. Id. Nancy Schwartz agrees with this account. SeeSCHWARTr., supra note 114, at 15-16.
181. JOHNDUNN, INTERPRETING POLITIcAL REsPONSIBILITr: ESSAY 1981-1989, at 35 (1990).
182. PHILIP PETrIT, Republican Theory and Political Trust, in TRUST AND GOVERNANcE 295, 302
(Valerie Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998).
183. See HERBERTJ. STORING, 1 THE COMPI.ETE ANTI-FEDERAI.IST 20-21 (1981); see also Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985) (stating that
the principle of early republican government was civic virtue); Jennifer Nedelsky, Confining
Democratic Politics: Antifederalists, Federalists and the Constitution, 96 HARv. L. REv. 340, 342-43
(1982) (finding that the debate between Federalists and Anti-federalists suggests that the
Constitution relied "on private interest rather than public virtue"); Frank I. Michelman,
Foreword: Tracres of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1986) (stating that "[r]epublicnism
forms a highly participatory form of politics ... for the sake of nourishing civic virtue").
184. mCHAIm) C. SINOPOI.I, THE FOUNDATIONS oFAMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: LIBERAL.ISM, TlE
CONSTITUTION, AND CIVIC VIRTUE 7 (1992).
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revolutionary generation, according to Gordon Wood, "sought to construct
a society and government[] based on virtue and disinterested public
leadership and to set in motion a moral movement that would eventually be
felt around the globe." 5  To this end, they sought to create a government
that "would foster rule by the informed and reasoned judgments of the
citizenry,"'86 a government that would be deliberative in the sense of aiming
to achieve some public good rather than engaging in self-interested
calculation.1 7 Such a government was intended to act morally, yet "self-love,"
wrote Jefferson, "is no part of morality." 'ts To keep the United States
government on the right course, its institutions were framed, according to
Madison, with the aim of "obtain[ing] for rulers men who possess most
wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the
society. " 'ss The Framers thus sought to minimize the impact of self-interest
on politics and "allow more public-spirited motives to hold swa-y."' They
held out, in sum, "the possibility of a virtuous politics."'
This conception of politics has continued to exert a substantial
influence on American political thought. Throughout the early nineteenth
century, the dominant political ideal was one of wholeness based on an
underlying social unity of interest. "Representation in the minds of most
Americans of the pre-Civil War period," writes Alfred De Grazia, "was
representation of the whole people, not of any part or of any minority."" In
his monumental study of the evolution of American conceptions of self-rule,
Robert Wiebe reaches a similar conclusion: "19th century democracy
185. WOOD, RADCALLSM, supra note 156, at 229.
186. BEssETrE, supra note 154, at 1.
187. Seeidat46,48.
188. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Law Uune 13, 1814), in THlt. LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMASJEFFERSON 636, 638 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds.,
1972) [hereinafter LIFE AND WRITINGS]. For more on this aspect ofJefferson's thought. see
DAVID N. M.,AYER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT OFTHO.ASJEFFEsoN 73 (1994); AD"NFNE
KOCH, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 40.43 (1943). Later in his life, Jefferson
apparently moderated his view on this subject, coming to believe that self-love might
nevertheless lead people to virtuous positions, and that such positions were none the worse for
having been arrived at by this route. SwJFAN M. YARBROUGH, A.MERICvN NIRTUL2S: THO'.LS
JEFFERSON ON THE CHARACTER OF A FREE PEOPLE 104-05 (1998); WOOD, RMI-.IS.M, supra note
156, at 220.
189. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison).
190. Mark A. Graber, Confhlting Representations: Lani Guinier andJairaa Madisan on Electoral
Systems, 13 CONsT. COMENT. 291,292 (1996). See alsolilliam D. Richardson & Llo)d G. Nigro,
Constitutional Correclives for Democratic Vices, in ETHICS A[ND CHARACTEI: THE PURSUIT OF
DEtOCRATIC VIRTUES 69 (William D. Richardson et al. eds., 1998); Sanford Levinson,
Genymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Reprentation: II "y Won't It Go Away?,
33 UCLA L RE%9 257, 274 (1985) ("The framers considered politics, at best, a process not of
bargaining but of creating a collective order with a shared social vision and sense of public
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acknowledged no significant contradictions between individual self-interest
and collective action."'" To Americans, Wiebe writes, elections "looked just
like the People deciding," and by mid-century, "American" and "democracy"
were synonymous; Americans "merged People and nation" through the
mechanism of democracy.
9 4
These observations are borne out in the politics of the Jacksonian era.
For Jackson, "the people" comprised all segments of the community, and
they had a collective will that transcended fluctuating majorities and was
based on a common interest transcending considerations of section and
class.' 9" At the same time, Americans of the Jacksonian period carried
forward the republican ideology of politics as an arena of virtue, an attitude
which produced
a disposition to see politics as a struggle between good and evil,
expressed as the eternal warfare between liberty and power, virtue
and corruption. It did not imply a tolerance for many and varied
interests, each contending with the other for a place in the sun.
Instead,. . . republicans of that era.., tended to regard their
opponents as enemies of liberty itself, not as rival interests having
equal claims to public favor .... [These] prevailing political
attitudes tended to make compromise very difficult, if not
impossible. Since each participant in a quarrel tended to view the
interests of his constituents or himself as essential to the common
good and those of his opponents as subversive of liberty itself,
polemical controversies were frequent and vociferous)
The pursuit of private interest, in this formulation, was thus understood as a
form of corruption, a disease of the body politic.
A strikingly similar view of politics was advanced much later in the
nineteenth century and on into the twentieth by the Progressives. Like the
Jacksonians, Progressive reformers sought to eliminate corruption from and
restore purity to politics. 9 7 Drawing on a Yankee-Protestant tradition of
disinterested public participation in politics, which they sometimes
contrasted with what they viewed as the hierarchical and dependent political
behavior of recent European immigrants," Progressives advocated a form of
193. ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RUI.E: OF AMERICAN DImOCRAG(Y 83 (1995) [hcreinafter
WIEBE, SELF-RUiE].
194. Id.
195. MARVINMEYERS, THEJACKSONIAN PERSUASION: PoI.TICS AND BELIEF 19 (1960).
196. HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OFJACKSONIAN AMERICa\ 47-48
(1990). See also HOFSTADTER, PARTY SYSTEM, supra note 176, at 8 (finding that the early
Federalists and Republicans did not see themselves as "alternating parties in a two-party system";
when Republicans prevailed and Federalists withered away, this was seen as "evidence of tie
correctness of their views").
197. HOFSTADTER, AG; OF REFORM, supra note 162, at 5.
198. Id. at 7-11.
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politics in which virtue and the pursuit of the common good played
preeminent roles. On the Progressive ideal, officials were "expected to make
decisions on the basis of what they perceived to be good for the entire city,
notjust one geographic or social segment of it."" They would be, in Nancy
Schwartz's evocative formulation, "Kantian; the representative was to act as
everyman, and could attend to the public interest by thinking in general
categories about issues at hand.'"  Voters, in turn, bore "the
responsibility... to educate themselves and vote for the best candidates
strictly on the merits, not on the basis of party loyalty.""' Citizens were thus
obliged to work together to find the "right answer to a political problem," "
an enterprise that Progressives believed could succeed because of their
"belief in the underlying harmony of society.""' The Progressives had faith
in "the civic virtue.., of the individual, his willingness not to pursue his
interests but to transcend them."4 To the extent that the people needed
leadership to fulfill these duties, Progressives echoed the Jeffersonian
imperative to do so by providing an appropriate education.? In this way, the
ultimate Progressive vision of social justice in the common good could be
realized, a vision according to which, in the words of a leading Progressive
reformer, "[t]he tendency to democracy is a tendency to altruism .... [I]f
democracy holds true to faith, true to its instinct, we may expect democracy
to bejust." ' 5
On this view, then, politics is manifestly understood to be an arena in
which private, selfish interests are set aside and in which all political actors
work together to discern the common good and to take collective action to
achieve it. Politics consequently becomes a forum for the forging not of
compromise, but of collective unity.,' 7 for the settling, not of conflicting
individual claims to collective resources, but of the content of the singular
199. Richard L Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, Te Efferl of At.Large rsus District
Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities, in ELECORAL LA'B3 AND THEIR POI'CAL
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 19, at 203.
200. ScmvART-Z, supra note 114, at 124.
201. JUDD, supra note 164, at 94. See also HOFrAnTER, AGE OF REFOR., supra note 162, at
259; WIEBE, SELF-RULE, supra note 193, at 163-64.
202. ROBERT C. WVOOD, SUBURBIA: ITS PEOPLEANt)THEIR POLITIS 158 (1958).
203. SAIUEL HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC tALNAGEMENT IN THE PROGRssvE
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205. See ROBERT M. CRUNDEN, MINISTERS OF REFORM: THE PROGRESSIvES' ACHIEVEMENT IN
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common good itself. The connection of this kind of thinking to a winner-
take-all electoral system is, I hope, beginning to become clear. Before
tracing those connections more explicitly, however, I want to explore this
conception of politics a bit further by examining the details of an important
fault line, one that divides proponents of a politics of virtue according to
their views as to how politics actually functions to identify the common
good. These details will become important when we turn in Part IV to the
question of whether it is possible for an electoral system to permit a politics
of virtue to flourish while simultaneously confining a self-interested,
pluralistic politics within the bounds of fairness.
2. The Epistemological Problem
If society has some objective common good that it is the function of
politics to identify, how precisely can a democratic political system lead
society to discover it? Democratic political thought has generally answered
this question in one of two different ways. One school of thought, which I
shall call republican, holds that democratic societies discover the common
good by electing wise and virtuous representatives, who then deliberate
independently-that is, without significant regard to the beliefs of their
constituents. Through this deliberative process, the representatives find the
common good-or at least make the closest approach to it of which society
is capable-and then use governmental power to achieve it. A second and
generally more recent school of thought, which I shall call populist, holds
that the main repository of wisdom and virtue in any society is the people
themselves rather than their representatives. On this account, the people
decide collectively upon the common good and then elect representatives
whose principal responsibility is to implement the common good as the
people have decreed it. Representatives thus have little independence,
serving much more directly as agents whose function is to carry out a set of
instructions from their principals.
a. Republicanism: Wise and Virtuous Representatives
Republicanism typically relies on what is sometimes called the "trustee"
model of political representation. On this model, government officials are
entrusted with the power to rule, but they are confined to using that power
in behalf of its intended beneficiaries-the people.20 Representation, on this
model, is not some kind of second-best substitute for direct democracy
required by the inability of a large citizenry to meet in person; it is, rather, a
different and superior form of government,2 a system the purpose of which
208. See PITKIN, supra note 33, at 128; SCHWARTZ, supra note 114, at 32-35. Katz calls this
"Tory" popular sovereignty. KATZ, D-NIOCRACYAND) EI.ECTIONS, supra note 119, at 30-32.
209. SeeMANIN, supra note 62, at 2.
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is "to select leadership, not to maximize democracy.""' Moreover,
republicanism does not contemplate that representatives will take their seats
in the assembly committed in advance to a concrete set of policies or even
abstract beliefs. Because officials are selected precisely on the basis of their
own personal wisdom and virtue rather than the wisdom and virtue of their
constituents, representatives must exercise considerable autonomy of
judgment, thus raising the distinct possibility that they will do things
differently than their constituents might think right.2 1' The legislature, then,
becomes a deliberating body, "a place where individuals form their wills
through discussion,"12  and it is clear that "discussion can produce
agreement among participants with divergent opinions at the outset only if
they are in a position to change their minds during the course of the
exchange"--if they are not, that is, bound to some externally determined
position.-' -
Once again, this model of politics has ancient roots: "Immemorial
practice and an enormous weight of political theory accepted that the
character and quality of a people depended on the good influence of their
government and also taught that this required attention to the virtue of the
rulers, assumed to be a prince or some sort of aristocracy."14 Although
ancient thinkers such as Aristotle did not rule out the possibility that
preeminent virtue could be found in any segment of societyN'1 mediev,'al
thought distinguished clearly between social quantity and social quality
(maior pars and sanior pars) and tended to locate the latter in a ruling
aristocracy.2 16 By the Enlightenment, however, this concept was replaced by
the idea of what Jefferson, echoing contemporary political terminology,
called a "natural aristocracy"* 1-- one based not on birth but on merit. The
210. SARTORi, DF-MocRAT IcTHEoRY, supra note 61, at 108.
211. MANIN, supra note 62, at 203-05; HOFSTrADTER, PkR1YS rtM, supra note 176. at 47-18.
212. MANIN, supra note 62, at 205-06.
213. Id. at 205-06.
214. KErcHAsi, supra note 92, at 78.
215. In his discussion of which kinds of constitutions are best suited to variots political
communities, Aristotle advances a kind of geometric formula that identifies die portions of the
community that predominate in "quantity" and the portions that predominate in "quality,' and
weighs them against one another to decide where power should lie. In appl)ing this formula to
various examples, he proceeds immediately to the difficult cases: the ones in which "quality ma)
belong to one of the parts which compose a state, and quantity to another." ARISTOTru, supra
note 91, bk. IV, ch. xii, at 1296b17. His first example is the realistic one in which the low-bom
exceed the high-born in quantity, but not in quality. Nevertheless, it is clear from his formula
that nothing requires quantity to be weighed against quality, and where the two coincide in a
single class that class, whatever it may be, should rule. i. He also specifically recognizes a type
of constitution, "polity," in which "the masses govern the state with a %iew to the common
interest" Id. at bk. III, ch. vii, 1279a32.
216. KA'r, DEi~ocRAcvAND Et.EcTIONS, supra note 119, at 18-21, 29-30.
217. Letter from ThomasJefferson toJohn Adams (Oct. 28, 1813). in CoRLr O.DE=CE OF
JOHN ADAMS AND THOMASJEFFERSON, 1812-1828, at 92 (Paul Wilstach ed., 1925).
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concept of a natural aristocracy did not do away with the idea that some are
better suited than others to rule, but merely democratized it: members of a
natural aristocracy of wisdom and virtue might, at least in theory, be found
in any social class or economic condition. 's
The idea of a natural aristocracy entitled to be elevated to the reins of
government fit well with long-established social customs of hierarchy,
patronage and dependence. 2' 9 England, wrote Walter Bagehot, was "a
deferential country" in which members of the lower classes "did not really
form their own opinions... [but] were in fact guided in their judgment by
the better educated classes."20 While this deference had traditionally been
exercised in favor of "rank and wealth,"2' it required no great shift of
attitude or behavior to redirect the habit of deference toward the republican
value of merit. The result, indeed, was a substantial gain in status for the
ordinary person, for behavior that had previously been understood as the
due of social and hereditary privilege was reconceptualized in a way that
credited ordinary citizens with an exceedingly important, though certainly
limited, kind of skill and judgment. Montesquieu put it thusly:
The people are extremely well qualified for choosing those whom
they are to intrust with part of their authority. They have only to be
determined by things to which they cannot be strangers, and by
facts that are obvious to sense. They can tell when a person has
fought many battles, and been crowned with success; they are,
therefore, capable of electing a general. They can tell when ajudge
is assiduous in his office, gives general satisfaction, and has never
been charged with bribery: this is sufficient for choosing a praetor.
They are struck with the magnificence or riches of a fellow-citizen;
no more is requisite for electing an edile [executive]. These are
facts of which they can have better information in a public forum
than a monarch in his palace. But are they capable of conducting
an intricate affair, of seizing and improving the opportunity and
critical moment of action? No; this surpasses their abilities.2
218. HARRY L. WATSON, LIBERTY AND POWER: THE POLITICS OFJACKSONIAN AIERICA 5.6
(1990). On republican assumptions, however, the possibility of finding members of the natural
aristocracy in the lower social orders was mostly theoretical because the kind of virtue that
concerned republicanism tended to require a kind of leisure and economic independence that
could be found mostly among the relatively well off. WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 156, at 106-
08.
219. WOOD, RADIcALiSM, supra note 156, chs. 1-5.
220. WAI.TER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION AND OTHER POLITICAL ESSAY 271
(Fountain Press 1993) (1915).
221. Md. at 7; see also Beeman, supra note 175, at 401 (finding that deference in eighteenth.
century America was given to "property, education, lineage").
222. BARON DE MONTISQUIEU, THE SPIRIT oFTHE LAWS bk. 11, ch. 2, at 9-10 (1748) (Franz
Neumann ed., Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Books 1949). See alo ADRIENNE KOCH, THE
PHI.OSOPHY OF THOMASJEFFERSON 153 (1943) (discussing a letter from Thomas Jefferson to
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Thus, in the eighteenth century, the citizen "was entrusted with the
responsibility of identifying and evaluating his superiors, "2 those with a
legitimate claim to leadership. -'
So conceived, the republican model contemplates an extremely clear
division of political labor.225 The job of the people is to use their judgment
regarding individual qualities and character to select the wisest and most
virtuous representatives. The job of those selected, in turn, is to use their
gifts of intellect and character to identify and implement the common good.
To do this job properly, however, representatives must be independent; they
must be free to follow their judgment wherever it leads them. This is a view
of representation that accords well with traditional British notions of
Parliament as "a place for deliberating and reasoning on the great affairs of
state," and one that is correspondingly hostile to the concept of instructions
from constituents and to "organized pressure politics."2
Much of the American constitutional structure of political institutions
reflects the assumptions of a republican epistemology of morals. In the
original scheme, the Senate and the President were elected indirectly,
utilizing mechanisms designed to produce the election of the wisest and
most virtuous officials.-7 The Electoral College, in particular, was structured
so as to make the choice of President depend upon the detached
deliberation of wise and virtuous electors rather than on popularjudgments
about the merits of particular candidates or policies." Madison expressly
defended the large size of electoral districts under the proposed
Constitution on the ground that such elections were more likely to result in
the selection of virtuous candidates than would be the case in small election
districts. Because the ratio of constituents to legislators would be greater in a
large republic, said Madison, the number of "fit characters" from whom
voters could choose would be proportionately larger the larger the election
district.22 Moreover, candidates would need to persuade a larger number of
Dupont de Nemours dated Apr. 24, 1816, in which Jefferson claims that the people are
competent as judges of fact and choose representatives based on their knowledge of human
character).
223. Beeman, supra note 175, at 407.
224. See MANIN, supra note 62, at 94.
225. On the division of political labor see ERNEST BARKER, REn.rLTo.S ox Go\iRN.*!L%,'r
38-47 (1942); JOHN DUNN, INTERPrING PoLrFrML Rs roNsIrnLrru Ess.%s 1981-1989, at 24,
40-41 (1990). The republican division of labor, to succeed, must be based on considerable
mutual trust among society's members. Se, generally TRU. AND GOvRiANC. (Valerie
Braithwaite & Margaret Levi eds., 1998); KENDALU, LocmE, supra note 179; Willmoore Kendall,
The Two Majorities, 4 MIDwTsTJ. POL St. 317 (1960).
226. Samuel H. Beer, New Stinuures of Demorray in Britain and Arcaem-a, in D IMOUCT' IN
THE MI~D-TIWENTIETH CENTURY. PROBLDMIS AND PROSPEcTs 32 (William N. Chambers & Robert
H. Salisbury eds., 1960).
227. THE FEDERALIST No. 57 (James Madison); se also BESSEhrE, supra note 154, at 19.
228. THE FEDERAI.ST No. 68 (Alexander Hamilton).
229. THEFEDERALIST No. 10, at63 (James Madison).
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people to get elected, making it more likely that voters would pick "men who
possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established
characters.'"
2 30
The founding generation, then, did not assume that "the job of
members of the legislature was to transform electoral sentiments into
legislation."2 3 Far from it: the purpose of elections was to select leaders, not
to involve the public in affairs of government.23 2 On the republican model,
government should be staffed by members of a natural aristocracy of merit,
and the role of the people was to "recognize these sages, put them in office,
and follow their capable directions."2"
b. Populism: A Wise and Virtuous People
Republican ideology, it goes without saying, was soon overtaken in
American political thought by a rather different conception of how
democratic politics identifies and implements the common good. Under the
influence of an emphatically leveling notion of equality, Americans, in
Gordon Wood's words, "came to believe that no one in a basic down-to-earth
and day-in-and-day-out manner was really better than anyone else .... Good
republicans had to believe in the common sense of the common people.
2 "
When combined with a well-established American skepticism of government,
this belief in intrinsic equality soon led to an idea even further removed
from republican concepts of a natural aristocracy: the idea that the people
were actually superior to their representatives. 235 Consequently, as Elaine
Spitz observes, "a belief in the general populace as the repository of natural
civic virtue became commonplace,"2m a belief that was put into practice by
the rapid expansion of suffrage and, somewhat later, by the introduction in
the states of numerous devices of direct democracy.
Once again, the idea that the people are superior-wiser or more
virtuous-than their governmental servants has ancient roots. Aristotle put
the case for the people in these terms:
There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may
not be of a good quality; but when they all come together it is
possible that they may surpass-collectively and as a body, although
230. Id. See also Mark A. Graber, Conflicting Representations: Lani Guinier and James Madison on
Electoral Systems, 13 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 300-01 (1996).
231. Robert W. Bennett, Democracy as Meaningful Conversation, 14 CONsTr. COMMENT, 481,
498 (1997).
232. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DiRECT DENOCRAcY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALl. 7-8 (1989).
233. WATSON, supra note 196, at 6.
234. WOOD, RADICALIsM, supra note 156, at 234-35.
235. MORONE, supra note 154, at 5 (defining "the populist ideal" as the notion that "[t]hie
people are iser than their governors").
236. EI.AINE Sprrz, MAJORITYRULE 3 (1984).
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not individually-the quality of the few best .... [W] hen there are
many [who contribute to the process of deliberation], each can
bring his share of goodness and moral prudence; and when all
meet together the people may thus become something in the
nature of a single person, who-as he has many feet, many hands,
and many senses-may also have many qualities of character and
intelligence.ss 7
Even Machiavelli, conventionally understood to hold the people in low
regard, frankly acknowledged their capacity for acute judgment:
I claim that the populace is more prudent, more stable, and of
sounder judgement than the prince. Not without good reason is
the voice of the populace likened to that of God; for public
opinion is remarkably accurate in its prognostications, so much so
that it seems as if the populace by some hidden power discerned
the evil and the good that was to befall it. With regard to its
judgement, when two speakers of equal skill are heard advocating
different alternatives, very rarely does one find the populace failing
to adopt the better view or incapable of appreciating the truth of
what it hears.2 '
These pragmatic justifications were later supplemented by a powerful
epistemological account, provided by the common sense philosophers of the
Scottish Enlightenment, of the abilities of the ordinary human mind.
According to this account, all normal individuals have a kind of innate sense
of morality that, left to itself, orients them with considerable accuracy toward
237. ARISTOTLE, supra note 91, bk. Il1, ch. XI, at 128la-b.
238. NiccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE DiscouRsEs 1:58, at 255 (Bernard Crick ed., Leslie J.
Walker trans., Penguin 1970). Machiavelli refers here to the ancient aphorism 'vox populi. %ox
Dei," the voice of the people is the voice of God. This sa)ing is extremely difficult to track down.
The earliest known direct attribution appears to be its use by Alcuin, an eighth centtur English
monk and adviser to Charlemagne. Yet Alcuin wrote to dispute the validity of the mxim.
apparently then well-knowm, in the course of arguing that 'only those who enjoyed specal grace
were allowed to voice the Vox Dei, namely, prelates, kings or pseudoprophets on whom God
Himself had conferred such a right." SOPHIA MENAcHE, THE VOx DEU: COm'uLNIuT-'\io I% THE
MIDDLE AGEs 3 (1990). The Latin may suggest a Roman origin, though the phrase does not
appear to be from Cicero, who speaks of the good of tie people as the highest good, NLu.
WOOD, CicERo's SOCIAL AND PoLITIAL THOUGHT 128-10 (1988), but draws no specific link
between the people's wishes and God's. Perhaps the expression owes more to the Christian
notion of the sensusfidelium, the idea that "Ithe body of the faithful as a w'hole, anointed as
they are by the Holy One [see 1 John 2:20, 27] cannot err in matters of belief. Thanks to a
supernatural sense of the faith which characterizes the People as a whole, it manifests this
unerring quality when ... it shows universal agreement in matters of faitl and morals.'
RICHARD P. McBRiEN, CATHOLICIsM 24 (1994) (quoting Dogmatic Constitution on the Church,
12). The Dogmatic Constitution on the Church can be found at I VATIm N CouN.CI I1 363
(rev. ed. 1988). The references toJohn are: "But you have been anointed b) the Holy One, and
all of you have knowledge," and "the anointing that you received from him abides in %ou, and
so you do not need anyone to teach you." 1John 2:20, 27 (New Oxford Annotated).
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right and wrong. 9 In the context of a general Enlightenment resistance to
monarchical and aristocratic claims to moral superiority, and to a
consequent entitlement to the reins of power, common sense philosophy
provided a convenient basis forjustifying republican forms of government.
Common sense philosophy made a distinct impression on many of the
American founding generation.24 Jefferson, for example, struggled to
reconcile his sympathy for the common sense view of universal moral
aptitude with what he apparently regarded as obvious, everyday evidence of
the inability of at least some portion of the populace. In a frequently quoted
letter, Jefferson made the case as strongly as any American of his generation
for the universal competence of the people:
[Man] was endowed with a sense of right and wrong .... This
sense is as much a part of his nature as the sense of hearing, seeing,
feeling .... The moral sense ... is given to all human beings in a
stronger or weaker degree .... It may be strengthened by
exercise .... This sense is submitted indeed in some degree to the
guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for
this .... State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor. The
former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter,
because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.'
Yet at the same time, as we have seen, Jefferson professed a belief in the
propriety of rule by a natural aristocracy distinguished by virtue and
intelligence. In what might well be called a characteristically American way
of reconciling these two positions, Jefferson allowed himself to be guided by
a certain optimism about basic human nature and a belief in the possibility
of human progress, 42 beliefs that allowed him ultimately to maintain that
virtue does not flow down from virtuous leaders, but up from a virtuous
populace . 43 Any disjunction between the theory of universal popular virtue
and the reality of popular ignorance or venality was to be addressed, in
Jefferson's view, not by concluding that the people were incapable of good
and just self-rule, but by providing for all citizens an education appropriate
to the role that democracy demands of them.
If Jefferson's personal struggle to reconcile republicanism and
239. See KNUD HAAKONSSEN, NATURAl. LAW AND MORAl. PHILOSOPiY: FRONt GROTItS TO THE
SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 66 (1996).
240. See generally MORTON WHITE, supra note 151; GARRY WILLS, INVENTING ANERICA:
JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1978).
241. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Peter Carr (Aug. 10, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 14 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955). On Jefferson's debt to moral sense
philosophy, see KOCH, sulra note 188, ch. 3; YARBROUGH, supra note 188, ch. 2; MORTON
WHITE, supra note 151, chs. 2-3.
242. KOCH, supra note 188, at 116-18; WHITE, supra note 151, at 137.
243. SeeYARBROUGH, supra note 188, at 103.
244. See CRONIN, supra note 232, at 40.
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populism typified the transitional beliefs of the founding generation, that
struggle was by all accounts definitively resolved within a generation in favor
of a populistic belief in the competence, the virtue, and, ultimately, the
superiority of the common people. As pre-revolutionary social hierarchies
weakened, so did traditional attitudes of deference toward social and
economic elites. 245 In a strange twist on the platonic account of the
relationship between truth and power, decentralization of power apparently
led to a belief in the decentralization of wisdom as well. In Gordon Wood's
perhaps overly exuberant account
The result of all these assaults on elite opinion and celebrations of
common ordinary judgment was a dispersion of authority and
ultimately a diffusion of truth itself to a degree the world had never
before seen. With every ordinary person being told that his ideas
and tastes, on everything from medicine to art and government,
were as good as, if not better than, those of "connoisseurs" and
"speculative men" who had college degrees, it is not surprising that
truth and knowledge became elusive and difficult to pin down.
Knowledge and truth, it was argued, now indeed had to become
more fluid and changeable, more timely and current ....
Americans of the early Republic experienced an epistemological
crisis as severe as any in their history. [They were c]onfident of
their ability to determine all by themselves the truth or validity of
any idea or thing presented to them .... [Under the influence of
this] democratization of truth... [m]ost ordinary people were no
longer willing to defer to the knowledge and judgments of those
who had once been their superiors .... [TI hey had eyes and ears,
and they knew what was true for them better than some
"commanding genius" or "learned sage" did."'
In Wood's view, not only had "the nature of truth and the ways to
discover it... become public issues," 4 7 but the criterion for determining
truth was no longer the opinion of an enlightened elite but "the opinion of
the whole people'--in the terminology of the nineteenth century, "public
opinion."-4
245. See generally WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 156, chs. 13-19; WIEDF, StI-.RuI.L. supra
note 193, ch. 1.
246. WOOD, RADICALIsM. supra note 156, at 361-62.
247. Id. at 362.
248. id. at 363. Cf. WAI.TER LIPPMANN, PUBIC OPINION (1922) (noting the subjective nature
of public opinion). Wood goes on to argue, somewhat extravagantly, that early nineteenth-
century Americans developed a self-consdous theory of truth analogous to the utilitarian theory
of morals in which truth is merely the aggregation of indiidual viete. Sn Gordon S. Wood, Th7e
Democratization of Mind in the American Retoltuion, in TH- MORAl. FOiUNI).TIOS OFlILA.IEfIC-n
REPUBLIC 102, 126 (Robert H. Horvitz ed., 1977). Aside from the historicist implausibility of
the possibility that utilitarian ideas could have been extended to truth before they were
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Whatever the strength of Wood's account of the founding and the
period immediately following, it is clear that by the Jacksonian period "a
strident egalitarianism had become the staple of American political
rhetoric.",249 Politicians of this era professed "an appreciation of the common
man, and a desire to serve his needs and aspirations."2 ° This faith in the
common person rested on a belief in the purity of the popular will and on
the people's responsiveness to rational argument, qualities that Jacksonians,
following Jefferson, often attributed to the independence and self-
sufficiency of what they took to be the typical American yeoman."
Jacksonians thus claimed, loudly and repeatedly, that the people were
"good, trustworthy, and capable of self-rule." 252
There is, to be sure, some tension between the rhetoric of the
Jacksonian democratic faith and the techniques of mass democratic politics
that Jacksonian Democrats developed, techniques that tended to treat the
voter as "a simple fellow more responsive to hokum than to straight talk
about issues."23 Moreover, even those whose faith in the people was sincere
found that faith severely tested by the 1840 election of William Henry
Harrison, an event that Jacksonians saw as a grievous popular error.
2 '1
Nevertheless, at least in their public rhetoric, Jacksonians typically claimed
that any problems in the operation of democratic self-rule were not caused
by the people, who remained virtuous and reasonable, but by politicians or
government officials who had become corrupted and who had in
consequence betrayed the people's true interests.,:
This formulation-a virtuous and competent citizenry whose will had
been obstructed either by corrupt individuals or unsuitable governmental
structures and institutions-continued to dominate American public
political thought through the nineteenth century and on into the twentieth.
While populists like William Jennings Bryan proclaimed in Jacksonian
fashion their faith in the common people,56 it was the Progressives who
articulated and applied to utility, Wood's position seems directly contradicted by the much
more orthodox views of the Jacksonians and Progressives set out in the ensuing paragraphs of
the text.
249. WATSON, supra note 196, at 5.
250. GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, THEJACKSONIAN ERA, 1828-1848, at xi (1959).
251. See MEYERs, supra note 195, at 19-21 (describing Jackson's belief of the political
superiority of the common man as compared to the aristocracy).
252. ROBERT V. RENIINI, THEJACKSONIANERA26 (1989).
253. EDWARD PESSEN, JACKSONIAN AMERICA: SOCIETY, PERSONALITY, AND POI.ITIC S 166
(1969).
254. SeeART4UR M. SCHLESINGER,JR., THE AGE OFJACKSON 401-02 (1945).
255. See hiL at 402-04 (discussing John C. Calhoun's thoughts on powerful economic
interests and the government).
256. Bryan claimed that:
the people were competent "to sit in judgment on every question which has arisen
or which will arise, no matter how long our government will endure," and ... that
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developed a full-blown theory of popular virtue and capacity for self-rule,
along with a package of institutional reforms designed to put these beliefs
into action by turning over substantial direct political power to the people
themselves at the expense of their representatives. At the center of the
Progressive democratic ideology lay the conviction that the average
contemporary American citizen is fully competent to exercise extremely
close oversight and control over the apparatus of government. According to
Benjamin Parke De Witt, an early historian of the Progressive movement:
With the telephone, the telegraph, the railroad, the newspaper,
and the magazine, with the spread of education and the increase in
the intelligence of the average voter, there is every reason why the
people should exert more and more influence on government
rather than less and less. There is every reason why a majority of
the people, expressing their opinions in an open, legal way should
control the acts of presidents, judges, and legislators rather than
that they should allow corporations and banking interests to
control them in a secret and illegal way. To make the federal
government more democratic by eliminating the impediments to
popular rule is not to make it less representative; it is merely to
change the persons represented.17
Significantly, by characterizing popular competence as a modern
phenomenon brought about by modern education and technology, the
Progressives were able to appropriate the founding generation's republican
beliefs in an objective common good and a politics of virtue, yet at the same
time repudiate republican institutions of governance that, as Madison
frankly admitted, were designed to effect "the total exclusion of the people
in their collective capacity" from the reins of government.?A
If leading Progressives believed in "the intelligence, the self-restraint,
the morality, the breadth of view of the average man, the emergent New
Citizen,"2 they also believed that these qualities imposed upon citizens an
obligation to improve society through their active participation in politics.- '
the great political questions were in the final analysis moral questions concerning
which the intuitions of the people were as good as almost any degree of
experience.
HOFsTADTER, AGE OF REFORM, supra note 162, at 260.
257. DE Wrrr, supra note 163, at 143. In his own, somewhat quirky account of
progressivism, William Allen White attributed increases in popular leisure time and education
to technological innovations---specifically, "steam.* WHITE, supra note 206, at -1-5.
258. THE FEDERA isT No. 63, at 428 (James Madison) (emphasis deleted). The Progressives
were openly critical of the Framers on this point, often describing them and the Constitution in
ways that could not be more different from the kind of pious reverence characteristic of today's
originalist discourse. See WHrE, supra note 206, at 3,34, 38.
259. HOFSTADTER, AGE OF RE~oPM, supra note 162, at 257.
260. See DEWrT, supra note 163, at 190 ("The theory of democracy upon which the entire
progressive movement is based is that every normal citizen who is mentally and morally fit not
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Unlike earlier admirers of the public, who nevertheless remained suspicious
of democracy and feared popular power, Progressives put their beliefs into
practice by a carefully coordinated and extremely successful campaign for
political reform. Among their widely adopted innovations are such now-
familiar mechanisms of direct democracy as the initiative, referendum,
direct primary, and recall election.2 1' They also sought to tighten popular
control over government through extension of the franchise to women,
popular election of Senators, improved voter registration systems, corrupt
practices acts, and the short ballot.2 12 In introducing these innovations,
Progressives took a view of the function of representation that could not
have been more different from its republican predecessor: far from
exercising independence based on their wisdom and virtue, government
officials, on the Progressive view, "served as little more than highly
intelligent coordinators who responded to all manner of rational public
demands, integrated them, and arranged for their fulfillment."2 '3s Clearly,
behind such a conception of politics lies an extremely robust conception of
popular competence, wisdom, and virtue.
The notion that the people are competent and virtuous, and that the
common good is best identified by them, and implemented according to
their instructions, raises the question of precisely how the people are to
decide among themselves where the common good lies. Historically, the
most common answer to this question has been that a majority shall decide.
Because of the intimate connections between the populist conception of a
politics of virtue and the notion of majority rule, I turn now to a brief
examination of some of the historically most important justifications for
majority rule.
only has the right, but is also under a duty to participate in the solution of political problems.").
Cf. WIEBE, ORDER, supra note 165, at 160-61:
Above [government officials] stood the public man, a unique and indispensable
leader. Although learned enough to comprehend the details of a modern,
specialized government, he was much more than an expert among experts. His
vision encompassed the entire nation, his impartiality freed him from all
prejudices, and his detached wisdom enabled him to devise an equitable and
progressive policy for the whole society .... As the nation's leader, the public man
would be an educator-extraordinary. He bore the greatest responsibility for raising
mass intelligence to the level of true public opinion .... [After a period of civic
training,] the electorate would come to participate directly in certain aspects of
government through the initiative, referendum, and recall. The proper use of such
mechanisms, however, depended upon the prior existence of that rational public.
261. SeeDEWrrr, supranote 163, chs. 10-11.
262. See id.
263. WIEBE, ORDER, supra note 165, at 162. See also DE GRAZIA, supra note 116, at 185




c. Justificationsfor Majority Rule
In his first inaugural address, Thomas Jefferson declared that "absolute
acquiescence in the decisions of the majority" is "the vital principle of
republics" and one of the "essential principles of our government." In later
years, Jefferson maintained that "the will of the society enounced by the
majority of a single vote, as sacred as if unanimous, is the first of all lessons
in importance."26 In taking this position, Jefferson stood firmly on tradition,
to be sure-but did he stand on anything more? Is majority rule justifiable
on normative grounds as well? We have seen that the founding generation
believed both that the common good is objective and that the purpose of
politics is to discover it. It would seem to follow from these premises that
absolute acquiescence is owed not to political decisions made by a majority,
but to political decisions that accurately discern and pursue the common
good.-6" Majority decisions might be entitled to obedience, but only if they
are substantively right.
Historically, the notion that some group of decision makers-whether
the people or their representatives-are wise and virtuous has long been
linked with the idea that the majority of the group is more likely to be right
than the minority. According to Willmoore Kendall, "It] he proposition that
there is resident in the majority a certain virtue which, outweighing all the
claims of expertise or intellectual superiority, gives it the right to make final
decisions affecting the welfare of the state, was more or less a commonplace
in the utterances of the democratic statesmen of the ancient uorld." " Later,
influenced by the Roman principle that the will of the majority is the will of
the collectivity, " 3 medieval church usage concerning majority rule tended to
conflate superiority of numbers (mafior pars) with superiority of wisdom
(sanior pars).2-9
By the time of the Enlightenment, some natural law theorists seemed to
try to avoid defending majority rule on these grounds, preferring to justify it
on some kind of logic inherent in the natural world. Grotius, for example,
wrote that it must be the wish of any association to have some way of
264. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Miar. 4, 1801) [hereinafterJefferson, First
Inaugural], in LIFEAND WRriNGs, supra note 188, at 321,324.
265. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Baron F. H. Alexander Uune 13, 1817), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OFTHOMASJEFFEPSON, supra note 205, at 89.
266. This is a position rarely staked out today. But ste WIUIjAM N. NElsoN, ONJusTnImNG
DFiOCRAcY (1980) (arguing that democracy. as a representative form of government, is
preferable to other forms of government because it produces morally justifiable expressions).
See also GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEtocAC REvISrrED 137.41 (1987) (noting that
the strength of democracy is rooted in making effective societal decsions).
267. KENDAI.L, LocKE, supra note 179, at 12-13.
268. KATz, DENOCRACY AND Et.EcTiONS, supra note 119, at 29-30; scr aLso John Gilbert
Heinberg, Theories of Majority Rude, 26 AM. POL Sd. REV. 452,456 (1932) (concluding that, over
time, a preponderance of numbers came to be regarded as morally correct).
269. See Sprrz, supra note 126, at 198.
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"conducting business." "[I]t is manifestly unfair," he argued "that the
majority should be ruled by the minority. Therefore, naturally, the majority
has the same right as the entire body."2 70 In a famous passage, Locke also
appealed to a kind of natural logic:
when any number of men have.., made a community, with a
power to act as one body, [it] is only by the will and determination
of the majority; for.., it being necessary to that which is one body
to move one way, it is necessary the body should move that way
whither the greater force carries it, which is the consent of the
majority; or else it is impossible it should act or continue one body
.. ; and so every one is bound by [his or her] consent to be
concluded by the majority.
2 7t
Because these passages seem to appeal to natural, and thus non-
normative principles, they appear to justify majority rule as a pragmatic
requirement of collective life without regard to the content of the majority's-• 27223
decisions. Yet, as I have already indicated,75 such passages must be read in
light of the many other constraints that natural law theories place on
political decision making of any kind. AsJefferson put it, "though the will of
the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be
reasonable."' 4
Peter Laslett resolves this tension by attributing to Locke a doctrine of
what Laslett calls "natural political virtue," according to which people are
naturally disposed to treat each other well and to attempt to do what is
right.2 75 This doctrine, Laslett argues, "goes some way to justify in ethical
terms Locke's rather perfunctory defence of majority rule in mechanical
terms. For a majority, which is simply a random sample of those who voted,
will under this doctrine tend to act with some responsibility towards those in
270. HUGO GRoTius, DEJURE BE.LI Ac PACiS LIBRI TRES, bk. II, ch. V, sec. XVII, at 249 (F.
Kelsey trans., 1925) (1646).
271. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 96, at 55 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
1980) (1690).
272. Perhaps the modern equivalent of this approach is Kenneth May's well-known
demonstration that only majority rule can simultaneously satisfy four seemingly reasonable
conditions: uniqueness, anonymity, neutrality, and monotonicity. See Kenneth 0. May, A Set of
Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision, 20 ECONOMETRICA 680
(1952). Downs similarly claimed that majority rule was a consequence of a preference for
equality over other values. Anthony Downs, In Defense of Majority Voting, 69J. Pot.. ECON. 192
(1961).
273. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
274. Jefferson, First Inaugural, supra note 264, at 322. See also Letter from ThomasJefferson
to Thomas Seymour (Feb. 7, 1807), in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 43 (H.
Washington ed., 1869) (discussing majority's "righlfulwill").
275. PETER LASLE'rT, INTRODUCTION TOJOHN LOCKE, TWo TRFATISES OF GOVERNMENT 122-
23 (Peter Laslett ed., Mentor 1960).
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the minority."-76 Kendall goes further. Locke did not believe, he claims, that
"it is the fact of majority support which nakes right in politics," for Locke
could not have committed himself to this kind of moral relativism. The
proposition that the majority always wills what is right need not, however,
involve a commitment to relativism. It may rest equally on "a judgment
regarding the quantitative relation between the wise and the just, on the one
hand, and the foolish and the unjust on the other hand." Such a view would
be consistent with the belief that "there are moral standards which do not in
any sense depend for their validity upon acceptance by majorities" as well as
with the belief that "the majority of each political society both accept and
know how to apply these [objective moral] standards." '
There is probably no more perceptive account of liberalism's ethical
claims for majority rule than that of the sociologist Georg Simmel. Majority
rule, according to Simmel, is merely one manifestation of the more general
problem of "reconciling the individual's unity and totality.., with his social
role .... It is an attempt at saving the unity and totality of society from
disruption by the autonomy of its parts. Every conflict among the members
of a collectivity makes the continuance of this collectivity dubious."' In its
most basic aspect, a society might resort to majority rule "from the fact that
the many are more powerful than the few"; " voting is then nothing more
than a peaceful substitute for resort to force, a way of convincing the
minority that resistance would be impossible. In this situation, "two parties
confront one another like two independent groups, between which the
decision is made by power relations. em)
In more sophisticated forms, however, "this enforced physical
subordination is sublimated into an ethical form," namely "the principle that
the minority ought to follow the majority."2'
This principle, evidently does not only involve the suggestion that
the minority should cooperate with the majority for practical
reasons: it should also accept the will of the majorit) it should
recognize that the majority wants what is right. Unanimity is not a
fact but a moral claim. The action taken against the will of the
276. Id at 123.
277. KENDALL, LOCKE, supra note 179, at 133; see also Willmore Kendall, Pro!rgor.rna to Any
Future WA on Majority Rule, 12 J. PoL 694, 699 (1950) (arguing tat the majority principle,
properly understood, does not legitimate majority mill without restriction, but rather that 'the
will of the majority shall be accepted as the closest possible approximation to the wIll of the
community within limits set by certain other rules whose violation would prrnt tial fire arring at
majorities which is taken for granted by the majority principle itself).
278. Georg Simmel, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMmI. 239 (Kurt H. Wolff ed., trans.,
1950).
279. Id. at 241.
280. Id- at 242.
281. Id
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minority is legitimated by a unity of the will, which is produced
retroactively .... [In this view,] [t]he majority appears as the
natural representative of the totality. It shares in the significance of
its unity, which transcends the mere sum of the component
individuals ....
The voice of the majority now no longer is the voice of the greater
power within the group, but is the sign that the homogeneous will
of the group has decided in favor of this side .... The requirement
of unanimity initially derived entirely from an individualistic basis.
[This is replaced with] the principle of an objective group unity,
with its own, homogeneous will... [which is] based on a common
interest... [and] exists irrespective of any contrasts among
individual wills contained in these groups .... Since the group will
is one, it must act in a certain, homogeneous fashion. [But this
conflicts with the facts. The contradiction is resolved by assuming]
that the majority knows or represents this will better than the
minority .... [N] ow, the minority is, in principle, not excluded but
included; and the majority acts, not in the name of its own greater
power, but in the name of the ideal unity and totality. It is only to
the latter, speaking through the voice of the majority, that the
minority subordinates itself.
8 2
Rousseau certainly seems to be getting at just such a notion with his
282. Id. at 242-43. Simmel goes on to identify with stunning precision the feeling that
members of a democratic minority may experience upon defeat under a regime of majority
rule. The minority, he writes,
must subordinate itself.... And it must subordinate itself, not only in the simple
sense in which ordinarily convictions and efforts are negated and made ineffectual
by opposing forces, but in the more subtle and crafty sense that the loser, because
he is part of the group, must positively participate in the action which was decided
against his will and conviction. What is more, the uniform character of the eventual
decision which contains no trace of his dissent, makes him, too, responsible for it.
In this way, outvoting.., becomes the most poignant expression of the dualism
between the autonomous life of the individual and the life of society, a dualism
which is often harmonized in experience, but which, in principle, is irreconcilable.
h at 249. There is a striking similarity between Simmel's account and accounts by some VRA
activists of the feelings of black Americans who conceive of themselves as permanent political
losers. See GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 76-7; QuiET REvoL.UTION, s.pra note 25, at 16; see
also CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF GUI.TURES 317 (1973):
For a state to do more than administer privilege and defend itself against its own
population, its acts must seem continuous with the selves of those whose state it
pretends it is, its citizens-to be, in some stepped-up, amplified sense, their acts.
This is not a mere question of consensus. A man does not have to agree with his
government's acts to see himself as embodied in them any more than he has to
approve of his own acts to acknowledge that he has, alas, himself performed them.
It is a question of immediacy, of experiencing what the state "does" as proceeding
naturally from a familiar and intelligible "we."
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coordinate claims that "the general will is always rightful," and that "the
counting of the votes yields a declaration of the general vill." " Voting,
Rousseau explains, is not an attempt to canvass public opinion, but rather to
solve a much more specific epistemological problem-the identification of
the general will. This is a task that a majority is more likely to perform
correctly than a minority," 4 and those who vote with the minority have not
been overpowered, but have simply erred: "When, therefore, the opinion
contrary to my own prevails, this proves only that I have made a mistake, and
that what I believed to be the general will was not so." m' In this vay, as
Simmel suggests, majority rule isjustified on the ground that the majority is
better able than the minority to perceive the unitary common goody.
Because Americans inherited the principle of majority rule, and
because its underlying assumptions so closely track other leading
assumptions about politics, American political actors have rarely felt a need
to articulate justifications for majority rule of any sophistication.
Nevertheless, it is clear that support for majority rule has often been
associated with the populist conception of politics described earlier.-
Andrew Jackson, for example, frequently referred to the importance of
majority rule.2s Populists held that "[t]he way to discover the general will,
which is the objectively correct common interest of the incorporated
citizens, is to compute it by consulting the citizens."2" Progressives claimed
that their institutional reforms would "give to a majority of the people.., an
easy, direct, and certain control over their government." '
A few Progressives attempted to work out more detailed explanations as
to why the majority is better able than the minority to discern the public
interest. Much of the Progressive reform agenda was achieved in state
283. RoUssEAu, supra note 146, at 83, 153.
284. See BErrz, supra note 136, at 67 (describing the differences between the ability of the
majority and minority to ascertain the general will).
285. Id at 153.
286. It is possible, of course, to take this position too far. even on its own terms. For
example, the Stalinist theorist Andrei Vyshisky used this reasoning to justify the complete
suppression of dissent. See ELIAS BERG, DF.MOCc- GY AND THE MAJORITY PRINCIPLE: A STUD"IN
TWELVE CoTrEPORARY POLITIcAI. THEORIES 5-10 (1965). Nothing in Rousseau's reasoning,
however, suggests that a minority can justifiably be silenced. Rousseau %as concerned merely
wvith the minority's compliance, not its existence.
287. "Populistic democracy's bets.., are on the notion that a political system can be
adjudged good or bad according as authoritative decisions within it emanate from a certain
'source'...-from, concretely, the majority of a voting population made up of political equals,
and not some minority .... " Willmoore Kendall & George W. Carey. The "Intnsity" Prari~n and
Democratic Theaojy 62 AM. POL Sci. REv. 5, 10 (1968).
288. See 3 ROBERT V. REMINI, ANDREWJACKSON AN) THE COURSE OFA.MERICAN DLiOCFLA.cy,
1833-1845, at xiv (1984); DIXON, supra note 13, at 42-44.
289. WIuAM H. RiKER, LIBERAi.tsM. AGAINST POPULISM: A CoN'FRO%.rATION BET%"11 A THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACYAND THETHEORYOFSOULAL CHOICE 11 (1982).
290. DEWrrr, supra note 163, at 196.
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constitutional conventions, where Progressives urged that state constitutions
be amended to include their package of direct democratic devices and anti-
corruption measures. In his study of state constitutional conventions of the
Progressive era, John Dinan has usefully collected some of the more
sophisticated arguments and debates. During the 1907-1908 Michigan
constitutional convention, for instance, one delegate defended the populist
version of majority rule in these terms:
[T]here is not a chance nor an opportunity for error or private
interests to creep in where a matter is proposed by the electors of
the state in a collective capacity, that there is in any small or
appointed body from the people. We must remember this[:] that
truth is a unit, and that when a great aggregation of people pass
upon a matter proposed and agree upon the exact words of that
subject matter as it may be proposed in the amendment in that
proposal, that there are from eighty to a hundred thousand
qualified electors of the state in the very beginning who have
agreed upon the principle of that proposal. That where there is
that multitude of individuals who must agree, that there must be
eliminated from that process of agreement, the errors of each
individual and the private interests of each individualafl
Writing in The Atlantic Monthly in 1912, Jonathan Bourne of Oregon made a
similar public defense of the reliability of Progressive mass majoritarian
democracy. When the people act collectively, Bourne argued, many different
and selfish interests are set in motion, but "[n]o one selfish interest is
powerful enough to overcome all the others; they must wear each other away
until general welfare, according to the views of the majority acting, is
substituted for the individual selfish interest."2
3. Winner-Take-All: Electoral System for a Politics of Virtue
It is time now to pull together the threads of the argument thus far. My
contention is this: just as PR is the electoral system best suited to a
conception of politics as interest pluralism, so winner-take-all electoral
systems are perfectly suited to achieve the goals of politics understood as a
politics of virtue. If the common good is objective and unitary; if the
purpose of politics is to identify and implement this common good; if the
people have either the ability to identify the best and wisest representatives,
or the virtue and wisdom to discern the common good directly; and if a
291. JOHNJ. DINAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES: LEGIsiATORS, CITIZENS, ANDJUDCFS
AS GUARDIANS OF RIGHTS 72 (1998) (quoting Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Michigan, 1907-1908, at 566 (Lansing: Wynkoop, Hallenbek,
Crawford Co. 1908)).
292. Id. (quoting Jonathan Bourne, Jr., Initiative, Referendum, and Recall, ATr\ANTIC
MoNTHi.Y 109, 122, 123 (Jan. 1912)).
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majority of the people know these things better than any minority; then a
winner-take-all electoral system must be the electoral system of choice. On
these assumptions, the very features of winner-take-all systems that
contemporary proportionalists most frequently criticize-its insensitivity to
minority views, its exaggeration of majority strength, its lack of
proportionality in representation-appear as strengths rather than
weaknesses. They are features of an electoral system that has no purpose
other than to place the full, undivided power of the state in the service of
the good.23
As we saw earlier, proportionalists since Mill have claimed that winner-
take-all electoral systems leave the minority entirely unrepresented, their
votes wasted as though discarded. But if politics is understood as a politics of
virtue, this is no vice. If the purpose of politics is to permit a majority to
identify the common good, then a formal political decision shows only that
those in the minority are simply wrong on the merits: what they want has
been authoritatively (though not permanently) determined to be not in the
best interest of the entire community. Once such a decision has been made,
it would be both counterproductive and unethical to give the minority any
significant strength in the councils of government, for the only way in which
they could be expected to use that power would be to perpetuate their error
by obstructing governmental achievement of the common good. The same
reasoning answers the proportionalist objection that a winner-take-all system
exaggerates the majority's strength by over-rewarding electoral success with
disproportionate representation. Of course it does. The very purpose of
such a system is to assure as far as possible that the majority controls the
levers of power, control'that ethically it and no one else must exercise for
the simple reason that the majority, by hypothesis, knows better than any
other group or individual where the common good lies.
Similarly, the complaint that the minority lacks its own representatives
under a winner-take-all system24 has no bite, for no group in such a system
has its "own" representative to press its interests, or needs one. A winner-
take-all system is designed to be responsive, but not to the interests of any
293. See LUPHART, DFMoCRAcEs, supra note 43, at 207 (arguing that it is possible 'to derive
all of the characteristics of the majoritarian model logically from the principle of concentrating
as much political power as possible in the hands of the majority"). Cf QLTUE, supM note 122, at
37 (arguing that the purpose of "democratic statecraft" is "to synthesize society's parts, unify
and defend its people, [and] identify and pursue the common good," and that the real test of
democratic politics is "the test of excellence in state action").
294. SeeVoting Rights Act § 2,42 U.S.C. § 1973b (1994) ("A violation ofsubsection (a) ...
is established if... it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election ...
are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection
(a) ... in that its members have less opportunity than other members.., to elect
representatives of their choice...."); Lu-tAN, sulpra note 9, at 165 (stressing the importance
of proportional representation regardless of any disadvantages of the multimember
constituencies).
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particular constituency-it is designed to be responsive to the common
good. On a republican model, where the common good is determined in
Burkean fashion by the independent deliberations of the representatives, it
is clear that no one needs or is entitled to his or her "own" representative.
But even on the populist model, where the common good is determined by
a majority of voters, the government acts in accordance with the majority's
determination not out of some desire to be "responsive" to the majority's
wishes, but out of a desire to implement the common good which the
majority happens to have identified.
This kind of reasoning has rarely come to the surface in American
political thought, apparently because almost no one has thought it necessary
to lay out justifications for winner-take-all electoral systems. Although the
connections between a politics of virtue and winner-take-all political
structures thus typically lie deep beneath the surface, they have occasionally
bubbled up into plainer view, most notably in the thought of the
Progressives. One of the most common items in the Progressive bundle of
reforms was the at-large municipal election,2g5 the most robustly winner-take-
all of electoral systems. As we have seen, Progressive ideology conceived of
politics as a politics of virtue. Progressives thus crafted their reform
proposals in the belief that the measures they advocated would, more
successfully than existing institutions, bring about a reign of the common
good in public life.
How could at-large elections accomplish this goal? Here, Progressives
were frank. In the Progressive view, local politics had become corrupted by
the selfish pursuit of private interest.2 One of the main culprits, they
believed, was the ward system of politics, a system in which local bosses could
gain and then easily maintain control over small segments of municipal
society by engaging in a wasteful and corrupt politics of spoils .2 7 At-large
elections, Progressives argued, would break machine control over municipal
politics by eliminating the "neighborhood base of the machine." '
Politicians would have to
appeal to a large electorate rather than to one neighborhood or
ethnic group. All members of such a legislative body would be
statesmen, representing all the citizens as best they could. Gone
295. Se Richard L. Engstrom & Michael D. McDonald, The Affect of At-Large Versus District
Elections on Racial Representation in U.S. Municipalities, in Ei.ECTORAl. LAWS AN THEIR POLrICAl.
CONSEQUENCES, supra note 19, at 203; Joseph F. Zimmerman, Alternative Local Electoral Systems,
79 NAT'L Civic REv. 23, 26 (1990);JUDD, supra note 164, at 95-97.
296. See ROBERT M. CRUNDEN, MINIsTERS OF REFORM: THE PROGR-SSwIES' AcHIEvEi.NT IN
AMERICAN CIVII.lZATION, 1889-1920, at x, 15 (1982); DE WiTr, supra note 163, at 4, 23, 113;
HOFSTADTER, AGE OF REFORM, supra note 162, at 5-6, 257; Progressive Party Platform of 1912, in
THE PROGRESSI E MOVEMIENT 1900-1915, at 128 (Richard Hofstadter ed., 1963).
297. JUDD, supra note 164, at 95-96.
298. hU. at 95.
[2000]
MADISON'S HOPE
would be the politics of trade-off and compromise among
legislators representing their own particular areas. "Special
interest" politics would give way to "public interest" politics.r9
Moreover, Progressive reformers most often packaged at-large elections
together with nonpartisanship.s"  Nonpartisanship, now used in a majority of
local American jurisdicdons,' is premised on the belief that most issues of
local governance are inherently apolitical-that they admit of only one
correct answer."' Clearly, Progressives thought that at-large, inner-take-all
elections were the kind of elections most likely to produce objectively
correct answers to political questions.
The proportionalist argument that poses the greatest problems for
winner-take-all systems, even on the assumptions most favorable to them, is
the argument that such systems, in the American context, transform racial
minorities into permanent political minorities which are then deprived of all
direct influence over government actions. Nevertheless, on the assumptions
of a politics of virtue, the most direct answer" is perfectly clear, if perhaps
not entirely palatable: the only reason why a racial minority might become a
chronic political minority under a winner-take-all electoral system is because
its members chronically take political positions that are wrong on the merits,
and thus do not capture the common good of the entire society, a common
good best identified by the majority. Blacks, Hispanics, and other racial or
ethnic minorities, the argument goes, are thus in no different position than
many other groups-communists, socialists, neo-Nazis, Christian
299. Id. In addition, Cain argues in his book, 77e Rappartionwuent Pzu.e, that the
Progressives in essence anticipated what today would be called the 'median preference theory
of representation": they believed that if districts are large and heterogeneous, representaies
will have to respond to the median position of all voters, which will prevent them from
becoming too parochial in outlook. BRUCE CAIN, THE PJ.PORTToNNiENr PUT7.LE 63 (1984). Se
supra note 117 (citing writers who discuss the extent of influence of'voters wvho do not directly
support the candidate elected by the majority).
300. Carol A. Cassel, The Nonpartisan Ballot in the United States, in ELEC"TORUa. L%%S ,AD
THEIR POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 19, at 22C-27; WEAvER, mipra note 167, at 1.
301. Cassel, supra note 300, at 226.
302. SA. tuE HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFr: SCIENTIFIC MANAGE!.E.NT IN THE PRO;REssrvE
ERA, 1890-1920, at 102-03 (1964); HoFSTADTER, AGE OF REFORM, slipra note 162, at 101, 116;
WEAVER, supra note 167, at 20.
303. There are numerous indirect ways to blunt tie force of this criticism. It is often
argued, for example, that voting is far from the only way, and perhaps not even tile most
effective way, to influence government behavior. Sr ganrall, Kathryn Abrams, Razusing Politic
Up': Minority Political Participation and &zfion 2 of the Voting lutghts Art. 63 N.Y.U. L Riv. 449
(1988); CAROL M. SWAIN, BLACK FACES, BLACK INTERFsrS: THE REPRESENTATION OF AFwrI-CN
AmERICANS IN CONGRESS (1993). Another argument is that racial minorities exercise influence
more effectively by influencing representatives as minorities in numerous districts than by
directly electing favored representatives as majorities in a small number of majorityminority
districts. See generally DAVID LUBIN, THE PARADOX OF RFRPSENTATION: RACLU.
GERRYMANDERING AND MINORITY INTERESTS IN CONGRESS (1997). I put these arguments to one
side here in order to confront the basic claim.
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fundamentalists-who are members of a permanent political minority
because American society deems their political views wrong.'"
This approach is precisely what so infuriates VRA supporters and some
other proportionalists about the Supreme Court's decisions in the Shaw line
of cases. Whatever difficulties these case present-and political naivete,
internal incoherence, and impracticality may well be among them'0--it must
surely be conceded that the Court is attempting in the Shaw cases to appeal
to a unitary conception of the common good and to a politics that
transcends the race-based pursuit of private interest.O As Richard
Thompson Ford has observed, "[t]he Court's position in the colorblind
districting cases is a classic example of strong integrationism. The Court
repeatedly claims to aspire to a society in which race will not matter.""7 The
Court's decisions, Ford continues, thus constitute "a tacit nation-building
effort" conducted in the name of a particular conception of American
citizenship&s"8 It is only from this vantage point that the harms identified by
the Court in the Shaw cases make sense, harms that might be understood to
include impeding the achievement of a united multiracial society, for
example, or undermining "constitutional aspirations [for] a government in
which elected representatives owe a constitutionally-rooted obligation to
work for the entire community."9
The Court's critics, of course, tend to respond that the political
304. This kind of reasoning has recently begun to show up in cases alleging minority vote
dilution under the Voting Rights Act. For example, in Uno v. City of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973 (1st Cir.
1995), the court departed from the thrust of most prior rulings by holding that a showing of
bloc voting by a white majority, under the third prong of Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30
(1986), was insufficient by itself to support a claim of minority vote dilution. Instead, minority
plaintiffs would have to show that "other factors, apart from racial bias" did not cause the
majority bloc voting. Uno, 72 F.3d at 980. Thus, a Voting Rights Act claim could be defeated if
the defendants introduced, and the plaintiffs failed successfully to rebut, evidence "that whites
voted as a bloc for reasons wholly unrelated to racial animus." Defeat, the court said, "does not
prove a lack of electoral opportunity but a lack of whatever else it takes to be successful in
politics (say, failure to support popular programmatic initiatives, or failure to reflect the
majority's ideological viewpoints)."
305. Seesupra note 86 (citing sources that discuss the Shaw line of cases).
306. In this regard, Samuel IssacharoffreadsJustice O'Connor's swing opinions in the Shaw
cases as evincing a fear that minority groups' "claims of historical injustice [will servel as a
screen for interest group demands of the present." Samuel Issacharoff, The Constitutional
Contours of Race and Politics, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 45, 47. See also id. at 53 (arguing that the
"overriding theme" of the 1995 Term, in which Miller was decided, was that "the federal
government is as capable of succumbing to racial interest group politics as any other organ of
government").
307. Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial
Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1426 (1997).
308. Id. at 1436. See also ANNE PHIU.LipS, THEPOLITICSOFPRESENCE 124 (1995) (urging that
the politics of presence "always invokes some notion of proportionality between constituent
groups," meaning "it already presumes a heterogeneous society-and this presumption can be
precisely what some people will want to contest").
309. Emily Calhoun, Shaw v. Reno: On the Borderline, 65 U. COL.O. L. REV. 137, 141 (1993).
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subordination of blacks and other racial minorities has nothing to do with
the merits of their political positions and everything to do with race.' They
consequently understand the Court's rulings to pit a normative vision of
colorblindness against an empirical reality of racial discrimination."' As
Pamela Karlan and Daryl Levinson exasperatedly complain, the Court's
notion of an expressive or special representational harm is an "essentially
irrebuttable normative theory, rather than an empirical prediction.""M If
only the Court would stick to the facts, they seem to claim, its position would
be exposed as insupportable. This argument, however, is disingenuous. Facts
do not simply exist, waiting to be discovered and deployed to refute
normative theories. Rather, facts gain their power only in virtue of some
underlying norm that makes them relevant. The problem, of course, is that
the Court's critics are not merely confronting a norm with facts-they are
confronting one norm with another norm, a norm under which the
empirical reality of racial discrimination in politics makes a great deal more
difference than it does under the Court's norm of colorblindness.
On the Court's analysis, curtailing race-conscious districting will help
racial minorities (and everyone else) because race-conscious districting itself
harms the common good. Supporters of race-conscious districting argue in
response that race-conscious districting will in fact help minorities (and
everyone else) by increasing minority representation in government, which
will increase minority political influence, which will in turn help to achieve
the common good. But how does increasing the political influence of racial
minorities help achieve the common good? For the most part, VRA
supporters are thrown back at this point on some sort of interest pluralism."
310. Guinier and Karlan have taken this position particularly strongly. Se GevIitR,
T-.'R7xNx, supra note 1, at 3, 9, 34, 37, 60, 70, 103; Karlan, Undoing, supra note 2, at 41; Karlan,
TheRights to Vote, supra note 104, at 1740. This is in some ways a strange position for Guinier to
take, since she also conceives the VRA as a vehicle by which blacks are to achieve the
"transformative social agenda" of the original civil rights movement. GUINIER, "INMY, supra
note 1, at 44-48, 69. The latter idea, of course, opens Guinier's analysis of American racial
politics to the possibility that some or even most white voters reject black candidates not
because of their race but because of their substantive positions.
311. MEuss.A S. WILuAMS, VoicE, TRusr ANt) MlEMORy: N IARGINamzyi GROUPS AN) TtIE
FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENT1ATION 99, 102 (1998); Pamela S. Karlan & Darnl J. Levinson,
Why Voting is Dfferent, 84 CAL.L RA. 1201, 1212 (1996).
312. Karlan & Levinson, supra note 311, at 1211-12.
313. One important exception to this trend is the move tomard a multiculturalism.driven
notion of ideological differentiation, which I call "view pluralism," and its close cousin
deliberative democracy. SeePHILLIPS, supra note 308, at 145 (1995), stating:
[T]he politics of presence [always refers to] a notion that different groups have
different kinds of interests, and that, failing more equitable distnbution of political
office between different groups, there is little basis for believing that public policy
will be equitable between all .... The project of equal or proportionate presence
moves in close but uneasy association with the project of deliberative
democracy... [in that both address] who is present in political debate.
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What is primarily unjust about the current situation, they maintain, is that
the perpetual exclusion of racial minorities from political office prevents
these groups from getting their due-their fair share of political benefits.
Giving racial minorities political influence in rough proportion to their
numbers thus conduces to the common good by creating a fair and
equitable politics of self-interest. The Court, then, has played its cards well.
It cannot persuasively defend a winner-take-all system in terms of that
system's ability to promote a fair politics of self-interest. To attempt to do so
would be to meet VRA proportionalists on their own playing field. Instead,
the Court has come out against proportionality and in favor of winner-take-
all by identifying and relying upon a unitary common good that
proportionality itself, according to the Court, undermines.
This, at least, is how things look on the surface. What makes the whole
debate much more complex and unsatisfying, if I may be permitted a
moment of cynicism, is that neither side seems to be completely honest in
staking out its positions. At times, it seems that VRA proportionalists are less
interested in achieving proportionate political influence for blacks than they
are in achieving some set of substantive political objectives that, they
apparently believe, black elected officials would help to promote-Lani
Guinier's "transformative agenda of the civil rights movement," for
example.3 It is hard to escape the suspicion, meanwhile, that at least some
members of the Court sometimes seem more interested in assuring the
political dominance of the (white) majority than they do in pursuing
genuine principles of colorblindness. This has led to a truly breathtaking
irony in which one side promotes PR, a pluralist electoral system, as a way to
attain substantive justice; while the other side promotes winner-take-all, a
system designed to achieve substantive justice, for reasons of private interest.
The depressing reality may well be, as Peter Hain has observed, that support
for or opposition to particular electoral systems is often opportunistic and
driven by considerations of ideological or party interest. 5
IV. THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF MADISON'S HOPE
To this point, I have shown that proportional and winner-take-all
electoral systems rest on entirely different conceptions of politics. PR is
premised on a conception of politics as interest pluralism, a politics in which
the good emerges from free and fair bargaining among political actors
pursuing their own private self-interest. Winner-take-all electoral systems, on
the other hand, assume a politics in the classical sense, one in which political
314. GUINIER, TYRANNY, supra note 1, at 44-48, 69. See also PtllLips, supra note 308, at 100
("[T]hose pursuing the goal of minority political presence have always perceived it in relation
to the policy changes that will follow from this.").
315. HAIN, supra note 125, ch. 5; see WFAvR, supra note 167, at 143. For a recent example
of a study that adopts this point of view, see Caries Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of
Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies, 93 A i. Poi.. Sci. REv. 609 (1999).
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actors behave virtuously in an impartial search for a unitary common good.
The choice of an electoral system, then, appears to involve a choice of
something more than a method for casting and counting votes-it involves a
choice among competing conceptions of politics.
Any democratic society must, of course, choose an electoral system. So
which will it be? PR or winner-take-all? Politics or pluralism? Virtue or self-
interest? One obvious problem here is that neither choice seems, to the
contemporary mind, particularly appetizing. To build a political system on
interest pluralism seems like a complete capitulation at the outset to the
worst of human impulses. Moreover, interest pluralism's conception of the
public interest relies on a highly implausible bit of alchemy in which a
ceaseless stream of individual acts of selfishness is magically converted to the
greatest good of all. How convenient. On the other hand, politics in the
classical sense also seems like a deficient, or at least incomplete, conception
of political life. To build a political system that depends for its successful
operation upon the virtue and selflessness of political actors in a modern
mass democracy seems unrealistic, if not dangerously utopian."" But it is not
merely the unpalatability of the choices themselves that makes this problem
unsettling; it is also the possibility that we may have to choose at all. Surely
human social life encompasses both virtue and vice, selflessness and
selfishness, the pursuit of the common good, and the pursuit of private
goods. Must we really, in designing the institutions of democratic self-
governance, commit ourselves to expect, and hence to rely upon, only one
of these two qualities?
But perhaps no such choice is necessary. Perhaps there are some
institutions of governance that can function effectively regardless of whether
the citizenry behaves well or badly. If it is possible to build an automobile
engine that runs on gasoline but can also use propane when that is the only
fuel available, perhaps there is some way to structure a system of democratic
self-governance that can be propelled by either virtue or vice, or by some
realistic combination of the two. This is an attractive solution to an ugly
dilemma, and the path has been clearly blazed in American constitutional
thought. The founding generation wanted to devise just such institutions so
as to avoid precisely the choice I have identified between a politics ofvirtue
and a politics of self-interest. They believed that the best kind of government
would be based on virtue and would seek the common good, yet feared that
such a politics might be overwhelmed by a factional politics of self-interest.
Consequently, in ffaming the Constitution, they sought to develop a
governmental structure that would simultaneously encourage virtue to
316. The evident lack of political virtue in post-revolutionary America and the
disillusionment it caused revolutionary leaders probably had a significant influence on the
Framers' decision to construct a new constitution that did not depend heavily on a %irtuous
public. MICHAEL SANDEL, Dr.iocRAcv's Dtsco,4Tr.rNr 127-29 (1996).
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flourish and take full advantage of it whenever it appeared; yet would also be
well-prepared to confront and confine self-interested political behavior to
prevent it from causing serious damage to the nation. The promise of
avoiding difficult moral choices through clever institutional design I shall
call "Madison's hope."
Section A of this Part shows how Madison thought his hope could be
realized. Section B shows that Madison's hope is unattainable at the level of
electoral systems: no electoral system both permits a politics of virtue to
flourish without impediment and confines self-interested political behavior
within the bounds of fairness. Both leading contenders, PR and winner-take-
all, perform only one of these functions well while stumbling badly on the
other. To be clear, I make no claim here that Madison's hope is unattainable
under any circumstances. I argue only that it cannot be fulfilled through the
design of electoral systems alone. Whether Madison's hope is realizable
through some combination of democratic institutions is beyond the scope of
my analysis.
A. MADISON'S HOPE
Those who think of Madison as a pluralist typically rely on the mistaken
inference that because Madison thought "faction"--the pursuit of self-
interest rather than the common good3 7-was inevitable, he must also have
thought that political virtue was unattainable! 8 In fact, Madison makes it
quite clear that he preferred, and indeed fervently hoped for, a politics of
virtue, and he explicitly defended several aspects of the constitutional design
on the ground that they would help to usher such a politics into existence.
At the same time, the Framers knew that they could not count on a politics
of virtue to be sustained indefinitely or without interruption-"enlightened
statesmen will not always be at the helm," in Madison's words3" 9 -and they
thus expected factional behavior to appear. To prevent factions from doing
significant harm, they also tried to build into the constitutional structure
devices that would contain factions and inhibit their ability to seize the reins
317. See THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) ("By a faction I understand a
number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united
and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.")
318. The most notable proponent of this misreading is surely Dahl, who makes this mistake
in the very first "hypothesis" he attributes to Madison: "If unrestrained by external checks, any
given individual or group of individuals will tyrannize over others." DAHL, A PREFACE TO
DEMOCRATIC THEORY, supra note 99, at 6. It is true, of course, that Madison held that the
accumulation of all powers in the same hands is the equivalent of tyranny, THE FEDERA.RIS No.
47, at 324 (James Madison), a proposition that relies on an implicit assumption of human
venality. It does not follow, however, that Madison believed that all political actors will behave
self-interestedly all the time. His statement implies only that those with absolute power will yield
to the temptations of self-interest on enough occasions to characterize their rule as tyrannical.
319. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (James Madison).
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of power. Although at times the Framers sought to accomplish this goal
through a combination of distinct devices working in tandem,' in some
cases they intended a single institution to advance both goals at once.
The centerpiece of the constitutional plan, and surely its most elegant
stratagem, is the creation of a large republic. Madison la)s out his defense of
this constitutional innovation in Federalist No. 10. He begins from the
assumption that factional behavior is inevitable in politics, and that
attempting to prevent it would require intolerable restraints on liberty.
2
Unless Madison intended to defend the freedom to act contrary to the
common good, a dubious proposition,' what presumably makes such
restraints on liberty intolerable is that they would inhibit the behavior of
those who seek the common good as well as those who do not. Such
restraints on liberty might also limit the public-regarding behavior of those
who might act factionally on other occasions.-" The picture that Madison
paints, then, is from the outset one not of a politics characterized by the
constant, universal pursuit of self-interest, but of a politics consisting of some
mix of the pursuit of the common good and the pursuit of self-interest. The
problem, as Madison frames it, is to distill from such a politics whatever
virtue it is capable of producing, while at the same time prevent self-
interested behavior from bearing fruit."a The large republic, Madison
claims, can perform both these functions.
The distinguishing feature of a republic, Madison notes, is "the
delegation of the [g] overnment ... to a small number of citizens elected by
the rest.""' The effect of this process, he argues, is
to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best
discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and
love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or
partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen
that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the
320. Among the devices the Framers intended to reduce the potency of majority factions
are federalism, separation of powers, andjudidal review.
321. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 77-79 games Madison).
322. Kendall argues that the Framers were strongly committed to popular control over
government they were concerned about majority fadtios, but not majority rule itself. This
caused them to distinguish between "a popular majority as such and a popular majority
determined to commit an injustice." Willmoore Kendall, "Te Tw'o Majonrtu' 4 MnII)%-WrJ. OF
POL Sci. 317,334 (Nov. 1960). See also supra Part III.B.I.b.
323. THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 78 (James Madison).
324. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 350 (James Madison) ("The aim of every political
constitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to
discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the society; and in the next place, to
take the most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their
public trust.")
325. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison).
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people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if
pronounced by the people themselves .... 2
The first line of defense against a politics of self-interest, then, is the use
of an electoral mechanism which, when utilized by the citizenry in the
proper spirit, will install in office the wisest and most virtuous
representatives, who will then diligently pursue the common good. On the
other hand, Madison immediately acknowledges, "the effect may be
inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs,
may by intrigue, by corruption or by other means, first obtain the suffrages,
and then betray the interests of the people."2 What then?
The second line of defense, in Madison's view, is to make the republic
as large as possible. This works in two ways. First, because an effective
legislature can only be so large no matter what the size of the republic, the
number of people each legislator represents increases more rapidly than the
number of legislators as the size of the republic increases. This means that a
large republic will have larger election districts than a small one. If we may
assume, Madison suggests, that "the proportion of fit characters be not less
in the large than in the small Republic"-if, that is to say, wise and virtuous
individuals are distributed evenly throughout the population-then each
voter in a large republic will have a greater choice of good candidates,
thereby leading to "a greater probability of a fit choice." 28 Second, the large
size of election districts in a large republic means that any successful
candidate must attract the support of more voters than would be the case in
a small republic with smaller election districts. This works to the benefit of
the better quality candidates, Madison argues, because
it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with
success the vicious arts by which election are too often carried; and
the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to
center on men who possess the most attractive merit and the most
diffusive and established characters529
Finally, large election districts also impede the ability of factions to
coalesce and to elect venal candidates because each election district is likely
to be large enough to contain "a greater variety of parties and interests" than
would a small election district, thereby reducing the likelihood that a faction
will form a majority within any district. Furthermore, the sheer size of such a
district makes it "more difficult for all who feel [a factious motive] to
discover their own strength and to act in unison."2 Thus, in Madison's view,
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 63.
329. Id.
330. THE FEDERAI.IST No. 10, at 63 (James Madison).
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the creation of a large republic can be expected to yield three advantages: it
will result in "the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views
and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and
schemes of injustice"; it will impede the ability of any minority faction "to
outnumber and oppress the rest"; and it will raise "obstacles to the concert
and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested
majority," should one appear." Creating a large republic, then, spares us
the need to trust our fate entirely either to political virtue or vice. We need
not wait passively for virtue to appear, yet neither need we give up on virtue
altogether and hunker down, our only goal to survive, with our liberties
reasonably intact, the inevitable outbreaks of self-interest. Instead of
choosing one or the other, we choose both, equipping ourselves adequately
for each occasion.
Having decided that representatives to the national legislature should
be elected, the Framers left no further constitutional instructions
concerning the methods to be employed in conducting these elections. This
omission leaves the state and national governments substantial latitude in
the creation of subconstitutional democratic institutions. On the other
hand, it seems clear that the Framers hoped the electoral systems of a large
American republic would work simultaneously to encourage a politics of
virtue and to contain a politics of self-interest. Today, confronted as we are
by significant challenges to the structure and operation of electoral systems
at every level of government, might we take guidance from Madison's hope
by striving to choose electoral systems that perform both these functions at
once? Doing so would not only be in keeping with the original constitutional
plan, but might also spare us the pain of having to choose between
competing conceptions of politics.
We have seen that proportional electoral systems presuppose a politics
of interest pluralism and winner-take-all systems presuppose a politics of
virtue. But it need not follow that either system functions well exclusively
when politics is conducted in the way that it presumes. PR is designed to
allow the free and fair play of self-interested pluralism, but perhaps it is
capable of doing so without significantly impairing the ability of public-
regarding political actors to pursue and implement some conception of a
unitary common good. Conversely, a winner-take-all system should work best
when political actors behave disinterestedly, but perhaps it can also function
well when the pursuit of self-interest dominates the political process. If
either of these scenarios proves out, then choosing an electoral system need
not involve committing ourselves to one kind of politics or the other. In the
next section, I address this possibility by examining the performance of PR
and winner-take-all electoral systems under different political conditions.
331. Id. at 64.
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B. CHOOSE WE MusT
To claim that some particular institution of self-governance has the
ability to bring about in practice-to institutionalize-some philosophically
desirable conception of the common good is necessarily to make some
significant empirical assumptions about the way in which politics will actually
proceed when conducted in the proposed institutional setting. An electoral
system, that is to say, operates on a particular set of sociological facts about
the way political decision making occurs and how political actors behave-
what motivates them, how they interact, what means they are able and
willing to pursue to achieve their goals, how they exert political influence on
one another, and so on. As Melissa Williams has perspicuously observed, a
"theory of [political] institutions can be seen as standing between a
particular political sociology and a particular view of the common good.""'
The political sociology, in other words, explains how particular institutions
are capable of realizing some conception of the common good. To assess
the ability of some electoral system to achieve the common good under
different sets of conditions, then, requires first identifying the specific
sociological facts upon which each electoral system is thought to operate.
My analysis proceeds as follows. Earlier I identified in American political
thought two principal conceptions of politics, a politics of virtue and a
politics of self-interest, which are captured in the more specific political
models of republicanism, populism, and interest pluralism. For each of
these models, I first recapitulate briefly its associated political sociology-the
specifics, that is to say, about how, on its own assumptions, each model
contemplates that politics will achieve the common good. For each model, I
then "run" its political sociology-its hypotheses about political behavior-
"through" a winner-take-all and a PR electoral system. This yields
conclusions about which electoral system is best able to achieve the common
good on each of the models of politics. Finally, I analyze what would happen
under each electoral system if the assumptions contained in its best-case
political sociology were violated-if, for example, under an electoral system
that contemplates political virtue, political actors behaved self-interestedly,
and vice-versa. This analysis yields some conclusions about the versatility of
each electoral system, by which I mean its ability to achieve the common
good even when its primary assumptions about political behavior break
down. This analysis shows, alas, that neither PR nor winner-take-all electoral
systems perform well enough under nonoptimal conditions to relieve us of
the painful moral difficulty of choosing which conceptions of politics to
favor in the construction of democratic political institutions.
332. MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST AND MEMORY: MAR(;INAiLIZED GROuPS AND TIlE
FAILINGS OF LIBERAL R.PRE-SENTATION 51 (1998).
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1. Electoral Systems and the Politics of Virtue
a. Republicanism
Republican Political Sodology. As set out in greater detail earlier,"
republicanism contemplates an objective and unitary common good. The
purpose of politics is to discover and implement this common good. The
content of the common good is discovered and implemented, on the
republican model, through the legislative deliberations of elected
representatives who are preeminently wise and virtuous. To perform this
function adequately, representatives must be independent: they must be free
to pursue the common good wherever their deliberations lead them. The
people, on this model, have the competence to identify and the virtue to
select the best possible representatives. They do not, however, have the
ability on their own to determine collectively the content of the common
good. Popular competence ends with the selection of the representatives.
Popular competence and virtue, as the republican model understands them,
generally refer to the competence and virtue of a majority. Although
republicanism gives the people credit for a certain kind of perspicacity, it
does not assume the equality of all opinions, even those concerning the
character and intelligence of candidates for political office. Thus, decisions
about whom to install in office are for the greatest number.
The Best Electoral System for Republicanisw. On the assumptions of
republicanism, it seems clear that the common good can best be realized by
adopting a robustly winner-take-all electoral system. Most of the work toward
achieving the common good in a republican system is done by the
representatives through their post-election deliberations, so the critical
function of elections in a republican system is to give these deliberations the
best possible chance to succeed by identifying and installing in office the
absolutely wisest and most virtuous candidates.
Because it is so closely tied to majoritarianism, republicanism presumes
that a larger number of people is better at identifying the best candidates
than a smaller number of people. It follows that the best electoral system for
republicanism is one that will maximize the number of people who make
decisions about the merits of each candidate. This can be accomplished in at
least three ways. First, a republican electoral system would allow the largest
numbers of voters to put their heads together to identify the best candidates.
Second, because a majority of the largest possible voter grouping is most
likely correctly to identify the best candidates, the electoral system would
allow the majorities so constituted to make as many choices as possible.
Third, to maximize the voters' ability to select candidates who are in fact the
best, the electoral system should permit the voters to make their choices
from the best possible pool of candidates. If we assume that the likelihood of
333. This paragraph is condensed from the fuller discussion set out in supra Part 1lI.B.
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electing the truly best candidates increases with the number of candidates
from which voters are permitted to choose, this will probably mean taking
steps to offer voters the largest possible pool of candidates.
These conditions are, without question, best satisfied by a winner-take-
all electoral system. Indeed, they are best satisfied not merely by a system
that is winner-take-all, but by one that also conducts elections at-large, over
the widest possible area. A large election district takes in a correspondingly
large electorate that, by hypothesis, will be more competent than the
electorates of smaller districts. Because the majority of such a district will,
again by hypothesis, be best able to identify outstanding candidates, the
power of that majority should be maximized, something that an at-large
election using a place system is well-suited to accomplish. Finally, as Madison
argued, the large size of such a district increases the likelihood that it will
contain, and that the voters will therefore elect, the best possible candidates.
Indeed, the logic of republicanism is in some tension with the use of any
electoral subdistricting at all; its logic drives powerfully to the conclusion
that all elections should presumptively be held jurisdiction-ide. ' s
334. Cf Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 750 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting):
The very fact of geographic districting, the constitutional validity of which the
Court does not question, carries with it an acceptance of the idea of legislative
representation of regional needs and interests. Yet if geographical residence is
irrelevant, as the Court suggests ... I do not understand why the Court's
constitutional rule does not require the abolition of districts and the holding of all
elections at large.
Obviously, as a polity we have decided, at both the constitutional and legislative levels, to
deviate from the use of maximally large election districts. For example, the Constitution
provides that Senators and Representatives are elected statewide rather than nationwide, and
various federal laws, beginning with the Apportionment Act of 1842, ch. 14, 5 Stat. 491 (1842),
have further required that elections for Representatives be held from election districts rather
than at-large within each state. See LAURENCE F. SCHNIECKEBEIER, CONGRESSIONAL
APPORTIONMENT 132-35 (1941). It does not necessarily follow, however, that these decisions
reflect a retreat from the assumptions of republicanism. They may reflect only ajudgment that
countervailing considerations of significant weight require some compromise, perhaps only a
small one, regarding the ability of the electoral system to install the absolutely best candidates.
Clearly, the independent values of federalism and state sovereignty, to say nothing of political
realities, played a critical role in the Framers' decision to have representatives elected state by
state.
Issacharoff and Pildes argue that the adoption of the Apportionment Act in 1842
reflects a national commitment to enhanced proportionality of representation. See Samuel
Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politirs as Markets: Partisan Lockups of the l)emocratir Process, 50
STAN. L. Rrv. 643, 677 (1998) (claiming that the "principal aim" of the Apportionment Act was
"to increase political competition and encourage more diverse representation"). In my view,
greater emphasis ought to be placed on the complexities of the sectional politics of slavery that
consumed Congress during that period. To be sure, many members of Congress were sincerely
interested in the operation of republican government and the political relationship between
majorities and minorities. Compare, for example, the remarks of Representative Halsted, chair
of the House committee that introduced the legislation, 11 CONG. G.OBi: 465 (May 10, 1842)
(arguing that districting was needed "to secure equality in political rights" and "a fill
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For purposes of comparison, we may consider what would happen if,
instead of using a winner-take-all system on a politics consistent with
republican assumptions, we used PR instead. How well would PR produce
the common good as republicanism conceives it.' The answer is: not as vell.
PR elections use large, multimember election districts, so in this respect PR
is at least no worse than at-large elections. However, under PR, a majority
cannot control the disposition of all the seats to be filled from the district.
Instead, candidates preferred by minorities are elected in proportion to
their popular support. What would be the practical effect of such a change?
Even under PR, a single, cohesive, popular majority could still fill a majority
of legislative seats. Since, by hypothesis, the minority is not as capable as the
majority of identifying the wisest and most virtuous candidates, the result
would be a legislature a majority of whose members were extremely able,
and a minority of whom were less able. Depending upon the deficiencies of
the popular minorities that elected them, these lesser candidates might
range from only slightly lower in ability than candidates that the majority
would have selected, all the way down to incompetent and venal.
Nevertheless, in these circumstances, the legislature would still contain a
majority of the most able candidates who, in the best case, would have the
expression of popular opinion"), and Senator Miller, itd. at 568 Uune 2, 1842) (decr)ing 'the
monopoly of representation in a State" and claiming that the districted system "*was the only
possible way of feeling the pulse of popular will"), with those ofSenator Bagby (arguing in favor
of at-large congressional elections on the ground that 'the people of each State are, collectively.
interested in the relation which that State bears to the General Government; and it w-.as only by
the general-ticket system they could obtain their proper representation'). Id. at 571 Uune 3,
1842). Yet the debates also reveal, never very far from the surface, a concern for the politics of
slavery. In brief, Southern states wanted apportionment to preserve their legislative power in
Congress. In the South, political opinion s-as united in favor of slavery, and pro-slavery forces
could count on the support of every member of each state's congressional delegation. In the
North, in contrast, political opinion on slavery was divided. If congressional elections in
northern states were held at-large, there was a chance that anti-slavery forces could gain a voting
majority, enabling them to elect state delegations that were solidly anti-slavery. Southern
politicians believed that if northern elections were, on the contrary, held by district, it uas likely
that a good number of northern legislators would not support measures to end slavery. Thus,
apportionment would preserve a pro-slavery majority in Congress. Occasionally, such
sentiments were expressed quite directly, as by Representative William CostJohnson:
He was very free to confess that, representing as he did a peculiar institution of the
country, he should prefer to see the single district system. He believed that the
southern interests would be better advanced by that system, because, on all
questions touching it, the Representatives of the South would, as a matter of
course, stand together in protection of their owm rights guarantied them by the
Constitution, and there would always be differences of opinion in the North and
West, and those to unite ith the South in the %indication of its rights.
Id at 463 (May 2, 1842). Similarly, Rep. Garrett Davis argued that "the peculiar principles of the
South, and every interest it cherished, were to be protected by the district s)stem." Id at 448
(Apr. 27, 1842). Others alluded to "sectional interests," su- it at 469-70 (May 3, 1842) (remarks
of Rep. Ferris), or disparaged the legislation as "a movement of. . . one section against
another." Id. at568 (June 2, 1842) (remarks of Sen. Woodbury).
86 IOWA LAW REVIEW
power to control the legislature for the purpose of bringing about the
common good as they determine it.
While it is possible to imagine such a legislature performing reasonably
well, there are good reasons to think that, on a republican political
sociology, it would not typically do so. Republicanism contemplates that
truth and the common good will be identified through the deliberations of
the representatives. This depends upon two considerations: the degree of
wisdom and virtue that each representative brings to the legislature, and the
quality of the legislative deliberations themselves. A legislature assembled
through PR is likely to be inferior in both categories. First, those legislators
elected by popular minorities are unlikely to bring to the legislature the
same degree of competence as would legislators elected by the majority,
reducing the overall pool of delegate resources available to the legislature as
a whole. Second, less able legislators will be unable to contribute as much to
the legislature's deliberations as their more able counterparts, reducing the
quality and utility of discussion. Indeed, they might seriously impede it by
taking up limited time pursuing fruitless topics or avenues. On republican
assumptions, it is unquestionably better for all seats to be filled by the best
possible representatives, rather than merely some, even if amounting to a
majority. The Continental Congress had Jefferson and Adams and Franklin;
the Constitutional Convention had Madison and Hamilton and Washington
and Wilson. Surely a system best suited to including all these luminaries is to
be preferred to a system that might include merely some of them, or which
would replace them with incompetents.
Furthermore, except on the most absolutist conceptions of a unitary
common good,"'5 even the wisest and most virtuous representatives will often
disagree, at least at the outset of discussion. If this were not the case,
deliberation would be unnecessary. Some, moreover, no matter how wise,
may from time to time be wrong; others, no matter how virtuous, may from
time to time waver in their commitment to the common good. The best
antidote to these kinds of problems, on republican assumptions, is to assure
a legislature stocked to the brim with the best possible people, those most
capable of filling in any gaps left by the occasional faltering colleague. A
legislature assembled through PR, however, introduces the possibility that a
wrong-headed majority coalition might form from two smaller groups, one
consisting of generally able and good representatives, elected by the
majority, who have fallen short of their best, and the other consisting of a
group of stupid or venal representatives, elected by the (by definition
incorrect) minority. In this situation, the legislature's ability to identify and
act upon the common good is put in serious jeopardy.
Similar problems arise if there is no single, cohesive, popular majority




capable of coming to agreement on the identity of enough of the very best
candidates to install a majority of the legislature. If the largest voter
grouping amounts to only a plurality of the people, then PR systems, unlike
winner-take-all systems, will guarantee that the legislature is not controlled by
a majority of the absolutely wisest and most virtuous candidates. Since
republicanism typically draws no distinction between the visdom of the
greatest number when it is a majority or merely a plurality, PR has the
capacity seriously to undermine the achievement of the common good on a
republican political sociology. It is of course true that much in this analysis
depends upon the assumption that a majority is more competent than any
minority and that a plurality is more competent than any smaller minority,
yet this is simply part of the republican hypothesis. If we set it aside, then
nobody's opinion about who will make the best representative is any better
than anyone else's, and republicanism collapses into interest pluralism.
Winner-take-all on the Counterasswnptions. Winner-take-all electoral
systems, then, can be expected to perform at least somewhat better, and very
likely substantially better, than PR electoral systems on the assumptions of
republicanism. Suppose now that we are designing democratic institutions
and have high hopes for a politics of virtue. We consequently install a
robustly winner-take-all electoral system for the purpose of reaping as fully as
possible the benefits of political virtue. But what happens if our hopes for a
politics of virtue are not realized? Suppose that the electorate begins to
behave self-interestedly. Voters begin voting for candidates not on the basis
of their wisdom and virtue, but on the basis of their willingness to pursue
their constituents' private interests, at the expense of the common good, if
necessary. Representatives no longer seek the common good but instead
press measures designed to provide private advantage to themselves or their
constituents. What happens now in a legislature assembled utilizing a
winner-take-all electoral system?
The result, unfortunately, is that when a winner-take-all electoral system
confronts self-interested political behavior, it quickly collapses into a highly
leveraged and unfair power grab by the majority-all the more so if the
system is at-large, and all the more again if it operates over an extensive
territory. Winner-take-all systems are designed to place control over the
entire apparatus of government into the hands of a majority or plurality,
that is their point-that is how, on republican assumptions, they reap the
benefits of political virtue. Such a system deliberately magnifies the power of
the majority because it assumes that the majority knows, and intends to act
upon, what is good. A majority or plurality bent on pursuing its own private
interest rather than the common good-a faction, in Madison's
terminology--can, however, under these same conditions, without difficulty
seize control over governmental policy to serve its own selfish purposes.
When such a group gains control over the powers of government, the
common good is the first casualty. On republican assumptions, the common
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good is something different from the private good of any group, even a
majority, and the pursuit of self-interest by a ruling majority is thus by
definition not the pursuit of the common good. But even under the
assumptions of interest pluralism itself, an ethical system in which self-
interested behavior is to be praised rather than condemned, the winner-
take-all electoral apparatus thwarts the achievement of the common good as
interest pluralism conceives it. Interest pluralism is a utilitarian system in
which the common good is achieved through maximization of overall social
utility. By allowing a majority full control over the institutions of government
policy making, however, winner-take-all systems do not institute the
conditions necessary for the maximization of social utility. That would
require negotiation and trading among all significant social groups. Winner-
take-all systems, by giving all power to a majority, exclude the minority from
the councils of government and thus dispense altogether with the process of
compromise and negotiation between and among majorities and minorities
that the utilitarian calculus demands.3 6
This is, of course, exactly the kind of complaint that proportionalists so
frequently make about winner-take-all electoral systems. As we saw in section
I.C, proportionalists object to the way in which winner-take-all systems
exaggerate majority strength and deprive minorities of the kind of legislative
presence that would allow them to exert some influence on legislative
outcomes. For proportionalists, when winners take all they are taking
something to which they are not entitled; they are engaging in a cheap and
unprincipled grab for power. I hope to have shown here that what makes
this kind of result a power grab is not the winner-take-all electoral structure
itself, but rather a breakdown of its most critical assumption: instead of
behaving virtuously and in pursuit of the common good, political actors are
behaving badly by exploiting the electoral structure for the purpose of
pursuing their own private interests.
b. Populism
Populist Political Sociology. Let us now apply the same analysis to a
populist conception of the politics of virtue to see if things come out any
differently.-7 Like republicanism, populism contemplates an objective and
unitary common good and holds that the purpose of politics is to discover
and implement it. However, on the populist view, the people-usually
understood to mean a majority or plurality of the people-know better than
their elected representatives where the common good lies. The people thus
possess a substantial degree of competence; they are usually able, for
example, to evaluate the merits of competing policy alternatives and to
identify the alternative that most conduces to the common good. By
336. Issacharoff& Pildes, supra note 334.
337. This paragraph is condensed from the fuller discussion set out in Part lll.B.2.b supra.
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hypothesis, then, the main function of representatives is merely to press in
the legislature the policies that the people have determined to be in the
public interest. If representatives do not display this kind of loyalty--if they
exercise independence and are permitted to debate freely and to change
their views-then the system comes to resemble much more closely the
republican model.
The Best Electoral System for Populism. For much the same reasons as held
true for republicanism, winner-take-all electoral systems are the systems best
adapted to achieve the common good on the populist sociology of politics.
In a populist system, elections give the people the opportunity collectively to
identify the common good directly rather than merely the individuals who
will subsequently determine it through independent deliberation. Like
republicanism, populism assumes that the expected quality of the popular
decision increases with the number of decision makers. Consequently, as
with its republican counterpart, a populist politics of virtue is best conducted
utilizing an electoral system that maximizes the number of people consulted
and then gives to a majority of that group the broadest possible degree of
influence. A winner-take-all system, particularly an at-large system conducted
across large jurisdictions, fits the bill admirably.
Once again, PR has the potential to undermine the political system's
ability to achieve the common good as populism understands it. Under PR.,
small minorities would have the opportunity to determine for themselves
where the common good lies and to elect representatives committed to
pressing corresponding positions. Yet, on populist assumptions, these
minorities and the representatives they elect are likely to be wrong about the
content of the common good. Any electoral system that would deliberately
introduce into the legislature representatives committed to the advancement
of incorrect positions can only make it harder for the political process to
achieve the common good.
In some situations, the presence of these wrong-headed representatives
may make little difference to legislative outcomes. For example, if in a PR
election a popular majority is sufficiently large, its representatives may so
dominate the legislature as to have no need for the votes of representatives
committed to positions dictated by the minority. The smaller the majority,
however, the more often the votes of minority representatives might be
needed, and if the largest segment of the electorate amounts only to a
plurality then these additional votes become absolutely necessary. To attract
these votes, representatives of the majority or plurality might find themselves
called upon to engage in some form of compromising or vote trading with
representatives of the various minorities. Yet it is axiomatic on populist
assumptions that the majority possesses the truth, and the truth is not
something to be compromised or traded away in exchange for other
considerations. PR would thus force representatives to adopt an attitude
toward the common good that is inconsistent with the premises of a politics
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of virtue.
Populism on the Counterassumptions. If political actors should behave self-
interestedly instead of virtuously, a winner-take-all system adopted on the
assumptions of a populist sociology of politics would suffer from precisely
the same defects as one adopted on the assumptions of republicanism: it
would degenerate into a leveraged power grab by a popular majority bent on
advancing its own self-interest at the expense of the common good. A
winner-take-all system is designed to hand as much power as possible to a
majority on the assumption that such power will be put to good and proper
use. A popular majority or plurality that does not behave consistent with
these assumptions would have free rein to use the power of government for
selfish purposes. Again, the pursuit of self-interest is by definition contrary to
the populist conception of the common good, and the exaggerated
minimization of minority influence at the same time prevents the electoral
system from operating under conditions necessary to a fair and principled
interest pluralism.
In sum, winner-take-all electoral systems do a far better job than PR of
achieving the common good when politics is conducted as a politics of
virtue. Conversely, winner-take-all electoral systems do an extremely poorjob
of achieving the common good-on any conception of the common good,
political or pluralist-when politics is characterized by the pursuit of self-
interest. A winner-take-all electoral system, then, is not a particularly versatile
system; it works well only on one kind of political sociology and does not
work well on others.
2. Electoral Systems and the Politics of Self-Interest
The Political Sociology of Interest Pluralism. I turn now to the competing
conception of politics: politics as the pursuit of self-interest, as captured in
the model of interest pluralism. According to interest pluralism,"" the
common good is achieved through the maximization of social utility. 39 This
notion of the common good is in a sense objective,5 but it is not a common
good that can be reliably perceived either through ex ante contemplation or
by principled deliberation and reflection. Rather, the common good in a
system of interest pluralism can reliably be determined only by the political
system in action. Politics, on this model, achieves the common good
automatically when political actors engage in the mutual pursuit of self-
interest through a process of negotiation, compromise, and logrolling.
Consequently, the only way to get a fair share of the spoils, and thus to
338. This paragraph is condensed from the fuller discussion set out in supra Part IIA.
339. It is possible to conceive of a different kind of pluralism-call it raw pluralism-
consisting of a pure power struggle with no utilitarian payoff, a true Hobbesian system in which
all war against all. Because such a system depends entirely on strength and domination, and
thus holds no ethical interest, I shall not pursue it here.
340. PITKIN, supra note 33, at 200-05.
[20001
MADISON'S HOPE
attempt to maximize one's own utility (thereby contributing to the
maximization of overall utility) is to have one's interests represented directly
in the legislature.' This means that representatives must be lo),d to
constituents by attempting at every opportunity to advance their interests.
Representatives will do this out of political self-interest: because they seek
reelection, representatives will attempt to please voters, and voters will
respond either by rewarding representatives with additional terms or by
punishing them by turning them out of office.
The Best Electoral System for Interest Pluralism. On the assumptions of
interest pluralism, the common good can best be realized by adopting a PR
electoral system. As with republicanism, most of the work toward achieving
the common good in a system of interest pluralism occurs after the election,
within the legislature. In this case, however, the common good is hammered
out not in the disinterested deliberation of public-regarding representatives,
but in the give and take of legislative compromise, negotiation, and
logrolling, processes in which all legislators faithfully seek to advance the
private interests of their constituents. It follows that the most important
function of elections in a system of interest pluralism is to create the
conditions in the legislature most conducive to the accurate achievement of
maximal social utility.
On interest pluralist assumptions, the legislative process is likely to
maximize utility only when two conditions are fulfilled. First, the full
panoply of society's private interests must be represented and vigorously
advanced within the legislature.4 2 This condition is necessary to prevent
represented groups from unfairly distributing to unrepresented groups a
disproportionately low share of social benefits or saddling them with a
disproportionately large share of social costs, either of which would lower
overall utility. Second, social interests must be represented in rough
proportion to their social strength, which means generally that each interest
must be represented by a number of legislators proportional to the number
of voters who hold the interest. This condition is necessary to provide each
interest with an appropriate amount of legislative bargaining strength.
Utilitarianism holds that utility is maximized when resources are allocated to
those who are willing to pay the most for them. In the legislative setting, the
currency is votes. Premises of democratic equality, however, require that all
legislative votes count the same, both within the legislature and in terms of
the number of individuals represented by each vote.'"3 Consequently, the
most feasible way to translate the willingness to pay of represented interests
341. This ias certainly Mill's -ieu. See Mill, supra note 17, at 2 4-445, 303.-07; w ahs Gardner,
supra note 84, at 948-51. Mill's position, however, rests on some assumptions that may be
questionable. Id. at 951-56.
342. See supra note 110 (discussing Bentham's %iews on interest pluralism).
343. Or at least this is so according to some of the major philosophical models of political
fairness. SeeCHARLES R. BErTZ, PoLrriTQAL EQUALITY' AN ESSAYIN DELIOCriTICTEItRY (1989).
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into legislative resources with which to bargain is to provide for
proportionality in the representation of interests.
These conditions are obviously best satisfied by some kind of
proportional electoral system, and the more accurately votes are translated
into legislative strength, the better. Unlike other electoral systems, PR is
designed specifically to provide legislative representation to all significant
groups of voters."" It also contains mechanisms to adjust each group's
legislative strength proportionately to its popular support. Some PR systems,
such as the single-transferable vote, contain complex devices that make
them extremely sensitive to small changes in proportional support for
candidates.4 Thus, PR is well-suited to install a legislature that will be in a
good position to engage in the kind of bargaining that interest pluralism
contemplates.
For purposes of comparison, we may ask what would happen on the
political sociology of interest pluralism if we used a winner-take-all electoral
system instead of PR. As we have already seen, winner-take-all systems are
highly unlikely to achieve the common good when political actors behave
self-interestedly. Instead of producing the conditions for a fair and, on
interest pluralism's assumptions, principled form of pluralistic bargaining,
winner-take-all systems reward majorities or pluralities with complete control
over the apparatus of power. In so doing, winner-take-all systems make it
unnecessary for majorities to negotiate with minorities. Free from the need
to bargain and make trade-offs, majorities are free to institute policies that
maximize their own utility, but do not necessarily maximize the utility of
society as a whole. This problem would most likely manifest itself in a
shifting onto minorities of the external costs of political policies, but could
also show up in outright plunder, that is, in forcible wealth transfers from
the minority to the majority. Members of majority groups might benefit
greatly from policies adopted by majority action, but minorities might well
suffer losses of a magnitude that make the chosen policies inefficient from a
society-wide perspective. In sum, PR electoral systems are clearly better
suited than winner-take-all systems to achieve the common good on the
assumptions of interest pluralism.
Interest Pluralism on the Counterassumptions. Now let us consider what
would happen under a PR electoral system if the assumptions of interest
344. If the number of legislators is to be less than the number of voters, obviously not every
interest group will be able to muster the votes to elect a candidate. Thus, every PR system
contemplates some threshold vote total necessary to elect a candidate. The exclusion of small-
read "fringe" or "extremist"--groups inevitably introduces some degree of error into the
process by which politics maximizes social utility. However, this error can be adequately justified
on utilitarian premises because the exclusion of smaller groups reduces transaction costs by
allowing society to keep its legislature at a manageable size. Presumably, this gain in transaction
costs roughly offsets any errors resulting from the exclusion of groups that are too small to meet
the threshold requirement for election.
345. See DUIMriT, supra note 41, at 127-35.
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pluralism are violated and voters begin to behave virtuously rather than self-
interestedly. Instead of voting for the candidate whom they think will most
accurately advance their own private interests, suppose voters make sincere
and diligent efforts to cast votes on the basis of where they think the
common good lies. In these circumstances, the meaning of a candidate's
election is no longer clear. Some candidates might be elected to pursue
their constituents' private interests; others to advance policies that promote
the good of all; still others to use their best judgment independently for the
common good; and others yet for some variety of conflicting and
incompatible purposes. Ordinarily, we might be inclined to think that the
presence of virtue in politics-in any amount-is good. As Jeremy Waldron
has observed, however, things are not that simple:
This sounds as though it ought to make things better, since it
mitigates the centrifugal force of egoism in politics, but in fact it
makes things worse for the Benthamite theory of democracy. So
long as each voter decides on the basis of his own interest, some
chance exists that a majority decision might correspond roughly to
the aggregate happiness of society. But if large numbers are voting
on the basis of what they think the aggregate happiness demands
[i.e., on the basis of a belief about the common good], then the
whole thing falls apart. If some are voting that way and some are
voting selfishly, adding those votes to one another is like adding
chalk and cheese. And if all are voting selflessly, on the basis of
their personal perceptions of the general welfare, then we have no
aggregative reason for thinking that the majority decision tells us
anything new at all. Aggregation over individual votes makes some
sort of sense from the utilitarian point of view if votes represent
individual preferences. But it makes no sense at all from that point
of view if votes represent utilitarian opinions.l
In other words, for interest pluralism to work properly, all must behave
selfishly. A politics of virtue subverts pluralism's ability accurately to adjust
social benefits and burdens. A legislature assembled in this manner can be
expected to achieve the common good, on any set of assumptions, only
inadvertently or randomly. Moreover, as we have already seen, PR is
counterproductive even if all behave virtuously because it elevates to the
legislature mistakes made by popular minorities about the common good or
the qualifications of candidates. On the assumptions of republicanism or
populism, this result has a significant potential to undermine achievement
of the common good. PR electoral systems, then, are not particularly
versatile: they work exceedingly well on a pluralistic politics of self-interest,
346. Jeremy Waldron, Rights and Majorities: Roussau Rvisi&I4 in NOMOs, supra note 39, at
44, 49. Arrow makes much the same point in K5NN'-H J. ARROW, SOCL'J. CHoI0M Aa)
INDIVIDUALVALUES 85-86 (2d ed. 1963).
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but they work badly when political actors pursue a politics of virtue.
3. Summary
The preceding analysis shows that Madison's hope cannot be fulfilled
through the subconstitutional structuring of electoral systems. Winner-take-
all electoral systems perform admirably when it comes to nurturing political
virtue and allowing society to reap its benefits as fully as possible. In the
presence of a politics of self-interest, however, any winner-take-all system is at
grave risk of breaking down into a mechanism by which a self-interested
majority or plurality can seize the levers of power for the purpose of
advancing its own private interests at the expense of the common good.
Conversely, PR is extremely well-suited to handle a politics of self-interest. By
reproducing in the legislature a balance of legislative interests that
accurately reflects their distribution in society, PR creates the conditions for
a pluralism that will produce fair and utility-maximizing outcomes. When
political actors do not behave self-interestedly, however-when they behave
virtuously and make sincere efforts to use the political system to achieve the
common rather than their own private good-PR's ability to produce a fair
pluralism is severely undermined.
Neither system, then, is capable of doing what Madison hoped
democratic institutions would do: allow a politics of virtue to flourish and
contain and control a politics of self-interest. This means that in choosing an
electoral system we cannot escape the necessity of choosing among
conceptions of politics, or at least of choosing which conception of politics
will be favored by institutional circumstances. To choose an electoral system
is thus to put a thumb on the political scales. An electoral system is not
merely a passive receptacle for political behavior; it does not simply take
political behavior as it comes and convert it impartially into some version of
the common good. 7 Instead, the electoral system plays an important role in
347. Some political scientists who study electoral systems have acknowledged a similar
point. No electoral system is impartial, they argue, in the sense that it is merely a system that
takes and mechanically aggregates the electorate's preferences. What constitutes a "preference"
that ought to be aggregated, for example, is highly contestable and any choice in this respect is
typically referable to some underlying conception of what democratic politics ought to be
about. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 235 (1982) (observing that there
are many ways to amalgamate preferences; that they do not produce the same outcomes on the
same set of preferences; and that there is no one clearly superior method; each makes a claim
to superiority based on different features of fairness or efficiency and embodies "different
ethical principles"; as a result, "there is no fundamental reason of prudence or morality for
preferring the amalgamation produced by one method to the amalgamation produced by
another"); KATZ, DEMOCRACYAND ELECTIONS, supra note 119, at 279 (rejecting the possibility of
deciding which electoral system is most democratic and arguing instead that there is no single
answer because it depends on the "values to be encouraged" and "the political and social
environment in which one is working"). As Riker later observed in another context, "[m]utch of
the motivation for the invention of new electoral systems is a belief that a new method of
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constituting society's politics. A society that chooses PR will have little hope
of successfully producing a politics of virtue; a society that chooses inner-
take-all will have no good electoral defense against the concerted and
energetic pursuit of self-interest. Which do we prefer., to yield to our hopes
by making possible a politics of virtue; or to yield to our fears by consigning
ourselves to a politics of self-interest that is, if not virtuous, at least fair?
Designers of democratic institutions ought to have a clear idea of which
alternative they favor, and should choose an electoral system accordingly.
V. CONCLUSIONS: POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS IN THE 21ST CF.ITURy
The impossibility of fulfilling Madison's hope through the design of
electoral systems has several implications for any further consideration of
political structures and institutions. First, it may simply be that the
accomplishment of Madison's hope requires a broader, more systemic
approach in which the design of an electoral system is conceived as merely
one component of an integrated institutional design. Under such an
approach the promotion of political virtue might be allocated to the
electoral system, for example, while the containment of political self-interest
within the bounds of fairness might be assigned to some other institution. If
the electoral system can perform only one of these functions, deciding
which role it ought to perform might then depend on the availability and
capabilities of other institutions.
On this view, one argument for adopting a winner-take-all electoral
system might be that many constitutional institutions-bicameralism,
federalism, separation of powers, judicial review, and so on-are already
well-placed to thwart governmental action effectively. Given the adequacy of
these institutions at preventing any kind of political action, whether public-
regarding or self-interested, from bearing fruit, what might be needed to
balance the system is some institution that increases the chances for a
politics of virtue successfully to emerge. If so, a winner-take-all electoral
system might then be a sensible choice. Indeed, it is difficult to discern in
the Constitution, or even among subconstitutional political institutions,
other institutions that have much of a capacity to nurture political virtue.""
counting will resolve the inherent contradictions in opinions and values in society." William H.
Piker, Electoral Systems and Constitutional Restraints, in CHOOSING AN ELECTOLM. SMT1.l, supra
note 40, at 107.
348. Perhaps the party system might be capable of doing so, at least if it behaved consistent
vith the traditional responsible-party model of American political science. Ste RPu*Ev. supril
note 130; American Political Science Association, Toward a More lesponsible Two-party Sy tem, 44
AM. POL Sci. REv. Supp. (Sept. 1950). But there are good reasons to doubt whlether political
parties are capable of behaving in the way the responsible party model presupposes. A
substantial body of public choice literature claims that parties, like other political actors, behave
self-interestedly. See supra note 117 (noting the political science literature that discusses public
choice). It has been suggested that party behavior is best described by other models such as the
.catch-all" or "cartel" models in which parties, far from responding to and implementing
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Here, though, we might be justified in asking whether it is really within
the power of any institution to encourage political virtue at all. Institutions
may create the conditions in which political virtue may flourish when it
appears, but it must appear-it must be generated by citizens. As Judge
Hand wrote in a related context, "a society so riven that the spirit of
moderation is gone, no court can save; [and] a society where that spirit
flourishes, no court need save." 49 This view, if it is correct, points toward a
different allocation of social functions. If institutions cannot create virtue
but are capable, at least in some circumstances, of reining in the excesses of
a politics of self-interest, perhaps we should devote our institutions
uniformly to constraining self-interest and allocate the encouragement of
virtue to other areas of life such as education, either within the private realm
of the family, or in the semi-public one of schooling.
This conclusion, however, cannot stand because it rests on a false
distinction between public institutions and personal education. In fact, as
political theorists since Aristotle have observed, institutions educate.3 While
some of a citizen's education may be imparted directly through teaching
and other forms of direct instruction, much of it, as John Dewey has
persuasively argued, is not:
[T]he development within the young of the attitudes and
dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life of a
society cannot take place by direct conveyance of beliefs, emotions,
and knowledge. It takes place through the intermediary of the
environment. The environment consists of the sum total of
conditions which are concerned in the execution of the activity
characteristic of a living being. The social environment consists of
all the activities of fellow beings that are bound up in the carrying
on of the activities of any one of its members. It is truly educative in
popular wishes, aim primarily only to survive and will do whatever is necessary to assure their
own survival. See PETER MAIR, PARTY SYSTEM CHANGE: APPROACHES AND INTERPRETATIONS ci. 5
(1997). Recent developments in systems theory suggest a basis for understanding political
parties as "autopoietic" (self-sustaining) institutions. Some of these developments are described
in JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORiS 46-49 (1996). See alsoJames A. Gardner, Can
Party Politics Be Virtuous?, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 667 (2000) (arguing on structural grounds that a
virtuous party politics is possible, but unlikely).
349. Learned Hand, The Contribution of an IndependentJudiiaty to Civilization (1942), in THE
SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 155, 164 (3d ed., 1960). Justice Jackson similarly observed that the formal
separation of constitutional powers cannot "keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise
and timely in meeting its problems[;] ... only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping
through its fingers." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952)
(Jackson,J, concurring). An even more extreme position was taken by the political scientist
E.E. Schattschneider, who argued that political parties can and do routinely subvert even the
best-considered legal norms. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNNIFNT 12 (1942).
350. Aristotle argued, for example, that one of the most important jobs of the legislator is
.to ensure that his citizens become good men. He must therefore know what institutions will
produce this result." ARISTOTLE, supra note 91, bk. VII, ch. xiv, at 1333b32.
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its effect in the degree in which an individual shares or participates
in some conjoint activity. By doing his share in the associated
activity, the individual appropriates the purpose which actuates it,
becomes familiar with its methods and subject matters, acquires
needed skill, and is saturated with its emotional spirit.'
By living a certain kind of life, then, members of society become educated to
the society's values and beliefs.
This analysis requires us to ask what kind of education might be
provided by institutions designed to accommodate pluralism, and more
specifically whether such an education might work at cross-purposes with
and thus undermine, societal efforts to inculcate virtue at home and in
school. Surely there are good grounds for thinking that this would be the
case. Pluralistic institutions such as PR are designed in the expectation that
political actors will pursue their private self-interest, and indeed can be
utilized successfully only by actors behaving in just that way. Such institutions
thereby provide not only a structural incentive for the pursuit of self-interest,
but also an object social lesson which teaches that the pursuit of self-interest
is publicly expected, socially appropriate, and politically effective. In these
circumstances, it is difticult to see how pluralistic political institutions could
avoid undermining other efforts, at home or in school, to teach the young
that they ought to live public and political lives of virtue. Institutions
designed in the expectation of a politics of self-interest, then, may well
contribute to the fulfillment of those very expectations."
If these considerations counsel against a complete capitulation to
interest pluralism in the design of political institutions, they must be
weighed against a very different and potentially overwhelming
countervailing consideration: the possibility that institutions designed to
cultivate political virtue are simply inappropriate for the times in which wre
live. Those political institutions best suited to harvest public virtue-
institutions like majoritarianism, single-member districting, and winner-take-
all electoral systems-appeared during the Enlightenment at a time when a
belief in an objective and objectively knowable common good was part of
the standard intellectual equipment of the age. Since then, several
351. JOHN DEwEY, DE-MOCRACYAND EDUCATION 26 (1916).
352. Nancy Schwartz makes the complementary argument that winner-take-all, single-
member district s)stems "best promote[] citizenship." S(mHART., supra note 114, at 125.
Schwartz argues that political representation "is a process in which a people makes a choice
about how it will be recognized politically, and hence becomes self.conscious about who they
are collectively." To be constitutive, she argues, representation "must be rooted in local
constituencies" of place rather than interest. Single-member districts utilizing inner-take-all
elections, Schwartz maintains, "best encourage the development of political indihidualily, the
civic status of being a citizen who retains his or her own particular lo)aties yet ackno-.-ledges
membership in the whole. By having set boundaries to a district one defines a relevant
constituency notjust by one aspect of its life at a moment in time but rather by the totality of its
political life over the years." Id. at 129.
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important, interrelated developments have undermined, and perhaps wholly
discredited, the assumptions upon which those institutions originally were
founded.
In the political realm, the assumptions of eighteenth-century
republicanism soon yielded to a widespread belief in democratic equality.
Americans, to be sure, have never quite ceased to believe in political virtue
and the common good. Nevertheless, perhaps as early as the 1790s,s" but
certainly by the Jacksonian period,33 Americans came to accept equally the
notion that individuals and groups have distinct interests, and that the
pursuit of those interests is an entirely respectable object of political activity.
Indeed, the belief that different classes have different interests, when
combined with a general rejection of virtual representation, 3 led Americans
eventually to conclude that leaders could not know the interests of all classes
or transcend the interests of their own, an idea which in turn evolved into
calls for extension of the franchise)3
The extension of the franchise to previously excluded groups of white
males only eroded further the plausibility of the republican concept of a
politics of virtue by including within the polity voters who, by republican
standards, were incompetent to pursue political virtue themselves, "' and
who in all likelihood declined to practice an appropriately republican self-
abnegation in their personal or political lives. The declining competence of
the citizenry as America moved toward mass democracy in turn facilitated
rejection of the model of a virtuous politics.) At the same time, mass
democracy embraced the utilitarian article of faith that no one knows better
whether his shoe pinches than the man who wears it.'59 Consequently, the
citizens of this new mass democracy came to understand themselves to be
eminently competent-indeed, expert-in discerning their own self-interest.
353. See WOOD, RADICAUSM, supra note 156, at 255-67 (discussing the erosion of
disinterested political participation).
354. See WIEBE, SELF-RULE, supra note 193, at 79. Harry Watson places this transition
somewhat later in the nineteenth century. WATSON, supra note 196, at 48.
355. When British authorities invoked virtual representation to justify the
disenfranchisement of the American colonists, it "met at once with flat and universal rejection,
ultimately with derision." BAII.YN, supra note 174, at 167. See id. at 167-68, 173-74; see alsoJOHN
PHII.IIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AE OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 59-
60 (1989) (explaining American Whig arguments against virtual representation); PITKIN, supra
note 33, at 173-75 (supporting a distinction between the interests of the aristocracy and the
people).
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357. For example, most states eliminated property requirements for voting, requirements
originally justified by the belief that members of the economically dependent classes lacked the
independence and will to participate properly in political affairs. See RobertJ. Steinfeld, Properly
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This change in competencies further reinforced the tendency to see politics
in pluralist terms: as a forum for the pursuit and accommodation of
competing interests.
Parallel developments in the philosophical realm reinforced the impact
of these political developments on republican beliefs. During the nineteenth
century, skepticism toward the Enlightenment concept of objective truth
appeared everywhere, from Bentham's dismissal of natural law as "nonsense
on stilts"5 to Neitzsche's antifoundationalism.' Today, of course,
postmodernism utterly denies the existence of objective truths and deems
political judgments concerning truth and the common good to result from
the application of political power to social life. " '
Finally, two of the most dreadful historical episodes of the twentieth
century-World War II and the Gulag-furnished the world with the starkest
possible examples of what can go wrong when individuals armed with rigid
ideologies, and the sheer power to impose them on others, pursue their
conception of truth and the common good to its logical end. In his anti-
platonic polemic The Open Societ,, Karl Popper laid the blame for these
atrocities directly at the feet of a kind of "naive monism" to which the belief
in objective truth can lend itself. Democracies, Popper argued, are no
more entitled than tyrannies to claim that the outcome of their political
processes identifies the common good simply in virtue of the fact that the
decision is made by the people rather than a despots' and he arned
against "Utopian engineering" in any form, whether democratic or not!>7,
These developments raise an important question: is it possible for a
society that has experienced Jacksonian egalitarianism, the growth of
interest politics, universal suffrage, mass modern democracy, postmodern
philosophical skepticism, Nazism, and the Gulag to retain any significant
and contextually plausible belief in an objective common good? Is it possible
for politics in such a society to be conducted in any way other than the
universal pursuit of self-interest? Perhaps not. And if the beliefs underlying a
politics of virtue cannot be sustained, what is left to sustain political
institutions that are best justified by those beliefs? Perhaps, then, we ought
simply to discard winner-take-all and at-large electoral s)stems as quaint
relics of the Enlightenment.
And yet, it seems somehow premature to dismiss entirely the idea that
virtue-or some twenty-first-century reinvention of the idea of virtue-might
360. JEPEMYBENTHAM, ANARCHICAL FM±.LcIEs 489,501 (182.4).
361. See, for example, among many possible works, FRII)RICH NIlr/mv, TilL GLNL' L.ot
OF MORALS (1887).
362. See MAN LING LEE, supra note 169, at 5 (giving an overiew of posmnodem thought
regarding truth).
363. 1 KARLR. POPPER, THE OPEN SocIETYAN) ITS ENBIIES 59 (5th ed. 1966).
364. Id. at 125.
365. Id. at 157.
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play some meaningful role in political life, one that opposes the unmediated
political pursuit of self-interest. The proliferation of countertheories such as
civic republicanism, communitarianism, and discourse theory testify to the
longing for a politics that is more meaningful and more rewarding than the
politics interest pluralism promises to deliver and institutionalize. Certainly,
the task for political theory in the coming years is to restore virtue and the
common good to places of prominence without founding them upon
discredited conceptions of objective and objectively knowable truth.
